Juan v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: June 21, 2023
• Docket: 20-1581
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

20-1581 Juan v. Garland BIA Vomacka, IJ A206 445 905

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of June, two thousand twenty- three.

PRESENT: MICHAEL H. PARK, ALISON J. NATHAN, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ LIN CHAN JUAN, AKA CHUN JUAN LIN, Petitioner,

v. 20-1581 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Meer M. M. Rahman, Esq., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director; Joseph A. O’Connell, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Lin Chan Juan, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

China, seeks review of an April 23, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming a July 16,

2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). In re Lin Chan Juan, No. A206 445 905 (B.I.A. Apr. 23, 2020), aff’g No.

A206 445 905 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 16, 2018). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the

grounds for the denial of relief that the BIA did not rely on. See Xue Hong Yang v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The Petitioner’s challenge to

the adverse credibility determination is cursory and does not establish error in the

2 agency’s decision. She does not acknowledge or contest the inconsistencies relied

on by the agency, but summarily asserts that her testimony should have been

found credible. Accordingly, we defer to the agency’s adverse credibility

determination. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that

petitioner could only disprove his previous inconsistencies by “demonstrat[ing]

that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony” (cleaned

up)).

Moreover, our review of the record and the agency’s decisions reveals

substantial evidence for that determination given inconsistencies in the

Petitioner’s statements regarding whether the police physically assaulted her

during a church raid and whether anyone was arrested, and inconsistencies

between Petitioner’s and her husband’s statement regarding the year of the

alleged forced sterilization and whether she was in hiding for three years. See Likai

Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency

might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him

credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Xiu

Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We defer . . . to an IJ’s

3 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain

that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”).

The Petitioner also asserted a fear of future persecution because of her

continuing practice of Christianity, and the agency addressed that claim separately

from the adverse credibility determination. To establish a well-founded fear of

persecution, an applicant must show that “h[er] fear is objectively reasonable.”

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). “Objective

reasonableness entails a showing that a reasonable person in the petitioner’s

circumstances would fear persecution if returned to [her] native country.” Jian

Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2005). A fear “may be well-

founded even if there is only a slight, though discernible, chance of persecution.”

Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000). But a fear is not objectively

reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at

best.” Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129.

Although the Petitioner asserts that she will attend illegal house churches if

she is removed and the Chinese government will become aware of her Christianity

because she will proselytize, her evidence does not contradict the agency’s

conclusion that she would not likely practice in such a way as to come to the

4 attention of authorities in China and be persecuted as a result. The country

conditions evidence does not establish a “pattern or practice” of persecution of

“similarly situated” Christians. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). A pattern or practice

claim requires demonstration of “systemic or pervasive” persecution. In re A-M-,

23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005); see also Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 &

n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying petition where agency considered background

materials and rejected pattern or practice claim because persecution was not

systemic or pervasive). Where, as here, the treatment of Christians varies

throughout China, the Petitioner had the burden to demonstrate a pattern or

practice in her home province of Fujian. See Jian Liang v. Garland, 10 F.4th 106, 117

(2d Cir. 2021) (upholding agency’s decision that there was no “pervasive pattern

of persecution” of Christians across China or in Fujian Province specifically); Jian

Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 165–66, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the BIA

did not err in requiring localized evidence of persecution when the record

reflected wide variances in enforcement of family planning policies). As the

agency found, the Petitioner did not meet her burden of proof because there was

no evidence of persecution of Christians in Fujian Province. To the extent the

Petitioner argues that she has a lower burden of proof, “[w]e reject [her] request

5 that we adopt the Ninth Circuit’s ‘disfavored group’ analysis.” Johanes v. Holder,

358 F. App’x 280, 282 n.2 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court