Joseph v. Hemingway

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJanuary 31, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-11390
StatusUnknown

This text of Joseph v. Hemingway (Joseph v. Hemingway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph v. Hemingway, (E.D. Mich. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

GEDEON JOSEPH, #71698-018,

Petitioner, Civil Action No. 23-cv-11390 HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN vs.

JONATHAN HEMINGWAY,

Respondent. /

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

I. Introduction

Gedeon Joseph filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). He challenges his conviction, upon pleading guilty, to brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Before the Court is the government’s motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 (ECF No. 6). The Court will decide the motion without a hearing pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the following reasons,

1 The Court will decide the motion without a response from Joseph since it may dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Estacio v. Gilley, No. 21-5813, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7879, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Mar. 24, 2022) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of section 2241 habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds). (1) the motion is granted, and (2) the petition is dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Background A. Factual History On December 24, 2018, Joseph and two accomplices robbed a restaurant

located in Sunrise, Florida. (S.D. Fla. Case No. 19-60055, ECF No. 131, PageID.3). A grand jury indicted him for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). (Id., ECF No. 16, PageID.1-3). Joseph pled guilty

to the conspiracy count and the firearm count. (Id., ECF No. 39, PageID.1, ¶ 1). The government ultimately dismissed the robbery count. (Id., ¶ 2; ECF No. 94, PageID.25, Tr. 25:21-22). Pursuant to his plea agreement, Joseph waived his right

to challenge (1) the constitutionality of the statutes of conviction, and (2) whether the admitted conduct fell within the scope of those statutes. (Id., ECF No. 39, PageID.5, ¶ 12). A Florida district judge sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of 12

months for the conspiracy offense and 84 months for the firearm offense, for a total of 96 months. (Id., ECF No. 69, PageID.2; ECF No. 94, PageID.23-24, Tr. 23:22- 24:2). B. Procedural History Joseph appealed his conviction on the firearm offense despite the plea

agreement’s appellate waiver provision. (Id., ECF No. 73). Citing to intervening Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals precedents, Joseph argued that the conspiracy conviction cannot alone serve as the predicate offense to support

his conviction on the firearm charge because conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). United States v. Joseph, 811 F. App’x 595, 597 (11th Cir. 2020). But Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the plea agreement’s appellate waiver clause barred Joseph

from (1) attacking the firearm offense’s “constitutionality,” or (2) challenging whether his predicate acts qualified as a “crime of violence.” