1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN ANTONIO JAIMES LAZARO, No. 1:26-cv-00060-DC-SCR (A#044-547-070), 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 15 ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who filed this habeas corpus action pursuant 19 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 21 I. Factual and Procedural History 22 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States in 1994 as a 23 lawful permanent resident. ECF No. 1. He is currently detained at the Golden State Annex 24 located within this judicial district. ECF No. 1. Petitioner has been in the custody of Immigration 25 and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for more than six months, and alleges that he has not been 26 provided a bond hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether his prolonged 27 detention is justified based on danger or flight risk. ECF No. 1 at 2. He has a pending application 28 for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of his immigration 1 status. ECF No. 1 at 5. The petition’s sole claim for relief alleges that petitioner’s ongoing, 2 prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 3 Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 16. By way of relief, petitioner asks the court to determine that his 4 detention is not justified because the government has not established by clear and convincing 5 evidence that he is a risk of flight or danger and to order his release. Id. In the alternative, 6 petitioner asks the court to order his release within 30 days unless respondents schedule a hearing 7 before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) where, to continue detention, the government must meet that 8 same threshold. Id. 9 In their motion to dismiss, respondents clarify that petitioner has been in ICE custody 10 since August 12, 2025. ECF No. 9-1 at 3. Respondents contend that petitioner is lawfully 11 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) pending removal based upon his aggravated felony 12 convictions for attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. ECF No. 9 at 1. 13 Respondents rely on the Supreme Court decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 283 14 (2018), for the proposition that petitioner’s mandatory detention is authorized until the end of his 15 removal proceedings. ECF No. 9 at 2. Accordingly, respondents request that the § 2241 petition 16 be dismissed. 17 Petitioner filed a pro se reply brief indicating that he has requested a custody/bond 18 determination hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19, “but has been 19 denied without just or penological reason other than my prior offense.” ECF No. 10 at 2. 20 However, petitioner does not provide a copy of the request or any IJ order denying such request. 21 ECF No. 10. Therefore, there is not any evidence in the record that petitioner has been provided 22 the bond hearing he requests in his § 2241 petition. Petitioner also indicates in his reply that he 23 has a pending motion to vacate his conviction or sentence pending in the Fresno County Superior 24 Court pursuant to California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1). ECF No. 10 at 2, 24-47. 25 II. Legal Standards 26 The parties agree that petitioner remains subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 27 1226(c). That provision states that the Attorney General “shall take into custody any [noncitizen] 28 who” falls into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal or national security grounds, 1 § 1226(c), and specifies that the Attorney General “may release” such a noncitizen “only if the 2 Attorney General decides” both that doing so is necessary for witness-protection purposes and 3 that the noncitizen will not pose a danger or flight risk. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (citing 8 U.S.C. 4 § 1226(c)) (emphasis in original). Petitioner’s reported convictions bring his detention under § 5 1226(c). 6 III. Due Process Analysis 7 The petition raises an as-applied, procedural due process challenge to the constitutionality 8 of petitioner’s mandatory detention. Petitioner has been detained for over eight months at this 9 juncture. Respondents do not dispute that petitioner has never received a bond hearing to 10 determine whether his detention is justified based on danger or flight risk. 11 The Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of mandatory detention under 12 § 1226(c) in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). The Supreme Court did so with the 13 understanding that § 1226(c) detention is relatively “brief” and “limited,” and “lasts roughly a 14 month and a half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months in the minority of cases in 15 which the alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 513, 529 n.12, 530. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion 16 in full, but wrote a concurring opinion recognizing the viability of as-applied challenges under the 17 majority’s framework: “[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of 18 liberty, a lawful permanent resident [noncitizen] . . . could be entitled to an individualized 19 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 20 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Later, in 21 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court recognized the right to bring such as- 22 applied challenges: “Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision [8 U.S.C. § 23 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to 24 applications of the statute as we have now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. 25 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has expressly declined to address “[w]hether due 26 process requires a bond hearing” in such situations. Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th 27 Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). However, the Ninth Circuit 28 has expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without 1 any process is constitutional.