COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ————————————
No. 08-24-00372-CR ————————————
Joshua Anthony Gilbreath, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On Appeal from the 277th District Court Williamson County, Texas Trial Court No. 22-1467-K277
M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N 1
Appellant Joshua Anthony Gilbreath appeals his murder conviction and challenges the
jury’s rejection of his insanity defense. We affirm.
1 This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals to the extent it might conflict with our own. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. I. BACKGROUND A. The murder
On the evening of August 4, 2022, Gilbreath shot and killed 70-year-old Diana Pier in the
rural town of Florence, Texas. The relevant sequence of events occurred in the outskirts of Austin,
Texas, and the investigation revealed as follows.
Gilbreath spent the afternoon of August 4th drinking alone at Third Base Bar in Round
Rock, Texas, where he was a regular. He drank beer and liquor for a little over an hour, left without
paying his bill, then drove around and bought more alcohol. Gilbreath eventually returned to his
house in Pflugerville, Texas, then drove north and ended up in Florence, Texas.
Timing-advance data from Gilbreath’s cell phone confirmed the following location
activity. At around 7:45 p.m., two witnesses testified they saw a grey car partially parked in their
driveway that took off toward County Road 245 when they approached. Karola Schmidt, who lives
on County Road 245, testified that as she prepared to walk her dog, she noticed a silver car parked
along the road at the end of her driveway. She intermittently watched the car with binoculars.
Schmidt saw a second car parked behind Gilbreath’s car. When she looked out again, Schmidt saw
Gilbreath walking to his car. He stopped, looked around in both directions, got into the car, and
drove south towards County Road 241. Schmidt walked down her driveway to check on the driver
of the second car, which remained parked, and found Pier lying face down on the ground. Gilbreath
had shot Pier in the forehead; she was pronounced dead at the scene.
Gilbreath then drove to Twin Peaks in Round Rock to drink, then went to Dallas and stayed
at a Motel 6. Two days later, Gilbreath went to Bombshells to drink with his longtime friend,
Daniel Gonzales. While there, Gilbreath admitted to the murder.
2 After investigators held a press conference on August 11, they received a tip. Gonzales
called authorities to report that Gilbreath had admitted to murdering a woman about a week earlier
and that the suspect’s vehicle matched Gilbreath’s. Gonzales met with detectives that night, and
investigators later confirmed that Gilbreath had recently purchased a gun. An arrest warrant was
secured on the evening of August 12 and Gilbreath was arrested in the early hours of August 13.
Officers recovered a loaded 9 mm firearm from the backseat of Gilbreath’s car; a box of
ammunition from the driver-side door; loose ammunition on the driver-side floorboard; a receipt
for the firearm and ammunition purchase; an open bottle of beer in the center console cup holder;
and a bottle of liquor in the front passenger seat. A bullet casing recovered from the scene was
tested and confirmed to have been fired from the firearm found in Gilbreath’s car. Gilbreath
remained jailed until December 2022, when he was released on bond. He was placed on house
arrest and was arrested again at Bombshells Restaurant & Bar on March 27, 2023.
B. Trial proceedings
Gilbreath was indicted for murder on November 17, 2022. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 19.02(c).
After Gilbreath was found to be incompetent to stand trial, the trial court ordered him committed
for 120 days following a competency hearing on April 19, 2023. By October 2023, Gilbreath had
been reevaluated and was found competent to stand trial. On January 9, 2024, the defense provided
notice of its intent to pursue an insanity defense. A nine-day jury trial was held in September 2024.
