UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-1046
JUDESHIEA QUARLES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
C.W. WEEKS, individually and officially,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:16-cv-00304-MR-WCM)
Submitted: June 1, 2020 Decided: June 16, 2020
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cheyenne N. Chambers, S. Luke Largess, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Alesha S. Brown, Patrick H. Flanagan, CRANFILL SUMNER & HARTZOG LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Judeshiea Quarles filed suit against C.W. Weeks for malicious prosecution under
North Carolina law and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). Quarles’ suit stemmed from
his state prosecution and acquittal for breaking and entering and larceny. The district court
granted summary judgment to Weeks after finding that Weeks was entitled to qualified
immunity and that Quarles’ state law claim failed on the merits. On appeal, Quarles argues
that the district court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to him, that
probable cause did not support his arrest, and that Weeks was not entitled to qualified
immunity. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment, “applying
the same legal standards as the district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Grutzmacher v. Howard
Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). To
withstand a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than
conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or
the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311
(4th Cir. 2013).
2 “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but
who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were
lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether
the plaintiff has demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v.
Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,
and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith
v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 “is properly understood as a Fourth
Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the
common law tort” of malicious prosecution. Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.
City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on
such a claim, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the
plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal
proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Weeks obtained a warrant to arrest Quarles and
that the jury subsequently found Quarles not guilty on all charges. Thus, we review
whether probable cause supported Quarles’ arrest.
“Probable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
3 caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed an
offense.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 555 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We evaluate probable cause under an objective standard, considering the totality of the
circumstances known to the officers at the time of the seizure and without consideration of
the subjective beliefs of the officers involved. See Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253
(4th Cir. 2017); see Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016).
Our review of the record demonstrates sufficient facts within Weeks’ knowledge to
establish probable cause. At the time Weeks obtained a warrant to arrest Quarles, Weeks
knew that an eyewitness identified Quarles as one of two perpetrators and that the
homeowner placed Quarles at the home two weeks before the break-in. Quarles,
nevertheless, asserts that the district court erroneously treated the magistrate judge’s arrest
warrant and the grand jury’s subsequent indictment as conclusively establishing probable
cause. Although a magistrate judge’s probable cause determination when issuing an arrest
warrant is entitled to great deference and a grand jury’s indictment conclusively establishes
probable cause, we conclude that Quarles’ argument is misplaced, as his arrest
independently was supported by probable cause. See Munday, 848 F.3d at 255.
Next, Quarles argues that Weeks misrepresented a witness’ statement and omitted
information when applying for Quarles’ arrest warrant. False statements or omissions
violate the Fourth Amendment only if they are both “material, that is, necessary to the
finding of probable cause,” and “made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the
truth.” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 357 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Reckless disregard can be evidenced” if the officer “entertained serious doubts
4 as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the
information he reported,” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted), or
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-1046
JUDESHIEA QUARLES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
C.W. WEEKS, individually and officially,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:16-cv-00304-MR-WCM)
Submitted: June 1, 2020 Decided: June 16, 2020
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cheyenne N. Chambers, S. Luke Largess, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Alesha S. Brown, Patrick H. Flanagan, CRANFILL SUMNER & HARTZOG LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Judeshiea Quarles filed suit against C.W. Weeks for malicious prosecution under
North Carolina law and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). Quarles’ suit stemmed from
his state prosecution and acquittal for breaking and entering and larceny. The district court
granted summary judgment to Weeks after finding that Weeks was entitled to qualified
immunity and that Quarles’ state law claim failed on the merits. On appeal, Quarles argues
that the district court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to him, that
probable cause did not support his arrest, and that Weeks was not entitled to qualified
immunity. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment, “applying
the same legal standards as the district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Grutzmacher v. Howard
Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). To
withstand a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than
conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or
the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311
(4th Cir. 2013).
2 “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but
who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were
lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether
the plaintiff has demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v.
Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,
and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith
v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 “is properly understood as a Fourth
Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the
common law tort” of malicious prosecution. Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.
City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on
such a claim, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the
plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal
proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Weeks obtained a warrant to arrest Quarles and
that the jury subsequently found Quarles not guilty on all charges. Thus, we review
whether probable cause supported Quarles’ arrest.
“Probable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
3 caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed an
offense.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 555 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We evaluate probable cause under an objective standard, considering the totality of the
circumstances known to the officers at the time of the seizure and without consideration of
the subjective beliefs of the officers involved. See Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253
(4th Cir. 2017); see Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016).
Our review of the record demonstrates sufficient facts within Weeks’ knowledge to
establish probable cause. At the time Weeks obtained a warrant to arrest Quarles, Weeks
knew that an eyewitness identified Quarles as one of two perpetrators and that the
homeowner placed Quarles at the home two weeks before the break-in. Quarles,
nevertheless, asserts that the district court erroneously treated the magistrate judge’s arrest
warrant and the grand jury’s subsequent indictment as conclusively establishing probable
cause. Although a magistrate judge’s probable cause determination when issuing an arrest
warrant is entitled to great deference and a grand jury’s indictment conclusively establishes
probable cause, we conclude that Quarles’ argument is misplaced, as his arrest
independently was supported by probable cause. See Munday, 848 F.3d at 255.
Next, Quarles argues that Weeks misrepresented a witness’ statement and omitted
information when applying for Quarles’ arrest warrant. False statements or omissions
violate the Fourth Amendment only if they are both “material, that is, necessary to the
finding of probable cause,” and “made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the
truth.” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 357 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Reckless disregard can be evidenced” if the officer “entertained serious doubts
4 as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the
information he reported,” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted), or
“failed to inform the judicial officer of facts he knew would negate probable cause,” Miller
v. Prince George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record reveals that, even if the information Weeks omitted and
misrepresented was material, Quarles failed to establish that Weeks acted deliberately or
with reckless disregard. See Miller, 475 F.3d at 627-28 (noting that “[a] plaintiff’s
allegations of negligence or innocent mistake by a police officer will not provide a basis
for a constitutional violation” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, because Quarles’ arrest was supported by probable cause, and did not violate
Quarles’ Fourth Amendment rights, Weeks was entitled to qualified immunity. See
Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 178.
Turning to Quarles’ state law claim, we have determined that the existence of
probable cause to arrest Quarles renders his malicious prosecution claim meritless. To
establish a claim for malicious prosecution under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant caused a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff without probable cause
and with malice, and that the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. See Evans v.
Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 657 (4th Cir. 2012). In determining whether probable cause
exists, the North Carolina Supreme Court employs the same totality of the circumstances
test utilized in a Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis. State v. Allman, 794 S.E.2d
301, 303 (N.C. 2016). Quarles correctly contends that under North Carolina law, the
5 issuance of an arrest warrant or indictment does not bar malicious prosecution claims as a
matter of law. See Turner v. Thomas, 794 S.E.2d 439, 445 (N.C. 2016); Johnson v.
Whittington, 255 S.E.2d 558, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). However, because Quarles’ arrest
was supported by probable cause, and Quarles cannot establish that Weeks acted with
malice when obtaining the arrest warrant, the district court properly granted summary
judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgement. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED