Jules Michael v. Clark Equipment Company, Clark Leasing Corporation and Clark Rental Corporation

Second Circuit

Jules Michael v. Clark Equipment Company, Clark Leasing Corporation and Clark Rental Corporation

380 F.2d 351, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 51, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5628

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJuly 13, 1967

Docket488, Docket 31219

StatusPublished

Cited by24 cases

This text of 380 F.2d 351 (Jules Michael v. Clark Equipment Company, Clark Leasing Corporation and Clark Rental Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jules Michael v. Clark Equipment Company, Clark Leasing Corporation and Clark Rental Corporation, 380 F.2d 351, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 51, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5628 (2d Cir. 1967).

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Opinions

HAYS, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. Two grounds were given by the district court for its action: (1) failure of the plaintiff to plead fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ¹ and (2) failure of plaintiff to comply with an order of the court to set [352]*352forth his causes of action clearly. (See Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc. 41(b)).

(1) Our examination of the complaint leads us to conclude that the allegations of fraud are sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b). It appears that the fault which the district court found with the pleading was not in fact addressed to particularization but rather to the inclusiveness of the plaintiff’s allegations and to their possible inconsistency. The plaintiff is at liberty to refuse to be pinned down to a single theory of fraud; and inconsistency is not a tenable objection to a pleading. See Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc. 8(e) (2).

(2) There is no justification in the Federal Rules for an order to a plaintiff “to set forth his cause of action clearly.” In the first place there is no requirement under the Rules that a complaint state a cause of action. The only relevant requirement is that of stating a claim on which relief can be granted. See Rules 8(a); 12(b). The order of the district court seems to have been designed to require something in the nature of a bill of particulars. But there is no requirement under the Rules that plaintiff provide a bill of particulars.

A great deal of time has been spent in this case in a struggle to get the plaintiff's pleading into better shape. As this court has often remarked, time spent in this way is usually wasted. See, e. g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). A better procedure than the so-called “trial” of “preliminary issues” would have been to proceed at once to a consideration of the merits either by means of a motion for summary judgment or of a full trial of the factual issues presented by the pleadings.

Reversed.

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HAYS, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. Two grounds were given by the district court for its action: (1) failure of the plaintiff to plead fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ¹ and (2) failure of plaintiff to comply with an order of the court to set [352]*352forth his causes of action clearly. (See Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc. 41(b)).

(1) Our examination of the complaint leads us to conclude that the allegations of fraud are sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b). It appears that the fault which the district court found with the pleading was not in fact addressed to particularization but rather to the inclusiveness of the plaintiff’s allegations and to their possible inconsistency. The plaintiff is at liberty to refuse to be pinned down to a single theory of fraud; and inconsistency is not a tenable objection to a pleading. See Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc. 8(e) (2).

(2) There is no justification in the Federal Rules for an order to a plaintiff “to set forth his cause of action clearly.” In the first place there is no requirement under the Rules that a complaint state a cause of action. The only relevant requirement is that of stating a claim on which relief can be granted. See Rules 8(a); 12(b). The order of the district court seems to have been designed to require something in the nature of a bill of particulars. But there is no requirement under the Rules that plaintiff provide a bill of particulars.

A great deal of time has been spent in this case in a struggle to get the plaintiff's pleading into better shape. As this court has often remarked, time spent in this way is usually wasted. See, e. g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). A better procedure than the so-called “trial” of “preliminary issues” would have been to proceed at once to a consideration of the merits either by means of a motion for summary judgment or of a full trial of the factual issues presented by the pleadings.

Reversed.

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380 F.2d 351, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 51, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5628, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jules-michael-v-clark-equipment-company-clark-leasing-corporation-and-ca2-1967.

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