1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Juan De Dios Armenta Soto, No. CV-25-04178-PHX-MTL (MTM)
10 Petitioner, ORDER
11 v.
12 Kristi Noem, et al.,
13 Respondents. 14 15 Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under § 2241 16 challenging his immigration detention.1 (Doc. 11.) Petitioner also filed an Emergency 17 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 2.) The Court ordered expedited briefing of the 18 Petition and Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 7.) The Amended Petition and 19 Motion are fully briefed. (Docs. 16-17.) For the reasons that follow, the Amended Petition 20 is granted, and Respondents must either release Petitioner from custody or provide a bond 21 hearing within ten days. 22 I. Background 23 Petitioner was born in Mexico in 1964. (Doc. 16, Ex. A, Michie Decl. ¶ 3), 24 Following several voluntary removals from the United States, Petitioner reentered the 25 United States in 2008. (Id. ¶¶ 4-7; Doc. 11 ¶ 43.) He was encountered by Border Patrol 26 on August 5, 2019, taken into custody, and issued a Notice to Appear. (Id. ¶ 44.) On 27 August 22, 2019, Petitioner was released from immigration custody on a $5,000 bond. (Id.)
28 1 Petitioner’s Amended Petition is substantively identical to his original Petition except that it names two previously unidentified John Doe Respondents. 1 His removal proceedings were ultimately dismissed due to issuance of Military Parole in 2 Place. (Id.) Immigrations and Customs Enforcement encountered Petitioner and arrested 3 him on September 19, 2025. (Id. ¶ 47.) ICE issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner 4 with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). 5 (Id. ¶ 48.) 6 Petitioner requested custody redetermination, which was denied on November 4, 7 2025. (Id. ¶ 50.) The Immigration Judge denied the request on the basis that he lacked 8 jurisdiction to grant Petitioner bond because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 9 classified him as being detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore subject to mandatory 10 detention. (See id.) The Immigration Judge’s ruling follows a recent Board of Immigration 11 Appeals decision in In Re Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (B.I.A. 2025). Under In Re Hurtado, 12 noncitizens present without admission are now subject to mandatory detention under 8 13 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), because, 14 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), they are now deemed “applicant[s] for admission.” 15 Petitioner alleges his detention violates his due process rights and 8 U.S.C. 16 § 1225(b)(2)(A), which does not apply to all individuals residing in the United States who 17 entered the country without being admitted. Petitioner further argues the Immigration 18 Judge’s bond decision violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(d)(1) and 1003.19. He seeks a bond 19 hearing or release and an order declaring no statute or regulation prohibits an immigration 20 judge from holding a custody redetermination hearing for Petitioner and that his detention 21 is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 22 II. Analysis—Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and 8 U.S.C. § 1226 23 Respondents state they “are aware of a prior decision in this District rejecting 24 Respondents’ position, see Echevarria v. Bondi, et al., No. 2:25-cv-03252-PHX-DWL, 25 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025), but respectfully maintain that Petitioner falls 26 within the definition of an ‘arriving alien’ warranting mandatory detention as the removal 27 process unfolds. Respondents also respectfully maintain that an alien is an ‘applicant for 28 admission’ until an immigration official has inspected that person and determined that he 1 or she is admissible into the United States.” (Doc. 16 at 8.) 2 Among other things, Respondents contend that Echevarria did not “consider other 3 pieces of statutory context.” (Id.) The Court respectfully disagrees, as Echevarria contains 4 an extensive discussion of the statutory context. Echevarria, 2025 WL 2821282 at *5 5 (“Although [Respondents’] approach has surface appeal, the Court perceives at least two 6 problems with it: first, it ignores some of the additional requirements imposed by 7 § 1225(b)(2)(A); and second, it fails to account for the broader statutory scheme, 8 particularly in light of how that broader scheme has been interpreted by the Supreme 9 Court.”); id. at *7 (“Putting aside these textual problems with Respondents’ position, 10 Respondents’ narrow focus on § 1225(a)(1) also ignores the complexities of interpreting 11 the INA, a dense statute . . . which must be interpreted against the backdrop of our 12 constitutional principles, administrative law, and international treaty obligations. Divining 13 its meaning is ordinarily not for the faint of heart. To that end, in determining whether 14 Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, the court should not confine itself 15 to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, it must place the 16 provision in context, interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical and coherent 17 regulatory scheme.”) (cleaned up). Nothing in Respondents’ brief persuades the Court that 18 this analysis was mistaken. 