NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0176n.06
No. 23-1797
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: JUANNELIOUS BENJAMIN MURRAY, SR., ) FILED ) Debtor. ) Apr 19, 2024 ____________________________________________ ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk JUANNELIOUS BENJAMIN MURRAY, SR., ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT STEVEN A. FINEGOOD, ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN Interested Party-Appellant, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) v. ) OPINION ) SAFIR LAW P.L.C., ) ) Defendant-Appellee. ) )
BEFORE: COLE, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
We have seen this case twice before, each time affirming the bankruptcy court’s handling
of plaintiff’s unmeritorious claims. It now returns again, this time on review of the district court’s
imposition of sanctions against plaintiff and his attorney. We affirm.
I.
In 2015, defendant Safir Law represented plaintiff Juannelious Murray in an automobile-
negligence action against Allstate Insurance Company for no-fault benefits under Michigan law.
With Murray’s authorization, Safir Law settled the case and negotiated with each of his medical No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
providers to reduce his medical debt. Murray’s negotiated debt, his attorney fees, and other
administrative fees were to be paid from the settlement proceeds.
Unbeknownst to Safir Law, in 2016, Murray separately commenced a Chapter 13
bankruptcy case shortly after Safir Law filed the automobile-negligence action. Murray first
advised Safir Law of his bankruptcy case in August 2016 when he was at Safir Law’s office to
sign the settlement agreement. The bankruptcy court dismissed Murray’s case on October 20,
2016, for Murray’s failure to make proposed plan payments. Eight days later, the state court
approved the settlement agreement in Murray’s automobile-negligence suit, and Safir Law
subsequently received the settlement proceeds from Allstate. In November 2016, Safir Law paid
Murray’s medical debts from the settlement proceeds.
In 2018, Murray’s current attorney, Steven A. Finegood, filed a five-count state-court
complaint on behalf of Murray against Safir Law, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, conversion,
fraud, and malpractice related to Safir Law’s distribution of the automobile-negligence suit’s
settlement proceeds and interplay between that case and his 2016 bankruptcy case. The complaint
alleged, without supporting facts or evidence, that Safir Law “improperly embezzled or converted”
a majority of the settlement proceeds rather than paying Murray’s medical providers. Given the
indisputable evidence that Safir Law appropriately paid Murray’s medical providers in accordance
with the court order, the state court granted summary disposition to Safir Law on counts 1–4 of
the complaint, sanctioned Finegood for failing to determine whether the supporting allegations
were grounded in fact prior to filing suit, and sealed the complaint to protect Safir Law’s
reputational interests. Safir Law then moved for summary disposition on, and for sanctions related
to, count 5, which alleged that Safir Law had not “take[n] reasonable steps to protect [Murray’s]
interests as a bankruptcy debtor” by failing to move the state court “to enter a proper order
-2- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
regarding remittance of the parties’ settlement” in the automobile-negligence case and to prevent
Safir Law from “taking any payment of attorney fee[s] that had not been earned or authorized” by
the bankruptcy court. Although Murray failed to respond to the motion, the state court set a motion
hearing for March 2019.
The day before the scheduled motion hearing, Murray, represented by Finegood, moved to
reopen the 2016 bankruptcy case and then attempted to remove the 2018 state-court case against
Safir Law to bankruptcy court. This removal caused the state court to administratively close the
case before the motion hearing.1
Although the bankruptcy court originally reopened Murray’s 2016 bankruptcy case, it
vacated that order because Murray had an additional pending bankruptcy proceeding (which he
filed in March 2019), and he was not permitted to have two open bankruptcy cases. In the 2019
bankruptcy case, Murray filed a six-count adversary complaint against Safir Law, again
challenging Safir Law’s facilitation of the distribution of the automobile-negligence case’s
settlement proceeds. Before Safir Law even answered the adversary complaint, the bankruptcy
court dismissed Murray’s 2019 bankruptcy case and adversary complaint for failure to make plan
payments, and it also enjoined Murray from filing any bankruptcy proceedings for 180 days.
Murray, through Finegood, appealed the dismissal of his adversary complaint (not the
underlying 2019 bankruptcy case) to federal district court, which affirmed on lack-of-subject-
matter-jurisdiction grounds. See In re Murray, 2020 WL 5291964, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4,
2020). Murray appealed that decision to us, and although we affirmed the dismissal of five of the
six counts, we remanded count two to the bankruptcy court “so that it may exercise its discretion
1 Finegood allegedly attempted to remove the case to bankruptcy court because he had failed to file a response to the motion for summary disposition in state court. -3- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
to consider whether to retain residual jurisdiction over count two.” In re Murray, 2021 WL
4026732, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2021). We instructed the bankruptcy court to consider “[f]our
factors [to] guide that discretion: ‘economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. at *5
(quoting Peabody Landscape Constr. Inc. v. Schottenstein, 371 B.R. 276, 281 (S.D. Ohio 2007)).
On remand, the bankruptcy court declined to exercise jurisdiction. It found that count two
had little merit because: (1) there was no bankruptcy estate at the time of the settlement to which
Safir Law could turn over the funds; (2) the settlement proceeds were never property of the
bankruptcy estate so no violation of the automatic stay occurred; and (3) Safir Law neither
represented Murray in the 2016 bankruptcy case nor received proceeds during that case, so there
was no attorney-fee issue. The bankruptcy court noted that these types of claims are more
appropriately pursued in state court, which Murray could have done had he not “improperly
removed” the state-court claims against Safir Law to the bankruptcy court. Indeed, the bankruptcy
court recognized that Finegood appeared to have engaged in “forum shopping” after “[h]aving
failed to file a response to [Safir Law’s motion for summary disposition] in state court.” It also
found that the four factors weighed against retaining jurisdiction, and doing so would have been a
“bad policy,” given that a bankruptcy estate no longer existed. The bankruptcy court concluded
that granting Murray—“a serial filer that has no intent to repay creditors”—his requested relief
“would result in a windfall to [Murray] with no requirement to pay any of his creditors with the
funds, [which would be] an unfair result.”
Murray (still represented by Finegood) appealed to the federal district court, which
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. In re Murray, 2022 WL 1714623, at *10 (E.D. Mich.
May 27, 2022). The district court noted that Murray “fail[ed] to directly address the bankruptcy
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0176n.06
No. 23-1797
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: JUANNELIOUS BENJAMIN MURRAY, SR., ) FILED ) Debtor. ) Apr 19, 2024 ____________________________________________ ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk JUANNELIOUS BENJAMIN MURRAY, SR., ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT STEVEN A. FINEGOOD, ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN Interested Party-Appellant, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) v. ) OPINION ) SAFIR LAW P.L.C., ) ) Defendant-Appellee. ) )
BEFORE: COLE, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
We have seen this case twice before, each time affirming the bankruptcy court’s handling
of plaintiff’s unmeritorious claims. It now returns again, this time on review of the district court’s
imposition of sanctions against plaintiff and his attorney. We affirm.
I.
In 2015, defendant Safir Law represented plaintiff Juannelious Murray in an automobile-
negligence action against Allstate Insurance Company for no-fault benefits under Michigan law.
With Murray’s authorization, Safir Law settled the case and negotiated with each of his medical No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
providers to reduce his medical debt. Murray’s negotiated debt, his attorney fees, and other
administrative fees were to be paid from the settlement proceeds.
Unbeknownst to Safir Law, in 2016, Murray separately commenced a Chapter 13
bankruptcy case shortly after Safir Law filed the automobile-negligence action. Murray first
advised Safir Law of his bankruptcy case in August 2016 when he was at Safir Law’s office to
sign the settlement agreement. The bankruptcy court dismissed Murray’s case on October 20,
2016, for Murray’s failure to make proposed plan payments. Eight days later, the state court
approved the settlement agreement in Murray’s automobile-negligence suit, and Safir Law
subsequently received the settlement proceeds from Allstate. In November 2016, Safir Law paid
Murray’s medical debts from the settlement proceeds.
In 2018, Murray’s current attorney, Steven A. Finegood, filed a five-count state-court
complaint on behalf of Murray against Safir Law, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, conversion,
fraud, and malpractice related to Safir Law’s distribution of the automobile-negligence suit’s
settlement proceeds and interplay between that case and his 2016 bankruptcy case. The complaint
alleged, without supporting facts or evidence, that Safir Law “improperly embezzled or converted”
a majority of the settlement proceeds rather than paying Murray’s medical providers. Given the
indisputable evidence that Safir Law appropriately paid Murray’s medical providers in accordance
with the court order, the state court granted summary disposition to Safir Law on counts 1–4 of
the complaint, sanctioned Finegood for failing to determine whether the supporting allegations
were grounded in fact prior to filing suit, and sealed the complaint to protect Safir Law’s
reputational interests. Safir Law then moved for summary disposition on, and for sanctions related
to, count 5, which alleged that Safir Law had not “take[n] reasonable steps to protect [Murray’s]
interests as a bankruptcy debtor” by failing to move the state court “to enter a proper order
-2- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
regarding remittance of the parties’ settlement” in the automobile-negligence case and to prevent
Safir Law from “taking any payment of attorney fee[s] that had not been earned or authorized” by
the bankruptcy court. Although Murray failed to respond to the motion, the state court set a motion
hearing for March 2019.
