Judd Supply Co. v. Merchants & Manufacturers Insurance Co.

448 N.W.2d 895, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 1300, 1989 WL 148123
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedDecember 12, 1989
DocketC5-89-507
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 448 N.W.2d 895 (Judd Supply Co. v. Merchants & Manufacturers Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Judd Supply Co. v. Merchants & Manufacturers Insurance Co., 448 N.W.2d 895, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 1300, 1989 WL 148123 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

OPINION

NORTON, Judge.

The City of Princeton appeals a judgment awarding damages to former mechanics’ lienholders who foreclosed against a privately-owned parcel developed in part through tax increment financing. We reverse.

FACTS

This appeal arises after a tax increment financing-motivated construction project, begun within the City of Princeton in 1983, went awry. Appellant City of Princeton (“City”) had published a tax increment finance plan and designated a Development District (“District”) in accordance with Minn.Stat. ch. 472A (now replaced by Minn. Stat. ch. 469). Respondents either subcontracted or provided materials for the failed project.

Dickenson Bus Lines (“Dickenson”) was planning a bus remanufacturing plant for another city but was persuaded to instead consider a parcel in the District. Dicken-son was sold and the parent company, TU International, revived and expanded the project. Harold Becker formed and incorporated a construction company in order to become the developer of the project.

In early August, 1983, visible site improvement activity began, and Becker was receiving bids from subcontractors. It was subsequently established in a separate action that respondents’ mechanics’ liens attached at this time. No written agreements between Becker and the City or between Becker and TU or Dickenson had yet been executed.

The City intended to purchase the parcel for $100,000, and immediately sell the site to Becker for $1000 and write down $99,-000. Becker intended to enter into a purchase agreement with Dickenson, and to obtain construction financing for half the costs through a local bank, with the remaining costs supplied by Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs). The City expected to completely recover the write-down within two years, through increased taxes, after which the tax base of the City would be permanently improved. When Becker was unable to obtain a letter of credit, the City decided to require a performance bond, substantially in the form of a bond under Minn.Stat. § 574.26, to protect its $99,000 writedown. Work continued throughout this period.

In September, a Land Development Agreement (“LDA”) was executed by the City and Becker. The LDA provides for conveyance of the site and gives the City the right to reacquire the property if the project is not satisfactorily completed. At closing, the City purchased and then immediately conveyed the site to Becker. The two deeds and a construction financing mortgage were filed simultaneously the next day. The City owned the land for less than one minute.

In October, Becker and Dickenson executed a purchase agreement but Dicken-son's obligations were contingent upon the availability of both UDAGs and industrial revenue bonds. The UDAGs were unavailable and Dickenson terminated the agreement; the site was without a purchaser.

Throughout this time, construction continued. On January 25, 1984, respondent Varco-Pruden filed the first mechanics’ lien. Subcontractors and materials suppliers continued their work on the project; approximately thirty mechanics’ liens were eventually filed against the property.

The validity of Becker’s performance bond was disputed by the issuing company, which was subsequently liquidated. This action and a mechanics’ lien foreclosure action were begun; this action was held in abeyance pending the foreclosure action, to which the City was not a party. In foreclosure the issue was that of priority be *897 tween the mechanics’ liens and the construction financing mortgagee. The liens were held to have priority; Becker stipulated to the amounts of the liens. In April 1985, the court ordered foreclosure.

In June of 1985, the lienholders bid the full amounts of their liens and received title to the project. After the redemption period expired in 1986, the former lienhold-ers alleged that the property was worth less than their bid, and this lawsuit was revived. The former lienholders sought and failed to recover on the bond, and sought recovery from the City, alleging a duty to provide a bond for their benefit as third-party beneficiaries of the LDA between Becker and the City, or that the project was a public work for which the City was required to provide a bond pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 574.26 (1988).

The issue of whether the project was a public work was reserved, without dispute, for the court as a matter of law; the issues of fact regarding whether damage occurred, the value of the property, and the issues of negligence and apportionment of fault were tried before a jury. The jury returned its verdict that the City and the lienholders were all negligent, some in excess of the negligence of the City. The court determined that the project was a public work and denied any reduction in damages resulting from the verdict of contributory negligence, which reduction would otherwise apply pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 604.01 (1988). Judgment was entered against the City.

ISSUE

Did the trial court err in holding that the Dickenson project was a public work subject to the mandatory bond provisions of Minn.Stat. § 574.26?

DECISION

This court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions as to matters of law. A.J. Chromy Construction Co. v. Commercial Mechanical Services, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn.1977). Words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Minn.Stat. § 645.08, subd. 1 (1988).

The trial court committed a fundamental error when it chose to ignore the plain meaning of the Economic Development statutes in reaching its conclusion that the Dickenson project was a traditional public work. Private development is not transformed into “public work” simply because it receives public financial assistance. Rather, in enacting this comprehensive series of tax increment financing statutes, the legislature created a new way to stimulate private economic growth. Therefore, the proper analysis begins, as did the Dicken-son project, with the Municipal Industrial Development section of Minnesota Statutes ch. 469, Economic Development. This chapter governs tax base improvement through tax increment financing. Minn. Stat. § 469.152 is entitled "Purposes” and states in pertinent part:

The welfare of the state requires the active promotion, attraction, encouragement, and development of economically sound industry and commerce through governmental action * * *

Minn.Stat. § 469.152 (1988). The City’s plan parallels these statutes. Its stated objectives include creation of a major source of employment, expansion of the tax base and development and promotion of desirable industrial growth.

Section 469.153, “Definitions,” defines “project” to include “any properties, real or personal, used or useful in connection with a revenue-producing enterprise, * * * engaged in * * * manufacturing.” Minn. Stat. § 469.153, subd. 2 (1988). A bus re-manufacturing plant satisfies this definition. A municipality has the power to acquire, construct, or hold any land, improvements, capital equipment, or inventory that is necessary in connection with a project to be situated within the state, and construct, improve, and extend the project. Minn. Stat. § 469.155, subd. 2 (1988).

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Bluebook (online)
448 N.W.2d 895, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 1300, 1989 WL 148123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/judd-supply-co-v-merchants-manufacturers-insurance-co-minnctapp-1989.