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). And other 2 Circuit Courts of Appeal have concluded that Demore does not foreclose as-applied challenges to 3 prolonged detention under § 1226(c). Recently, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he Constitution 4 does not permit the Executive to detain a noncitizen for an unreasonably prolonged period under 5 section 1226(c) without a bond hearing; at some point, additional procedural protections—like a 6 bond hearing—become necessary.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2024).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN ANTONIO JAIMES LAZARO, No. 1:26-cv-00060-DC-SCR (A#044-547-070), 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 15 ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who filed this habeas corpus action pursuant 19 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 21 I. Factual and Procedural History 22 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States in 1994 as a 23 lawful permanent resident. ECF No. 1. He is currently detained at the Golden State Annex 24 located within this judicial district. ECF No. 1. Petitioner has been in the custody of Immigration 25 and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for more than six months, and alleges that he has not been 26 provided a bond hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether his prolonged 27 detention is justified based on danger or flight risk. ECF No. 1 at 2. He has a pending application 28 for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of his immigration 1 status. ECF No. 1 at 5. The petition’s sole claim for relief alleges that petitioner’s ongoing, 2 prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 3 Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 16. By way of relief, petitioner asks the court to determine that his 4 detention is not justified because the government has not established by clear and convincing 5 evidence that he is a risk of flight or danger and to order his release. Id. In the alternative, 6 petitioner asks the court to order his release within 30 days unless respondents schedule a hearing 7 before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) where, to continue detention, the government must meet that 8 same threshold. Id. 9 In their motion to dismiss, respondents clarify that petitioner has been in ICE custody 10 since August 12, 2025. ECF No. 9-1 at 3. Respondents contend that petitioner is lawfully 11 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) pending removal based upon his aggravated felony 12 convictions for attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. ECF No. 9 at 1. 13 Respondents rely on the Supreme Court decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 283 14 (2018), for the proposition that petitioner’s mandatory detention is authorized until the end of his 15 removal proceedings. ECF No. 9 at 2. Accordingly, respondents request that the § 2241 petition 16 be dismissed. 17 Petitioner filed a pro se reply brief indicating that he has requested a custody/bond 18 determination hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19, “but has been 19 denied without just or penological reason other than my prior offense.” ECF No. 10 at 2. 20 However, petitioner does not provide a copy of the request or any IJ order denying such request. 21 ECF No. 10. Therefore, there is not any evidence in the record that petitioner has been provided 22 the bond hearing he requests in his § 2241 petition. Petitioner also indicates in his reply that he 23 has a pending motion to vacate his conviction or sentence pending in the Fresno County Superior 24 Court pursuant to California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1). ECF No. 10 at 2, 24-47. 25 II. Legal Standards 26 The parties agree that petitioner remains subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 27 1226(c). That provision states that the Attorney General “shall take into custody any [noncitizen] 28 who” falls into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal or national security grounds, 1 § 1226(c), and specifies that the Attorney General “may release” such a noncitizen “only if the 2 Attorney General decides” both that doing so is necessary for witness-protection purposes and 3 that the noncitizen will not pose a danger or flight risk. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (citing 8 U.S.C. 4 § 1226(c)) (emphasis in original). Petitioner’s reported convictions bring his detention under § 5 1226(c). 6 III. Due Process Analysis 7 The petition raises an as-applied, procedural due process challenge to the constitutionality 8 of petitioner’s mandatory detention. Petitioner has been detained for over eight months at this 9 juncture. Respondents do not dispute that petitioner has never received a bond hearing to 10 determine whether his detention is justified based on danger or flight risk. 11 The Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of mandatory detention under 12 § 1226(c) in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). The Supreme Court did so with the 13 understanding that § 1226(c) detention is relatively “brief” and “limited,” and “lasts roughly a 14 month and a half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months in the minority of cases in 15 which the alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 513, 529 n.12, 530. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion 16 in full, but wrote a concurring opinion recognizing the viability of as-applied challenges under the 17 majority’s framework: “[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of 18 liberty, a lawful permanent resident [noncitizen] . . . could be entitled to an individualized 19 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 20 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Later, in 21 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court recognized the right to bring such as- 22 applied challenges: “Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision [8 U.S.C. § 23 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to 24 applications of the statute as we have now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. 