19 The Court is aware of several decisions adopting Respondents’ argument. Valencia 20 v. Chestnut, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Alonzo v. Noem, 2025 WL 21 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. 22 Nov. 10, 2025); Sandoval v. Acuna, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); Rojas v. 23 Olson, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wisc. Oct. 30, 2025); Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, No. 24 1:25-CV-177-H, Doc. 9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 25 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025), Chavez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26 24, 2025); Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi, No. 25-1094, 2025 WL 2490657 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025); 27 Pena v. Hyde, No. 25-11983, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025). But it is 28 unsurprising that judges across the country are not in full agreement on how this issue 1 should be resolved. It is also fair to note that Respondents’ view represents the minority 2 position—in the weeks since Judge Lanza considered the issue in Echevarria, dozens of 3 other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Quinapanta v. Bondi, 2025 WL 4 3157867, *6 (W.D. Wisc. Nov. 12, 2025) (“[M]ore than 45 district courts have now 5 rejected similar arguments made by respondents here and ordered bond hearings for 6 noncitizens who, like petitioner, were apprehended within the United States years after 7 entering without admission or inspection unless implicated by any criminal activity 8 covered by § 1226(c).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Juan De Dios Armenta Soto, No. CV-25-04178-PHX-MTL (MTM)
10 Petitioner, ORDER
11 v.
12 Kristi Noem, et al.,
13 Respondents. 14 15 Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under § 2241 16 challenging his immigration detention.1 (Doc. 11.) Petitioner also filed an Emergency 17 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 2.) The Court ordered expedited briefing of the 18 Petition and Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 7.) The Amended Petition and 19 Motion are fully briefed. (Docs. 16-17.) For the reasons that follow, the Amended Petition 20 is granted, and Respondents must either release Petitioner from custody or provide a bond 21 hearing within ten days. 22 I. Background 23 Petitioner was born in Mexico in 1964. (Doc. 16, Ex. A, Michie Decl. ¶ 3), 24 Following several voluntary removals from the United States, Petitioner reentered the 25 United States in 2008. (Id. ¶¶ 4-7; Doc. 11 ¶ 43.) He was encountered by Border Patrol 26 on August 5, 2019, taken into custody, and issued a Notice to Appear. (Id. ¶ 44.) On 27 August 22, 2019, Petitioner was released from immigration custody on a $5,000 bond. (Id.)
28 1 Petitioner’s Amended Petition is substantively identical to his original Petition except that it names two previously unidentified John Doe Respondents. 1 His removal proceedings were ultimately dismissed due to issuance of Military Parole in 2 Place. (Id.) Immigrations and Customs Enforcement encountered Petitioner and arrested 3 him on September 19, 2025. (Id. ¶ 47.) ICE issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner 4 with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). 5 (Id. ¶ 48.) 6 Petitioner requested custody redetermination, which was denied on November 4, 7 2025. (Id. ¶ 50.) The Immigration Judge denied the request on the basis that he lacked 8 jurisdiction to grant Petitioner bond because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 9 classified him as being detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore subject to mandatory 10 detention. (See id.) The Immigration Judge’s ruling follows a recent Board of Immigration 11 Appeals decision in In Re Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (B.I.A. 2025). Under In Re Hurtado, 12 noncitizens present without admission are now subject to mandatory detention under 8 13 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), because, 14 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), they are now deemed “applicant[s] for admission.” 15 Petitioner alleges his detention violates his due process rights and 8 U.S.C. 16 § 1225(b)(2)(A), which does not apply to all individuals residing in the United States who 17 entered the country without being admitted. Petitioner further argues the Immigration 18 Judge’s bond decision violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(d)(1) and 1003.19. He seeks a bond 19 hearing or release and an order declaring no statute or regulation prohibits an immigration 20 judge from holding a custody redetermination hearing for Petitioner and that his detention 21 is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 22 II. Analysis—Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and 8 U.S.C. § 1226 23 Respondents state they “are aware of a prior decision in this District rejecting 24 Respondents’ position, see Echevarria v. Bondi, et al., No. 2:25-cv-03252-PHX-DWL, 25 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025), but respectfully maintain that Petitioner falls 26 within the definition of an ‘arriving alien’ warranting mandatory detention as the removal 27 process unfolds. Respondents also respectfully maintain that an alien is an ‘applicant for 28 admission’ until an immigration official has inspected that person and determined that he 1 or she is admissible into the United States.” (Doc. 16 at 8.) 