At trial, the State presented eyewitness, law-enforcement, and expert testimony regarding
the investigation and Gilbreath’s conduct before, during, and after the murder. The State also
offered evidence of Gilbreath’s heavy alcohol use, cocaine use, and employment and financial
struggles in the months preceding the murder. After the State rested, Gilbreath called family
members who testified about his belief that he was living in a “black box” and a “simulation” and
3 about his statements that “the gods are black.” He also called officers who testified about his
conduct during his arrests. In support of his insanity defense, Gilbreath presented testimony from
Maureen Burrows, MD, PhD, who diagnosed him with schizophrenia and opined that he was
insane at the time of the murder. In rebuttal, the State called Christine Reed, PhD, who testified
that at the time of the murder, Gilbreath was experiencing psychosis resulting from his voluntary
substance use. After both sides rested, the trial court instructed the jury that “[v]oluntary
intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime.” 2 The jury returned a
guilty verdict, rejecting Gilbreath’s insanity defense. The trial court sentenced Gilbreath to 60
years confinement in accordance with the jury’s verdict. This appeal followed.
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Applicable law
The affirmative defense of insanity excuses a defendant from criminal responsibility even
though the State has proven every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To establish insanity, the defendant
must prove that “at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease
or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01(a). In the
context of insanity, “wrong” means illegal. Id. An accused knows that his conduct is wrong if he
understands that it is illegal by societal standards, even if, due to a mental disease or defect, he
believes his conduct is morally justified. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592. “Voluntary intoxication does
not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04(a). Because
the law presumes that the accused is sane, it is the accused who bears the burden to establish
2 Gilbreath also asserted the affirmative defense of self-defense, and the jury charge included an instruction on that defense.
4 insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 191–92 (“Texas law . . .
presumes that a criminal defendant is sane and that he intends the natural consequences of his
acts.”).
“The issue of insanity is not strictly medical; it also invokes both legal and ethical
considerations.” Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Graham v.
State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc)). Though expert witnesses can
provide helpful testimony, they “are not capable of dictating determination of that issue” and the
jury cannot give conclusive effect to such testimony. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949. Instead, “[o]nly
the jury can join the non-medical components that must be considered.” Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878.
Accordingly, the ultimate determination of insanity “lies in the province of the jury, not only as to
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, but also as to the limits of the defense
itself.” Id. The jury may determine the accused’s mental state at the time of the offense by
considering the circumstances of the crime itself, as well as the defendant’s demeanor before and
after the offense. McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d 622, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. 2015, pet.
ref’d); Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
Relevant considerations include evidence indicating knowledge of wrongful conduct, such as
attempts to evade police, expressions of regret or fear of consequences, and any other possible
explanations for the accused’s behavior. Id.
B. Standard of review
“In the factual-sufficiency review of a rejected affirmative defense, an appellate court
views the entirety of the evidence in a neutral light, but it may not usurp the function of the jury
by substituting its judgment in place of the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the
witnesses’ testimony.” Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A
5 reviewing court may sustain a claim of factual insufficiency “only if, after setting out the relevant
evidence and explaining precisely how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence
supporting the verdict, the court clearly states why the verdict is so much against the great weight
of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased.” Id. Rarely will
the factfinder’s determination of insanity be overturned on appeal. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 953.
Accordingly, the jury, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given to
the testimony and is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness’s testimony. Alvarado
v. State, 853 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). Because the factfinder has the
benefit of observing the witnesses’ actions and demeanor, we defer to the factfinder’s resolution
of conflicting evidence. Fisher v. State, 397 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, pet. ref’d). “Evidence that is factually sufficient” to support a rejection of an insanity defense
“is necessarily legally sufficient.” Reyes v. State, 480 S.W.3d 70, 73 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015,
pet. ref’d).
III. ANALYSIS In his sole issue on appeal, Gilbreath challenges the factual sufficiency of the jury’s
rejection of his insanity defense. 3 A review of the parties’ theories and the evidence presented will
be helpful to our discussion of Gilbreath’s insanity defense.
A. The State’s case
The State’s theory was that Gilbreath’s life was “spiraling our of control” in the months
leading to the murder and that his voluntary intoxication could not constitute a legal defense to his
conduct.
3 Gilbreath specifically contends that “his evidence is more than sufficient to support his affirmative defense, while the State’s evidence is insufficient to rebut it.”
6 The State called Gonzales, who testified that he met Gilbreath in high school and
maintained contact with him over the years by socializing at bars. He testified that since 2019, he
and Gilbreath went to bars together about three to four times a month. By the summer of 2022,
Gonzales described Gilbreath’s drinking as “ramping up,” with Gilbreath drinking “more heavily
and more often.” Gilbreath told Gonzales that he was having problems at work, was worried about
getting fired, and feared he might lose his house. During this period, Gilbreath regularly used
cocaine and mixed it with alcohol. Gonzales testified that Gilbreath said he was depressed and
described himself as living in a “black box” and “trapped,” as though he were in a “simulation.”
Gonzales stated that Gilbreath made these comments mostly while intoxicated, though he recalled
him making similar remarks on one or two occasions while sober. By August 2022, Gilbreath’s
drinking continued to increase.
The State also called Ryan Sutton, who also attended high school with Gilbreath and lived
with him at the time of the murder. Sutton described Gilbreath as someone who liked to
“antagonize,” “irritate,” and “troll[]” others for reactions, and testified that it was typical for
Gilbreath to joke and say random and unexpected things. Sutton and Gilbreath had reconnected
when Gilbreath moved back to Texas and Sutton moved into Gilbreath’s home in February 2022.
Sutton testified that initially, “everything was good” and he knew that Gilbreath drank but “didn’t
know how bad it was.” Sutton stated that Gilbreath frequently went out drinking, carried liquor
bottles around the house, and drank directly from them four to five times a week. As Gilbreath’s
drinking increased, it became daily by the summer of 2022. Sutton testified he also saw Gilbreath
use cocaine at home, which he said did not surprise him because Gilbreath had shared stories from
college and California and viewed partying as involving drugs. Sutton initially saw cocaine use
occur once or twice a week, but said it increased going into the summer of 2022. Sutton further
7 testified that Gilbreath regularly frequented bars, discussed encounters with prostitutes, and
brought them to the house about two to three times a week.
Maggie Wolf, an HR employee at Gilbreath’s workplace in Texas, testified that in January
2022, Gilbreath received a salary increase and a large bonus. As 2022 progressed, Gilbreath began
missing meetings, performing his work incorrectly, and was “nowhere to be found most of the
time.” On August 3, the day before the murder, the company decided to terminate Gilbreath and
scheduled a meeting for August 5 to notify him. On August 4, the day of the murder, Gilbreath’s
supervisor sent him an electronic invitation and attempted to confirm the meeting with Gilbreath,
but Gilbreath was offline and unresponsive. Instead, Gilbreath was drinking at Third Base.
Gilbreath drank alone for a little over an hour, consumed multiple rounds of beer and liquor, left
without paying his bill, then drove around and bought more alcohol. He eventually ended up in
Florence, Texas, and when Pier saw him parked on the side of the road, she stopped to offer
assistance. Gilbreath exited his vehicle and shot Pier in the forehead. Eyewitness testimony
established that Gilbreath looked around in both directions “as if wondering if someone was
watching,” before fleeing the scene. Additional witnesses, including a volunteer paramedic,
testified to seeing a silver car fleeing the area without yielding to emergency lights and sirens.
After the shooting, Gilbreath returned toward the area of his home and stopped at a Twin
Peaks in Round Rock, where he was a regular. Servers Priscilla Galindo and Sinead Murphy
testified that they saw Gilbreath that night. Gilbreath said hello to them, and they noticed that his
shirt was inside out, which Gilbreath corrected when they pointed it out. Galindo testified that
Gilbreath did not appear to be in distress or in crisis and looked “normal.” Gilbreath later drove to
Dallas and stayed at a Motel 6.