The day before the scheduled motion hearing, Murray, represented by Finegood, moved to
reopen the 2016 bankruptcy case and then attempted to remove the 2018 state-court case against
Safir Law to bankruptcy court. This removal caused the state court to administratively close the
case before the motion hearing.1
Although the bankruptcy court originally reopened Murray’s 2016 bankruptcy case, it
vacated that order because Murray had an additional pending bankruptcy proceeding (which he
filed in March 2019), and he was not permitted to have two open bankruptcy cases. In the 2019
bankruptcy case, Murray filed a six-count adversary complaint against Safir Law, again
challenging Safir Law’s facilitation of the distribution of the automobile-negligence case’s
settlement proceeds. Before Safir Law even answered the adversary complaint, the bankruptcy
court dismissed Murray’s 2019 bankruptcy case and adversary complaint for failure to make plan
payments, and it also enjoined Murray from filing any bankruptcy proceedings for 180 days.
Murray, through Finegood, appealed the dismissal of his adversary complaint (not the
underlying 2019 bankruptcy case) to federal district court, which affirmed on lack-of-subject-
matter-jurisdiction grounds. See In re Murray, 2020 WL 5291964, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4,
2020). Murray appealed that decision to us, and although we affirmed the dismissal of five of the
six counts, we remanded count two to the bankruptcy court “so that it may exercise its discretion
1 Finegood allegedly attempted to remove the case to bankruptcy court because he had failed to file a response to the motion for summary disposition in state court. -3- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
to consider whether to retain residual jurisdiction over count two.” In re Murray, 2021 WL
4026732, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2021). We instructed the bankruptcy court to consider “[f]our
factors [to] guide that discretion: ‘economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. at *5
(quoting Peabody Landscape Constr. Inc. v. Schottenstein, 371 B.R. 276, 281 (S.D. Ohio 2007)).
On remand, the bankruptcy court declined to exercise jurisdiction. It found that count two
had little merit because: (1) there was no bankruptcy estate at the time of the settlement to which
Safir Law could turn over the funds; (2) the settlement proceeds were never property of the
bankruptcy estate so no violation of the automatic stay occurred; and (3) Safir Law neither
represented Murray in the 2016 bankruptcy case nor received proceeds during that case, so there
was no attorney-fee issue. The bankruptcy court noted that these types of claims are more
appropriately pursued in state court, which Murray could have done had he not “improperly
removed” the state-court claims against Safir Law to the bankruptcy court. Indeed, the bankruptcy
court recognized that Finegood appeared to have engaged in “forum shopping” after “[h]aving
failed to file a response to [Safir Law’s motion for summary disposition] in state court.” It also
found that the four factors weighed against retaining jurisdiction, and doing so would have been a
“bad policy,” given that a bankruptcy estate no longer existed. The bankruptcy court concluded
that granting Murray—“a serial filer that has no intent to repay creditors”—his requested relief
“would result in a windfall to [Murray] with no requirement to pay any of his creditors with the
funds, [which would be] an unfair result.”
Murray (still represented by Finegood) appealed to the federal district court, which
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. In re Murray, 2022 WL 1714623, at *10 (E.D. Mich.
May 27, 2022). The district court noted that Murray “fail[ed] to directly address the bankruptcy
court’s rulings or explain how the bankruptcy court abused its discretion, and he in fact never
-4- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
mention[ed] the four factors, let alone even use[d] the words ‘economy,’ ‘convenience,’ ‘fairness,’
or ‘comity’ anywhere in his opening brief,” despite our specific remand order. Id. at *8. Murray
then appealed that order to us, and we affirmed. In re Murray, 2023 WL 2682372, at *2 (6th Cir.