2 Among other things, Respondents contend that Echevarria did not “consider other 3 pieces of statutory context.” (Id.) The Court respectfully disagrees, as Echevarria contains 4 an extensive discussion of the statutory context. Echevarria, 2025 WL 2821282 at *5 5 (“Although [Respondents’] approach has surface appeal, the Court perceives at least two 6 problems with it: first, it ignores some of the additional requirements imposed by 7 § 1225(b)(2)(A); and second, it fails to account for the broader statutory scheme, 8 particularly in light of how that broader scheme has been interpreted by the Supreme 9 Court.”); id. at *7 (“Putting aside these textual problems with Respondents’ position, 10 Respondents’ narrow focus on § 1225(a)(1) also ignores the complexities of interpreting 11 the INA, a dense statute . . . which must be interpreted against the backdrop of our 12 constitutional principles, administrative law, and international treaty obligations. Divining 13 its meaning is ordinarily not for the faint of heart. To that end, in determining whether 14 Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, the court should not confine itself 15 to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, it must place the 16 provision in context, interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical and coherent 17 regulatory scheme.”) (cleaned up). Nothing in Respondents’ brief persuades the Court that 18 this analysis was mistaken. 19 The Court is aware of several decisions adopting Respondents’ argument. Valencia 20 v. Chestnut, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Alonzo v. Noem, 2025 WL 21 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. 22 Nov. 10, 2025); Sandoval v. Acuna, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); Rojas v. 23 Olson, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wisc. Oct. 30, 2025); Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, No. 24 1:25-CV-177-H, Doc. 9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 25 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025), Chavez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26 24, 2025); Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi, No. 25-1094, 2025 WL 2490657 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025); 27 Pena v. Hyde, No. 25-11983, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025). But it is 28 unsurprising that judges across the country are not in full agreement on how this issue 1 should be resolved. It is also fair to note that Respondents’ view represents the minority 2 position—in the weeks since Judge Lanza considered the issue in Echevarria, dozens of 3 other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Quinapanta v. Bondi, 2025 WL 4 3157867, *6 (W.D. Wisc. Nov. 12, 2025) (“[M]ore than 45 district courts have now 5 rejected similar arguments made by respondents here and ordered bond hearings for 6 noncitizens who, like petitioner, were apprehended within the United States years after 7 entering without admission or inspection unless implicated by any criminal activity 8 covered by § 1226(c). These decisions, along with a growing number of others now 9 including this court have concluded that the statutory text, the statute’s history, 10 Congressional intent, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades support its 11 application to noncitizens in petitioner’s position.”) (cleaned up). Having reviewed the 12 recent decisions adopting the minority view, the Court agrees with the conclusion reached 13 by Judge Lanza in Echevarria. For these reasons, the Petition is granted as to Counts One 14 and Three of the Amended Petition, and Petitioner must receive a bond hearing under 8 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a).2 16 … 17 … 18 … 19 … 20 … 21 … 22 … 23 … 24 … 25 … 26 … 27 …
28 2 Because the Court grants relief as to Counts One and Three, it will deny the remainder of the Petition as moot. 1 IT IS ORDERED: 2 1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is granted as to 3 Petitioner’s Fifth Claim for Relief. The remainder of the Petition is denied 4 as moot. 5 2. Respondents must provide Petitioner a bond redetermination hearing within 6 ten days or release him from custody under the same conditions that existed 7 before his detention. 8 3. Respondents must provide a notice of compliance within three days of 9 releasing Petitioner or providing him a bond hearing. 10 4. All remaining motions are denied as moot. 11 5. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this 12 case. 13 Dated this 26th day of November, 2025. 14 Wicked T. diburde Michael T. Liburdi 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
_5-