8 The following day, Gilbreath missed work and did not attend the scheduled meeting; he
was terminated via email. Gilbreath returned home later that day. Text messages admitted into
evidence showed that Gilbreath purchased a “g” that day, which the State suggested was consistent
with cocaine measurements. Gonzales and Gilbreath then made plans to hang out. Gonzales picked
Gilbreath up and testified that Gilbreath was already intoxicated and was carrying a backpack
loaded with beer and liquor. While drinking at Bombshells, Gilbreath showed Gonzales his
termination letter and expressed worry about losing his job. Gilbreath then told Gonzales that he
had something else to tell him. Gilbreath took Gonzales outside, required that they place their
phones on top of the car, and directed that they get into Gonzales’s car. After imposing these three
conditions, Gilbreath confessed to Gonzales that he had pulled over to the side of the road and shot
a woman in Jarrell, Texas. Gonzales described that Gilbreath “rested his face into his hands,” and
repeatedly stated, “Bro, I’m crazy, you don’t even understand.” Gonzales did not initially believe
him. The two went back into the bar then went to Gilbreath’s house to change clothes for a night
out. They went to Twin Peaks then drove to Austin where they continued to drink on Sixth Street.
On August 8, Gilbreath appeared at work. Wolf testified he asked about his pay, severance,
and what the company would tell future employers. That same day, Gilbreath contacted a realtor
to list his house for sale. On August 10, Gilbreath and Gonzales hung out again. They went to
Bombshells, then to a creek in Austin. Gonzales testified that Gilbreath appeared “a little bit down”
and discussed his financial issues. Gonzales said he also discussed disputes with Sutton and
threatened to kill Sutton “if [he] tried anything.” Sutton confirmed their argument and testified that
Gilbreath “moped around the house” during that period. After a press conference on August 11,
Gonzales learned about the murder from his father and read an article describing the suspect
9 vehicle and realized that Gilbreath’s confession was accurate. Gonzales contacted authorities and
met with detectives that same night. An arrest warrant was secured the following day.
Law enforcement set up surveillance around Gilbreath’s home late on August 12. U.S.
Marshall Emir Perez testified that Gilbreath arrived and instead of parking in his driveway, parked
down the street and stayed in his car. He then drove away and after realizing he was not going to
return, a search for him began. Perez testified she believed Gilbreath was “actively avoiding
surveillance.” He was later located in a shopping center, where he remained inside his vehicle for
about an hour before his arrest.
Gilbreath remained in custody for approximately five months. Jail records reflected no
reported mental health concerns during intake or confinement. While incarcerated, Gilbreath
negotiated the sale of his home and confirmed at closing that he was of sound mind to grant his
father power of attorney to finalize the sale. Gilbreath was released on bond in December 2022
and placed on level one house arrest with GPS monitoring. Gilbreath’s pretrial officer testified that
the court imposed no conditions requiring mental health evaluation or treatment.
Gilbreath stayed with his parents, met with counsel, attended court and church, and sought
employment. On March 27, 2023, Gilbreath jumped his parents’ fence and left the house with his
cell phone. He went to Bombshells, appeared without a shirt, and refused to leave after threatening
to kill one of the servers and spitting on the DJ. Officers testified that Gilbreath refused to leave
after multiple requests and at one point, reached over the bar and grabbed a beer that had been
poured for someone else and drank it. Gilbreath resisted arrest, attempted to drink a beer after
being handcuffed, and headbutted a beer to the ground. Once outside, he attempted to spit on one
of the officers, made racial slurs, and stated that “the gods are black.” Officers testified that he
10 appeared intoxicated and that his behavior was consistent with substance use rather than a mental
health crisis.
In jail, Gilbreath threatened to kill officers. Mental health counselor Karen Cotton testified
that Gilbreath appeared verbally aggressive, uncooperative, irritable, and agitated. Gilbreath
denied mental health issues, told her that “the gods are black,” and refused to answer questions
about substance use. Cotton reported that Gilbreath appeared to be under the influence of drugs or
alcohol and did not exhibit signs of incoherence, disorientation, or mental illness. Because she
lacked prior records, Cotton noted that possible psychosis required further evaluation.