25 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has expressly declined to address “[w]hether due 26 process requires a bond hearing” in such situations. Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th 27 Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). However, the Ninth Circuit 28 has expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without 1 any process is constitutional.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). And other 2 Circuit Courts of Appeal have concluded that Demore does not foreclose as-applied challenges to 3 prolonged detention under § 1226(c). Recently, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he Constitution 4 does not permit the Executive to detain a noncitizen for an unreasonably prolonged period under 5 section 1226(c) without a bond hearing; at some point, additional procedural protections—like a 6 bond hearing—become necessary.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2024). The 7 undersigned finds this authority persuasive and agrees that Demore does not bar an as-applied 8 challenge to his prolonged detention without a hearing to determine whether such detention is 9 justified. The next step is to determine the appropriate framework in which to analyze 10 petitioner’s procedural due process arguments. 11 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 12 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has 13 concluded that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 14 including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 15 permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Courts examine procedural due 16 process claims in two steps: the first step is determining whether there exists a protected liberty 17 interest under the Due Process Clause. The second step examines the procedures necessary to 18 ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See 19 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 20 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains 21 what process is due.”). 22 The undersigned has considered the various tests developed by district courts within the 23 Ninth Circuit, and finds that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the appropriate 24 test for due process challenges to prolonged detention under § 1226(c). The undersigned is 25 particularly persuaded by the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Black, 103 F.4th at 145-49, that the 26 Mathews test is flexible enough to account for the factors identified by federal courts when 27 deciding whether detention under § 1226(c) has become unreasonably prolonged. Under 28 Mathews, the court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an 1 erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest involved including any 2 fiscal or administrative burden that additional procedures would include. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 3 335. 4 IV. Mathews Factors 5 A. Private Interest 6 An individual’s private interest in “freedom from prolonged detention” is “unquestionably 7 substantial.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts of Appeal have 8 generally declined to adopt a specific threshold for when detention under § 1226(c) becomes 9 prolonged. See German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 10 (3d Cir. 2020); Black, 103 F.4th at 150; Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7-9 (1st Cir. 2021). While 11 the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this question, it has previously referred to detentions longer 12 than six months as prolonged “in the context of detentions for which no individualized bond 13 hearings had taken place at all because the statutes on their faces did not allow for them.” 14 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (citations omitted). Indeed, numerous courts within this Circuit 15 have found due process violations where the length of mandatory detention without bond was 16 similar to the length of detention at issue here. See, e.g., Chen v. Aitken, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 17 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding petitioner’s seven-month detention under § 1225(b) was 18 “prolonged” because it “has lasted well beyond the typical period described in Demore” and 19 “neither release nor removal are imminent”); Sadeqi v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2587-RSH-BJW, --- 20 F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 3154520, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (noting that “examples 21 abound” of district courts ordering a bond hearing where a petitioner was subject to mandatory 22 detention for about a year and collecting cases). 23 Moreover, courts hearing as-applied challenges to § 1226(c) detention have also 24 considered the likely duration of future detention. See Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 25 880-81 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (finding petitioner’s administrative appeals and likely appeal to the 26 Ninth Circuit weighed toward granting request for bond hearing). Accordingly, based on its 27 duration to date without bond and the likelihood of continued mandatory detention during judicial 28 review, the undersigned finds petitioner’s detention is sufficiently “prolonged” and confers a 1 substantial private interest. 2 B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 3 The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [petitioner’s] 4 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 5 procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This factor firmly favors petitioner for 6 several reasons. First, there is no evidence that petitioner has been provided with a bonding 7 hearing. “[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing before a 8 neutral decisionmaker is substantial.