Juan Francisco Gonzalez-Monreal v. Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, et al.
Opinion
JUAN FRANCISCO GONZALEZ- Case No.: 26-cv-1577-RSH-JLB MONREAL, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION Petitioner, v. [ECF Nos. 2, 3] PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, et al., Respondents.
On March 12, 2026, petitioner Juan Francisco Gonzalez Monreal filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner has also filed motions to appoint counsel and for a temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 2, 3. Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (the “Habeas Rules”) requires summary | ||dismissal of a federal habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” See also Habeas Rule 1(b) (permitting district courts to apply Habeas Rules to Section 2241 habeas proceedings); Lane v. Feather, 584 F. App’x 843, 843 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s application of Habeas Rule 4 to dismiss Section 2241 petition). Petitioner alleges that he was arrested and taken into immigration custody on October 20, 2025, and is currently detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San || Diego, California, pending his removal hearing. ECF No. | at 1. Petitioner contends that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), he must be released from immigration custody because there is no significant likelihood that can be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. ECF No. | at 1-2. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court construed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statutory provision authorizing detention of a noncitizen subject to a final order of removal beyond the 90-day removal period, and concluded that the “statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits /an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Jd. at 689. However, Zadvydas does not apply here because Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal; instead, he is awaiting his /removal hearing. Nor does the length of Petitioner’s custody to date—less than five months—without more raise due process concerns of prolonged detention. Accordingly, the Petition is DISMISSED. In light of this disposition, the Court DENIES as moot Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel [ECF No. 2] and motion for a temporary restraining order [ECF No. 3]. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. Dated: March 16, 2026 [eebuet Home %6 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge
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Juan Francisco Gonzalez-Monreal v. Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, et al. (Juan Francisco Gonzalez-Monreal v. Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.