B. The defense’s case
The defense asserted that Gilbreath was experiencing a psychotic break caused by
schizophrenia at the time of the murder. To support this theory, the defense called officers to testify
about Gilbreath’s behavior during his arrests. Officers Jordan Tunnell and Luis Serrato were both
involved in Gilbreath’s criminal trespass arrest on March 27. Tunnell testified that he believed
Gilbreath was intoxicated on alcohol or substances, and the defense emphasized that Tunnell did
not include intoxication in his report. Tunnell explained he did not include intoxication in his report
because Gilbreath was arrested for criminal trespass. Serrato similarly testified that Gilbreath
appeared intoxicated on alcohol or drugs and explained that his report focused on the criminal-
trespass offense rather than intoxication. Bodycam footage from Tunnell and Serrato shows
Gilbreath agitated and defiant and repeatedly stating, “the gods are black,” during the arrest. The
defense called Cotton, the mental health counselor who evaluated Gilbreath after his March 27
arrest. Cotton testified that Gilbreath appeared paranoid and stated, “the gods are black.” The
defense questioned her about her report noting the need to rule out schizophrenia. Cotton
11 explained, “that’s only because we didn’t have any . . . history on him, [it was] just purely upon
[Gilbreath’s] presentation.”
Gilbreath’s sister and father also testified. Courtney Gilbreath testified that Gilbreath
attended the University of Texas at El Paso, double majored in accounting and finance, and
graduated with honors. He worked as a CPA in California then moved back to Texas. Courtney
testified she began noticing “changes” in Gilbreath in October 2021. On one occasion, Gilbreath
repeatedly called her to ask whether she had been speaking to someone they knew from high
school. After Courtney denied it, Gilbreath asked if she was okay and whether she needed any
money. Courtney responded she was fine and told him he could send her money if he wanted and
he did. Courtney described this as “weird” because Gilbreath was “very frugal.” She testified
Gilbreath did not remember the incident when she later asked him about it and that she was not
close to him in 2022.
Byron Gilbreath testified that Gilbreath had no disciplinary history in high school or
college and worked for a large accounting firm in California after graduating. When Gilbreath
moved back to Texas in 2020, he lived with his parents for a few months before purchasing a home
in Pflugerville. Byron described an incident in April 2022 where Gilbreath came to his home and
seemed paranoid. Gilbreath walked into the house without closing the front door and looked
around and outside the windows. He asked Byron whether he was living in a simulation, then left,
and returned 20 minutes later, appearing calmer. Byron testified this was “very out of character.”
Byron also testified that during Gilbreath’s house arrest, he monitored him and ensured there were
no drugs or alcohol in the home. He recalled that Gilbreath said “the gods are black” a day or two
before he broke bond and left the house. On the night he left, Gilbreath was sitting on the back
porch and when his parents checked on him, he was gone. Byron testified that he and his wife
12 “didn’t know what was going on . . . because he’d never acted like that before. We did not know
what it was.” On cross examination, Byron acknowledged that Gilbreath did not tell them that he
had been fired from his California job and that although he suspected Gilbreath might have been
drinking at the time of the April 2022 incident, he was not aware of his alcohol or cocaine use.
The jury also heard conflicting expert testimony regarding Gilbreath’s insanity defense.
Burrows, a defense expert, testified that she evaluated Gilbreath and diagnosed him with
schizophrenia. In forming her opinion, Burrows reviewed Gilbreath’s employment records,
offense reports, video statements from Sutton and Gonzales, bodycam footage from both arrests,
jail records, and notes from her conversation with Gilbreath’s parents. Burrows relied on
disciplinary write-ups from Gilbreath’s California job for cursing, singing loudly, and using a
British accent; the “black box” statements Gilbreath made to Sutton and Gonzales; Sutton’s report
to detectives that Gilbreath exhibited “schizophrenic behavior,” talked to himself, and would
repeatedly enter and exit the garage; and statements about “the black box” and “the gods are black”
made to officers and jail staff. Burrows testified that Gilbreath was psychotic at the time of his
second arrest, which she found significant because she believed he lacked access to drugs or
alcohol in the preceding months, indicating to her that his psychosis was not substance-induced.
Although Burrows acknowledged Gilbreath’s cocaine use and believed he “probably dr[a]nk too
much,” she testified she lacked evidence showing substance use at a level that explained his
behavior. As for Gilbreath’s conduct at the time of the crime and after, Burrows opined that driving
around randomly in Florence, fleeing the scene, purchasing a gun, and instructing Gonzales to
place his phone on the car, reflected paranoia consistent with his diagnosis. She also cited his
failure to conceal the murder weapon or take property from Pier as supporting insanity and claimed
that Gilbreath fleeing to Dallas “makes sense because he [was] scared.” Burrows concluded that
13 at the time of the murder, Gilbreath had schizophrenia, did not know his conduct was wrong, and
was insane.
On cross examination, Burrows agreed that psychiatry relies on self-reporting and admitted
that Gilbreath never disclosed his cocaine use, work-related instances where he was intoxicated,
or the true reason for moving back to Texas. Burrows acknowledged that Gilbreath had no
diagnosed mental illness before the offense and that no mental health conditions were imposed
when he was released on bond. She agreed that his post-offense conduct, such as looking around
to see if anyone had seen him, fleeing the scene at a high rate of speed, and attempting to conceal
the outside of his shirt, could indicate awareness that his conduct was wrong. The State also pressed
Burrows about Gilbreath’s omission of key information and his stated reason for fleeing the scene.
Although he told both Burrows and Reed that he fled to Dallas because he believed he was in a
simulation and feared that people from the simulation were pursuing him from the area of his
home, he did not tell either expert that he actually went straight to a bar near his home where he
was a regular. Burrows agreed that cocaine is known to cause psychotic symptoms, acknowledged
testimony that Gilbreath had used cocaine since April 2022, and conceded that her report did not
address his substance use. She ultimately agreed that even when someone exhibits symptoms of a
severe mental illness, the insanity defense does not apply if those symptoms result from voluntary
intoxication.
C. The State’s rebuttal
The State’s rebuttal expert, Dr. Christine Reed, testified that she diagnosed Gilbreath with
substance-induced psychotic disorder and concluded he did not meet the criteria for insanity. Reed
testified that voluntary intoxication of drugs or alcohol does not constitute a defense to a crime.
She explained that substance-induced psychosis can resemble schizophrenia and that
14 differentiation between the two depends on whether a primary mental illness exists or whether
substance use is causing symptoms that mimic mental illness. Reed testified that the distinction
requires examining when symptoms began, whether they occurred during a clear absence of
alcohol or substance use, how long they lasted, and whether they diminished after the effects of
substances wore off.
Reed determined that Gilbreath was not insane at the of the murder. She reviewed the same
records as Burrows and focused on Gilbreath’s conduct in the months and weeks leading to the
murder, the day of the offense, and after. Reed testified that Gilbreath did not exhibit overt signs
of mental illness during her evaluation and stated that his denial of substance use was concerning
because substance use is a critical factor in insanity evaluations. Reed stated that throughout the
evaluation, Gilbreath consistently denied cocaine use and presented his alcohol consumption as
minimal. Reed testified that much of what Gilbreath reported was inconsistent with the records
she reviewed. She noted that although Gilbreath claimed he was overwhelmed and was socially
isolating before the murder, the records reflect ongoing social activity and substance use. Reed
testified that information from Gonzales and Sutton of Gilbreath’s frequent work absences, alcohol
and drug use, increased time at bars and strip clubs, and spending large sums of money on
prostitutes, “lends itself more to substance abuse problems and the spiraling out of control related
to drug use.” She also emphasized that Gilbreath had no reported mental health issues before the
offense and that jail records from August to December 2022 reflected no mental health concerns,
episodes, or diagnoses, indicating that his psychosis was substance induced. His release on bond
without any mental health diagnoses or court imposed mental health conditions was also notable
to her.