Mar. 29, 2023). Like the district court, we found that Murray “fail[ed] to provide a particularized
analysis as to how the bankruptcy court erred in considering those [four] factors (per our prior
instruction) and in determining their applicability.” Id. Murray filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Murray v. Safir Law P.L.C.,
144 S. Ct. 289 (2023) (mem.).
Meanwhile, Safir Law moved for sanctions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, against Murray and Finegood in district court. The district
court exercised its discretion and awarded sanctions under both authorities as follows: (1) $5,000
against Murray and Finegood, jointly and severally, under Rule 8020; and (2) $5,000 against
Finegood under § 1927. Declining to consider Murray and Finegood’s conduct in a vacuum, the
district court assessed their conduct throughout the entirety of Murray’s legal proceedings relevant
to Safir Law, noting that Murray (through Finegood) is a serial filer of bankruptcy petitions,
continuously failed to raise adequate arguments or argue the appropriate standard of review,
engaged in forum shopping and improper removal, failed to set forth good-faith bases challenging
the courts’ discretionary rulings, raised numerous frivolous arguments, and unreasonably and
vexatiously multiplied the proceedings for the purpose of harassment or delay. This conduct,
concluded the district court, caused Safir Law to incur unnecessary attorney fees, expenses, and
effort. Murray and Finegood timely appealed.
-5- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
II.
We review the district court’s sanctions order for abuse of discretion. See In re Reese, 485
F. App’x 32, 35 (6th Cir. 2012) (reviewing Rule 8020 sanctions); Followell v. Mills, 317 F. App’x
501, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2009) (reviewing § 1927 sanctions). An abuse of discretion occurs “when
the district court applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies
on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Mich. Div.-Monument Builders of N. Am. v. Mich. Cemetery
Ass’n, 524 F.3d 726, 739 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Rule 8020 allows district courts (sitting as appellate courts) to “award just damages” to the
appellee if an appeal from a bankruptcy order is frivolous. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020(a). We have
recognized that this “rule is materially the same as Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38,” and
we therefore look to cases applying Rule 38 when reviewing a district court’s sanctions order under
Rule 8020. Reese, 485 F. App’x at 35; see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 advisory committee’s note
to 1997 amendment. Rule 38 allows for sanctions when an appeal involves an improper purpose—
such as harassment or delay—or consists of improperly raised or meritless arguments. Reese, 485
F. App’x at 35 (discussing Rule 38); B & H Med., L.L.C. v. ABP Admin., Inc., 526 F.3d 257, 270
(6th Cir. 2008).
Further, § 1927 allows federal courts to impose sanctions against attorneys for
“unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplying the proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1927; see also Maloof
v. Level Propane Gasses, Inc., 316 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Sanctions are
warranted “when an attorney objectively falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the
bar to the court.” Kidis v. Reid, 976 F.3d 708, 723 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “While subjective bad faith is not required, the attorney in question must at least
knowingly disregard the risk of abusing the judicial system, not be merely negligent.” Id.
-6- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Safir Law’s motion for sanctions.
The bankruptcy court thoroughly detailed why Murray’s claims under count two of his adversary
complaint lacked merit, as well as why it would have been “bad policy” to exercise residual
jurisdiction over these meritless claims, especially given Murray’s improper removal and forum
shopping. Despite the bankruptcy court’s thoughtful and deliberate reasoning in making this
discretionary decision, Murray appealed to the district court. His deficient filings failed to even
argue that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion, let alone address the four residual-jurisdiction
factors specifically directed for consideration on remand. Instead, he continued to raise patently
false allegations that Safir Law “refused to deliver” the settlement proceeds from his automobile-
negligence action, which had been rejected by multiple courts. Still not satisfied, Murray appealed
to us, again failing to make arguments under the relevant factors.
For the reasons in the bankruptcy court’s decision dismissing Murray’s adversary
complaint, Murray and Finegood should have known that the claims under count two were
meritless. And by continuing to pursue these claims through the district court, circuit court, and
even a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, they, at minimum, “knowingly
disregard[ed] the risk of abusing the judicial system,” and thereby unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplied these proceedings. Id. at 723. Moreover, as evidenced by their baseless state-court
malpractice suit against Safir Law, improper attempted removal of that lawsuit to remedy
Finegood’s failure to respond to a dispositive motion, and consequential forum shopping, Murray
and Finegood at least possessed an improper purpose in abusing the judicial system. Murray and
Finegood have failed to provide any reason why the district court abused its discretion in awarding
-7- No. 23-1797, Murray, et al. v. Safir Law P.L.C.
sanctions, and they do not dispute the amount awarded.2 Safir Law is entitled to sanctions for the
fees and time it incurred in litigating against these frivolous claims.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s sanctions order.
2 Notably, the amount in sanctions the district court awarded to Safir Law is less than the amount requested. -8-