Jubil Hikmah Khan v. Nordstrom Corporate Headquarters

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 2, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00236
StatusUnknown

This text of Jubil Hikmah Khan v. Nordstrom Corporate Headquarters (Jubil Hikmah Khan v. Nordstrom Corporate Headquarters) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jubil Hikmah Khan v. Nordstrom Corporate Headquarters, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JUBIL HIKMAH KHAN, Plaintiff, 25-CV-236 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NORDSTOM CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 and the “California Code of Regulations Title 2 Section 11062.” (ECF 1 at 1.) By order dated March 11, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this complaint against Nordstrom Corporate Headquarters, alleging that her former employer discriminated against her on the basis of her religion (“God given rights”) and national origin (“National American/indigenous “natural rights”). (ECF 1 at 3.) The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 During Plaintiff’s work day on May 1, 2024, she went to the café in a Nordstrom women’s store in Manhattan to eat her lunch. (ECF 1 at 9.) The store general manager told

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. Plaintiff that there were “break rooms” for employees and that she had to leave the café. There was “another person” in the café drinking coffee who was allowed to remain, but Plaintiff does not know if that individual “was an employee or a customer.” (Id.) Later that day, Plaintiff complained to a human resources (“HR”) representative about the way that the general manager

had spoken to her; the HR representative responded by saying that he “gets frustrated when employees don’t follow the rules,” and that the store policy was that employees are “not allowed to sit and eat” in the café. (Id.) In August 2024, while Plaintiff was on vacation, an HR manager came looking for Plaintiff in the stock room. A co-worker later told Plaintiff that the HR manager had said that Plaintiff needed to sign a document or risk “disciplinary action,” which Plaintiff alleges was retaliatory, unprofessional, and a violation of her privacy. (Id. at 10.) It appears that the document Plaintiff was required to sign was a “call monitoring privacy document.” (Id.) According to the complaint, all employees were required to download to their personal cell phones the “Microsoft Teams app” to enable them to communicate with other employees while at work. (Id.) On

September 16, 2024, Plaintiff complained to HR that she “believes they are discriminating against me because of my national origin by coercing me to sign the call monitoring privacy document. My employer told me that If I fail to sign this document by September 28th, 2024, my employment would be terminated September 29th 2024.” (Id.) Plaintiff was fired on September 27, 2024. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that her former employer discriminated against her, retaliated against her, and harassed her, and she seeks money damages. (Id. at 6.) The Equal Employment Opportunity Commissioner issued a notice of right to sue on October 16, 2024, and Plaintiff timely filed this complaint on January 5, 2025. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also filed a motion for discovery and a declaration in support of that motion. (ECF 7, 8.) DISCUSSION Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This antidiscrimination provision prohibits employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Jubil Hikmah Khan v. Nordstrom Corporate Headquarters, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jubil-hikmah-khan-v-nordstrom-corporate-headquarters-nysd-2025.