Juarez v. Ellison

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 3, 2023
Docket4:22-cv-04175
StatusUnknown

This text of Juarez v. Ellison (Juarez v. Ellison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Juarez v. Ellison, (C.D. Ill. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

ROBERT JUAREZ, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-04175-SLD-JEH ) MARVIN ELLISON, CHRISTINE E. ) WORMUTH, and BLAKE HALL, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER Pro se Plaintiff Robert Juarez brings suit against Marvin Ellison (the chief executive officer of Lowes), Christine E. Wormuth (the Secretary of the Army), and Blake Hall (the chief executive officer of ID me.com). See Compl. 1, 11, 22, ECF No. 1.1 The matter comes before the Court for screening. For the reasons that follow, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that he applied for and received a military discount at Lowes in June 2010. See id. at 4. He alleges that Lowes violated its store policy by failing to fully refund Plaintiff for mortar and concrete blocks. Id. at 4–5. Plaintiff further alleges that in 2022, he encountered unspecified issues in using his military discount at Lowes, which has caused Plaintiff stress because he thinks “Defendant(s) view [him] as if he is committing fraud or dis[]honoring military veteran(s).” See id. at 6 (capitalization altered). He alleges that he wrote to Ellison asking for assistance, but Ellison never replied. Id.

1 The Court is citing to ECF No. 1 as one complaint for purposes of this Order, notwithstanding that Plaintiff has set forth his claims against each Defendant in separate complaints. The Court uses the page numbers assigned by CM/ECF. Next, Plaintiff alleges that he was enlisted in the Army between July 23, 1968 and December 1968, when he was medically discharged, and that he did not receive his monthly compensation during that period. Id. at 12–13. He seeks to correct military records but does not specify what type of corrections he seeks to have made or to what records. See id. at 13.

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Lowes started using services from Hall to facilitate its military discount program. Id. at 23. He alleges that “ID me.[]com does not allow Plaintiff access to amend his record(s).” Id. at 24 (capitalization altered). He also alleges that Hall’s company failed to notify him that he would no longer be eligible for the discount program and that he never authorized Lowes to share his private information with outside parties. Id. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard “[D]istrict courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status.” Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). A court must dismiss a complaint if the court determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A court must also dismiss an action if it determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Moreover, a court may order a party to provide a more definite statement sua sponte. E.g., Mitchell v. Elec. Beach Tanning Salon Ltd., Case No. 18 C 7475, 2019 WL 1077127, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2019) (citing Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). II. Analysis There are a number of issues with Plaintiff’s complaint which necessitate repleading. First, and most importantly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to give Defendants and the Court “fair notice of what [his] . . . claim[s] [are] and the grounds upon which [they] rest[],” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). The Court cannot discern what Plaintiff’s claims are. For

example, Plaintiff does not specify what kind of issues he had using his military discount or which Defendant viewed him as committing fraud. Moreover, it is not clear what injury (or injuries) Plaintiff suffered by Ellison that he seeks relief for—the violation of store policy? An emotional harm from being ineligible for the military discount? Simply being ineligible for the discount? Failing to respond to his letter? Sharing private information (and, if so, what information)? The nature of his claim against Hall is similarly unclear. He vaguely mentions privacy concerns, contracts, a lack of notice, and an inability to correct records with ID me.com. He does not allege what records he wanted to correct with ID me.com or what role Hall played in his injuries. For similar reasons, his claim against Wormuth is unclear. He complains about failure to get monthly compensation in 1968, but the relief he seeks is correction of military records. He does not allege what records need to be corrected or with what information.2 And

though a “plaintiff is not required to plead . . . legal theories or cases or statutes,” Shah v. Inter- Cont’l Hotel Chi. Operating Corp., 314 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2002), because of the vagueness and ambiguity in the complaint, the Court cannot surmise what possible legal claims Plaintiff could have.3

2 The documents Plaintiff included along with this claim, see Compl. 15–16, further confuse the matter because they suggest no records exist. 3 Plaintiff did attach a printout of 45 C.F.R. § 5b.7 to his complaint, see Compl. 17–18, but that regulation applies to records of the Department of Health and Human Services. The only records Plaintiff seems to complain about are presumably Army records. Next, along those lines, Plaintiff fails to identify a basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. A federal court’s jurisdiction is limited to cases “authorized by Article III of the [United States] Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Buchel- Ruegsegger v. Buchel, 576 F.3d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area

Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). Generally, this court has the authority to hear two types of cases: (1) those in which a plaintiff alleges a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) those in which a citizen of one state alleges a violation of his rights established under state law by a citizen of another state where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32. Because Plaintiff’s claims are unclear, it is unclear whether the complaint invokes federal law or whether Plaintiff is relying on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. If he is relying on diversity jurisdiction, he fails to allege the citizenship of any of the parties. Lastly, Plaintiff has set forth his claims against each Defendant in what appear to be separate complaints. Compare, e.g., Compl. 1–7 (including a case caption that lists only Ellison

as a defendant and then setting forth claims that are purportedly only against Ellison), with id. at 11–13 (including a case caption that lists only Wormuth as a defendant and then setting forth claims that are purportedly only against Wormuth).

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Bender v. Williamsport Area School District
475 U.S. 534 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Valerie Bennett v. Marie Schmidt
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Büchel-Ruegsegger v. Buechel
576 F.3d 451 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
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Juarez v. Ellison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/juarez-v-ellison-ilcd-2023.