Judd v. Univ. of New Mexico

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 29, 2000
Docket99-2008
StatusPublished

This text of Judd v. Univ. of New Mexico (Judd v. Univ. of New Mexico) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Judd v. Univ. of New Mexico, (10th Cir. 2000).

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

KEITH JUDD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 99-2008

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO; DONALD GRADY, II; ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT; U.S. SECRET SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER Filed March 22, 2000

Before BALDOCK , HENRY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

On February 29, 2000, we entered an opinion dismissing Mr. Judd’s appeal

in this case for lack of jurisdiction and imposing appellate sanctions on him. Judd

v. University of New Mexico , No. 99-2008, 2000 WL 228298 (10th Cir. Feb. 29,

2000). Mr. Judd was given an opportunity to file objections to the sanctions, and

he has done so. We conclude that Mr. Judd’s objections to the proposed filing restrictions

lack merit. Accordingly, the restrictions set forth in our February 29, 2000

opinion shall take effect upon the date this order is filed.

Finally, upon its own motion, the court has determined that amendment of

the February 29, 2000 opinion is necessary. Accordingly, the court’s previous

opinion in this case is amended by deleting footnote two in its entirety. A copy of

the court’s amended opinion is attached to this order.

Entered for the Court

Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court

By: Keith Nelson Deputy Clerk

-2- F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH FEB 29 2000 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO; DONALD GRADY, II; ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT; U.S. SECRET SERVICE,

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO (D.C. No. CIV-93-740-LH)

Submitted on the briefs:

Keith Judd, pro se.

Norman F. Weiss, Simone, Roberts & Weiss, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee University of New Mexico.

Before BALDOCK , HENRY , MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK , Circuit Judge. In Judd v. University of New Mexico , No. 97-2273, 1998 WL 314315 (10th

Cir. Jun. 2, 1998) (unpublished disposition), we reversed the district court’s order

imposing filing restrictions on Mr. Judd, and remanded this case to the district

court. On February 9, 1999, the district court entered an order imposing amended

filing restrictions on Mr. Judd, from which he now appeals. 1 We lack jurisdiction

over Mr. Judd’s appeal, but we now announce additional filing restrictions in this

court on Mr. Judd.

1. Appellate jurisdiction

We consider first whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. The

district court entered its order proposing amended filing restrictions on

October 30, 1998. On December 17, 1998, Mr. Judd filed a notice of appeal from

the October 30, 1998 order. The notice of appeal was premature; the district

court’s order proposing sanctions was not a final, appealable order, because it did

not “end[] the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

-2- execute the judgment.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard , 486 U.S. 517, 521 (1988)

(quotation omitted). 2

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2), a premature notice of appeal may ripen

when the district court enters its final order. Mr. Judd’s notice of appeal did not

ripen when the district court entered its final order imposing filing restrictions on

February 9, 1999, however. The order proposing filing restrictions was subject to

Mr. Judd’s objections and therefore would not have been final even if

immediately followed by entry of judgment. See FirsTier Mortgage Co. v.

Investors Mortgage Ins. Co. , 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991) (“Rule 4(a)(2) permits a

notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of appeal from the

final judgment only when a district court announces a decision that would be

appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment.”) . We therefore

conclude that Mr. Judd’s December 17, 1998 notice of appeal was ineffective to

appeal from either the order proposing filing restrictions or the ultimate order

imposing filing restrictions. Cf., e.g. , Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of

Court , 148 F.3d 1272, 1273 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying FirsTier , holding that

2 Since our June 2, 1998 remand, Mr. Judd has filed a number of notices of appeal and amended notices of appeal purporting to appeal from the district court’s disposition of a motion for reconsideration which he filed in 1996. These untimely notices of appeal did not create jurisdiction in this court and are not properly before us.

-3- notice of appeal from magistrate judge’s recommendations did not ripen when

district court entered final judgment).

On April 5, 1999, Mr. Judd filed a second notice of appeal, this time from

the February 9, 1999 order. This notice of appeal was untimely. See

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (granting party thirty days from entry of order

appealed from to file notice of appeal). 3 It did not confer jurisdiction over this

court. We therefore lack jurisdiction over Mr. Judd’s appeal.

2. Prospective filing restrictions

In a previous decision in this case involving Mr. Judd, we detailed his

lengthy and abusive filing history in both the district court and this court. See

Judd v. University of N.M. , 1998 WL 314315, at **4. Because it appeared at that

time that the abusive history was “limited to pleadings filed in this case or against

these defendants,” id. , we limited the filing restrictions to “further filings from

appellant pertaining to this appeal” and “further appeals or original proceedings

relating to the parties and subject matter of this case filed by appellant,” id. at

**5.

3 Mr. Judd persists in arguing that he has sixty days to appeal because the United States Secret Service is a party to this action. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). However, the Secret Service was voluntarily dismissed from this case on May 16, 1994, and, as we recognized in a previous appeal, his argument lacks merit. See Judd v. University of N.M. , No. 94-2236, 1995 WL 228234, at **1 (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 1995) (unpublished disposition).

-4- Since the entry of our previous order, however, it has become clear that

Mr. Judd’s history of abusive filings is not limited to the parties or subject matter

of this case. In fact, Mr. Judd has filed numerous jurisdictionally defective

appeals with this court against a variety of other parties. See Judd v. Apfel ,

No. 98-2320 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 1999) (dismissed for lack of appellate

jurisdiction); Judd v. KOAT TV-7 , No. 98-2330 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999)

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