Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Quigg

732 F. Supp. 227, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1432, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2808, 1990 WL 27597
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 12, 1990
DocketCiv. A. 88-3656-OG
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 732 F. Supp. 227 (Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Quigg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Quigg, 732 F. Supp. 227, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1432, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2808, 1990 WL 27597 (D.D.C. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

BENNETT, Senior Circuit Judge. *

This patent case is before the court on the summary judgment motion of the defendant Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. The motion is denied because genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the objective indicia of nonobviousness. It appears from the parties’ submissions that the plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to many of the other facts essential to deciding the case as a matter of law. Therefore, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(d), those facts shall be deemed established. They are identified in the Memorandum and are set forth in the order issued today.

I. Background

Joy Technologies, Inc. (Joy), is the as-signee of U.S. Patent 4,042,864 (the ’864 patent), which issued August 16, 1977, and named Melvin N. Norris as inventor. The patent includes 18 claims directed to an AC-DC traction drive control system for a mining machine, a mining machine embodying that system, and methods of operating such a machine.

On August 23, 1985, a business competitor of Joy’s, National Mine Service Company (NMS), requested reexamination of the ’864 patent by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The PTO determined that substantial new questions of patenta-bility existed and that the patent should be reexamined. The patent examiner rejected claims 1 to 4, 11, 12, 16, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (lack of novelty) and section 103 (obviousness). Joy appealed to *229 the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board). On October 31, 1988, the Board rendered its decision, reversing the section 102 rejection but affirming the section 103 rejection.

Joy filed this suit against the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (Commissioner) under 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1982), which creates a remedy by civil action for patentees and applicants dissatisfied with the decision of the Board. This court (Gasch, J., presiding) granted the Commissioner’s partial summary judgment motion to dismiss Joy’s claims relating to the PTO’s exercise of discretion in initially granting the reexamination and the alleged unconstitutionality of reexamination proceedings, as well as to strike Joy’s request for a jury trial. 12 USPQ2d 1112, 1989 WL 150027 (D.D.C.1989). Thereafter, the Commissioner filed the present motion for summary judgment that the invention of the ’864 patent would have been obvious under section 103 and that the decision of the Board was correct.

II. The Standards for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for granting summary judgment. “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” As the Supreme Court has stated, “[sjummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).

Rule 56 further provides that “[wjhen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), “there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). The nonmoving party must do more than merely raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact; the nonmoving party must present evidence sufficient to require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1560, 7 USPQ2d 1548, 1550 (Fed.Cir.1988).

As the Federal Circuit has held, “[w]ith respect to whether there is a genuine issue, the court may not simply accept a party’s statement that a fact is challenged. The party opposing the motion must point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counter statement of a fact or facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant. Mere denials or conclusory statements are insufficient.” Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835-36, 221 USPQ 561, 564 (Fed.Cir.1984). See also Russell v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 695 F.Supp. 572, 573, 8 USPQ2d 1452, 1453 (D.D.C.1988).

While the nonmovant must come forward with some evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, the established facts, as well as any inferences reasonably drawn from those facts, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Barmag Barmer, 731 F.2d at 836, 221 USPQ at 564.

Finally, Rule 56(d) provides that if summary judgment is not rendered on the *230 whole case and a trial is necessary, the court may make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy. Upon trial of the action, the facts so specified shall be deemed established. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).

In this case, Joy has failed to show that there are genuine issues with respect to most of the facts of this case. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment sets forth in great detail the material facts relevant to the obviousness question.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Alberts v. Kappos
917 F. Supp. 2d 94 (District of Columbia, 2013)
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Pharmadyne Corp.
32 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D. Maryland, 1998)
Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp.
969 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Illinois, 1997)
Estate of Stoller v. Ford Motor Co.
784 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Illinois, 1992)
Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck
751 F. Supp. 225 (District of Columbia, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
732 F. Supp. 227, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1432, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2808, 1990 WL 27597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joy-technologies-inc-v-quigg-dcd-1990.