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) 9 (abrogated on other grounds). Indeed, “[i]n the absence of any meaningful initial procedural 10 safeguards, it appears to us that almost any additional procedural safeguards at some point in the 11 detention would add value.” Black, 103 F.4th at 153 (emphasis in original); see also Jimenez v. 12 Wolf, No. 19-cv-7996 NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (finding “high” risk 13 of an erroneous deprivation where petitioner had not received any bond or custody 14 redetermination hearing during his one-year detention under § 1226(c)). Accordingly, the second 15 Mathews factor also weighs toward petitioner. 16 C. Government Interest 17 Under this factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, “including the function 18 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement 19 would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Higher courts have repeatedly recognized that, “[t]he 20 government has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous criminal 21 [noncitizens].’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 515). Courts 22 have also recognized that the detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings can also serve 23 the legitimate government purpose of preventing flight. Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065 (citing 24 Demore, 538 U.S. at 528). Thus, in some general way, the government has an interest in the 25 detention of non-citizens held under § 1226(c). However, “the additional procedural safeguards 26 we would allow here under Mathews do nothing to undercut those interests. At any ordered bond 27 hearing, the IJ would assess on an individualized basis whether the noncitizen presents a flight 28 risk or a danger to the community, as IJs routinely do for other noncitizen detainees.” Black, 103 1 F.4th at 153–54; see also Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (“Providing a bond hearing would not 2 undercut the government’s asserted interest in effecting removal. After all, the purpose of a bond 3 hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a flight risk or danger to the community.”) 4 (citing In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006)). In petitioner’s case, the government’s 5 interest in further detaining him without a hearing to determine whether such detention is justified 6 is minimal. 7 Administrative burden is a legally cognizable interest under Mathews. But respondents’ 8 interest is further diminished by the low fiscal and administrative burdens associated with a bond 9 hearing. See D. L.C. v. Wofford, 2026 WL 25511, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (“Custody 10 hearings in immigration court are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost on the government.” 11 (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). 12 V. Remedy 13 For reasons explained above in the Mathews analysis, the undersigned finds petitioner’s 14 request for a bond hearing to be the appropriate relief in this case where the government has the 15 burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner presents a risk of flight 16 or danger. See Singh v. Albarran, No. 1:26-cv-0940 DC DMC (HC), 2026 WL 392169, at *5 17 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026) (collecting cases); Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-00127 DC SCR 18 (HC), 2026 WL 766567 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2026) (adopting Findings and Recommendations 19 and granting a bond hearing). This is the appropriate burden given the liberty interests at stake 20 and recommends that petitioner receive a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator at which the 21 government bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he is either a 22 flight risk or a threat to safety to justify his continued detention. See Black, 103 F.4th at 157 23 (“[O]nce detention under section 1226(c) has become so prolonged that due process warrants a 24 bond hearing . . . the government must justify continued detention at such a hearing . . .by clear 25 and convincing evidence.”). 26 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 27 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 28 2. Respondents be ordered to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an 1 | immigration judge at which the government shall bear the burden of justifying Petitioner's 2 || continued detention by clear and convincing evidence, within fourteen (14) days of issuance of 3 || such order. 4 3. Respondent be further directed to file a notice certifying compliance with the above 5 || provision within seven (7) days from the date of the bond hearing. 6 4. If petitioner is granted release on bond, respondents shall return all of petitioner’s 7 || documents and possessions at the time of release. 8 5. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) be denied. 9 6. This order does not address the circumstances in which Respondents may detain 10 | Petitioner in the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and 11 | Petitioner receives notice of that final order of removal. 12 7. Judgement be entered in petitioner’s favor and this case be closed. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 14 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days after 15 || being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 16 | the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period 17 || is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties 18 | have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v. 19 | Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets 20 || the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties 21 | are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 22 || the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 23 || DATED: April 15, 2026 24 25 /
26 SEAN C. RIORDAN 57 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE