Joy Builders, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Joy Builders, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown

127 A.D.3d 1029, 5 N.Y.S.3d 882

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 22, 2015

Docket2013-04139

StatusPublished

This text of 127 A.D.3d 1029 (Joy Builders, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Joy Builders, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 127 A.D.3d 1029, 5 N.Y.S.3d 882 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for inverse condemnation, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Kelly, J.), dated March 11, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“In a modern inverse condemnation action, an owner whose property has been taken de facto may sue the entity that took it to obtain just compensation, and if the action is successful the defendant has no choice in the matter — the compensation must be paid” (Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 NY3d 777, 786 [2012]).

“[W]aiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, which is not created by negligence, oversight, or silence” (Plato Gen. Constr. Corp. / EMCO Tech Constr. Corp., JV, LLC v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 89 AD3d 819, 825 [2011]; see City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]). Here, the Supreme Court incorrectly determined that a triable issue of fact exists with respect to the defense of waiver. The plaintiff established, prima facie, that in the event a taking of its property had occurred, it did not waive its right to compensation. In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the defendant’s affirmative defense of waiver, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action, which was to recover damages for inverse condemnation. While the plaintiffs claim is premised on the theory that the defendant’s acts stripped the relevant property of all economically viable uses (see Matter of Smith v Town of Mendon, 4 NY3d 1, 13-14 [2004]), a triable issue of fact exists as to whether any economically viable use remains.

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court.

Eng, P.J., Dillon, Chambers and Barros, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for inverse condemnation, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Kelly, J.), dated March 11, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“In a modern inverse condemnation action, an owner whose property has been taken de facto may sue the entity that took it to obtain just compensation, and if the action is successful the defendant has no choice in the matter — the compensation must be paid” (Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 NY3d 777, 786 [2012]).

“[W]aiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, which is not created by negligence, oversight, or silence” (Plato Gen. Constr. Corp. / EMCO Tech Constr. Corp., JV, LLC v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 89 AD3d 819, 825 [2011]; see City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]). Here, the Supreme Court incorrectly determined that a triable issue of fact exists with respect to the defense of waiver. The plaintiff established, prima facie, that in the event a taking of its property had occurred, it did not waive its right to compensation. In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the defendant’s affirmative defense of waiver, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action, which was to recover damages for inverse condemnation. While the plaintiffs claim is premised on the theory that the defendant’s acts stripped the relevant property of all economically viable uses (see Matter of Smith v Town of Mendon, 4 NY3d 1, 13-14 [2004]), a triable issue of fact exists as to whether any economically viable use remains.

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court.

Eng, P.J., Dillon, Chambers and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

127 A.D.3d 1029, 5 N.Y.S.3d 882, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joy-builders-inc-v-town-of-clarkstown-nyappdiv-2015.

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