15 Reed concluded that Gilbreath’s alcohol and drug use predated or precluded psychosis
symptoms and that periods of sobriety, including incarceration, produced no documented mental
health concerns. She testified that most symptoms reported by Gilbreath and others coincided with
periods of drinking or drug use, including his second arrest, where he visibly appeared psychotic
and agitated, consistent with substance abuse. Reed identified Gilbreath’s post-offense conduct as
another significant indicator.
Reed testified that Gilbreath told her he shot and killed Pier because he believed he was in
a simulation and thought she was involved, and that he fled to Dallas because he believed people
from the simulation were coming from his home and were after him. Reed explained that despite
this account, records show that Gilbreath fled the scene, returned to the area of his home, and
interacted with people at his regular bar—a fact Gilbreath did not disclose to her. Reed opined that
this omission was purposeful information that is the opposite of what [Gilbreath] was saying and
suggested an attempt to manipulate her opinion. Reed also testified that Gilbreath appeared to
know he was under surveillance at the time of his August arrest and took steps to avoid
apprehension.
She stated that the conditions Gilbreath imposed on Gonzales before confessing, his
instruction not to tell anyone, his failure to report fears of being pursued or killed by people in the
simulation to police, and his flight to Dallas to distance himself from the crime scene, demonstrated
his awareness that his conduct was wrong. Reed testified that because much of what was occurring
was substance induced, Gilbreath experienced substance-induced psychosis and did not meet the
legal criteria for insanity.
16 D. The evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of Gilbreath’s insanity defense.
Gilbreath argues “the evidence overwhelmingly showed that [he] was experiencing
psychosis caused by schizophrenia before, during, and after the shooting, and [he] did not know
his actions were unlawful at the time of the shooting.” He primarily relies on Burrows’s
schizophrenia diagnosis, his “strange behavior” reflected in his California employment records,
his difficulty performing his work at his Texas job, and testimony from Gonzales, Sutton, and
family members describing changes in his behavior. He also relies on his statements about “the
black box” and “simulation,” Sutton’s descriptions of his conduct, and Sutton’s statement to police
characterizing his behavior as “schizophrenic.” Gilbreath further points to eyewitness accounts
from the day of the murder, including his alleged “aimless” and “odd” driving before and after the
murder, and his appearance at one of his regular bars with his shirt inside out. According to
Gilbreath, the crime lacked any motive “other than his own delusions.” He also points our attention
to what he characterized as “paranoid” behavior after the murder, including requiring Gonzales to
place his phone on the car and making no attempt to conceal the murder weapon. Gilbreath relies
on Burrow’s conclusion that he remained psychotic after months of sobriety in jail along with the
jail notes stating that he “responded to the medication like somebody with schizophrenia would,”
which he contends shows that mental illness was the underlying cause of his symptoms. He further
asserts that the evidence did not support Reed’s substance-use conclusions because officers never
found drugs on his person during either arrest or his home.
The State responds that the jury was within its discretion to reject Gilbreath’s insanity
defense. The State maintains that the evidence shows that Gilbreath did not have a severe mental
illness at the time of the offense and that his conduct was consistent with knowing his conduct was
17 wrong. The State relies on trial evidence regarding Gilbreath’s alcohol and drug use before and at
the time of the murder. Citing Texas Penal Code § 8.04(a), the State argues that Gilbreath cannot
prevail on his insanity defense due to his voluntary intoxication, as “the trial record is replete with
testimony about [his] heavy use of drugs and alcohol.” We agree.
Testimony established that in the months leading to the murder, Gilbreath regularly drank
at bars and escalated his use to drinking directly from liquor bottles at home on a weekly basis.
Testimony also showed that he used cocaine during this period and Sutton specifically explained
that Gilbreath’s comments about “the black box” and “simulation” increased as his alcohol and
cocaine use increased. On the day of the murder, Gilbreath drank several rounds of beer and liquor
at a bar, left the bar, bought more alcohol, and drove around. After the murder, the jury heard
testimony that Gilbreath was “looking around as if wondering if someone was watching” and
“stood there and looked in both directions” before fleeing the scene and driving at a high rate of
speed.
Consistent with the record, the State emphasizes that no “witnesses testified to [Gilbreath]
having significant mental issues on the day of the offense.” Gilbreath’s actions after the murder
are significant, including leaving the scene and going to Twin Peaks—where he was well known—
with his shirt inside out, then going to Dallas for the night. The jury heard Sutton’s testimony that
Gilbreath told him he went to Dallas and that he was “coked out” and “drunk” around the time.
These actions could be construed as consistent with Gilbreath avoiding police, concealing
evidence, and attempting to establish an alibi—all while being under the influence. Two days after
the murder, Gilbreath continued using alcohol and drugs, and the State argues that his confession
to Gonzales and “[his] desire to move to a more private area and be away from cell phones before
confessing a murder to his friend shows his fear of being overheard and potentially apprehended.”
18 Regarding Burrows’s evaluation, the State also argues that the jury could reasonably credit Reed’s
testimony over Burrows’s based on evidence that Gilbreath’s symptoms were largely self-reported,
that Burrows did not consider his substance use, or that Reed’s evaluation proved to be more
objective or persuasive.
The jury heard conflicting expert testimony and was free to reject Burrow’s opinion and
accept Reed’s. See Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 950–951. A central issue was whether Gilbreath’s
mental disease or defect caused him not to know that his conduct was illegal. Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 8.01(a). The jury heard evidence of Gilbreath’s conduct before, during, and after the murder
and could reasonably conclude that he understood his conduct was against the law. Gilbreath’s
justification that he believed he was in a simulation and feared Pier might have been part of the
simulation and might kill him, does not excuse his conduct or establish that he lacked knowledge
of its illegality. Compare McDonald v. State, No. 05-23-00419-CR, 2024 WL 4784421, at *6
(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 14, 2024) (not designated for publication) (holding evidence factually
sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of appellant’s insanity defense where appellant stated she
sedated and smothered her children because delusions and hallucinations made her believe her
children were being sexually abused), with Olivier v. State, 850 S.W.2d 742, 745–46 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence factually insufficient to support the jury’s
rejection of insanity defense where appellant believed the devil was within her and thought she
would go to hell if she did not kill the “thing” she was wrestling with in her bed—which was her
daughter—and where three doctors provided uncontroverted testimony that the appellant was
insane at the time of the offense).
The Texas Penal Code expressly provides that “[v]oluntary intoxication does not constitute
a defense to the commission of crime.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04(a). Evidence showed that
19 Gilbreath voluntarily consumed alcohol and cocaine before the offense and drank on the day of
the murder. As factfinder, the jury acted within its discretion in determining that Gilbreath’s
psychosis was substance-induced. See Afzal v. State, 559 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2018, pet. ref’d) (“Based on the conflicting evidence presented at trial, we find that the trial court
was within its discretion to find that Afzal’s psychosis was caused by benzodiazepine withdrawal
and not his earlier head injury.). “Sister courts of ours have recognized that psychosis resulting
from voluntary drug use falls within the definition of voluntary intoxication.” Id. (citing Valdes-
Fuerte v. State, 892 S.W.2d 103, 108–09 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.), Dominguez v.
State, 661 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1983, pet. ref’d)). We agree.
Based on our review of the record it its entirety, we cannot say that the jury’s rejection of
Gilbreath’s insanity defense was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as
to be manifestly unjust. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670 n.29, 671. The evidence was factually
sufficient to support the jury’s determination. Gilbreath’s sole issue is overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice
March 5, 2026
Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)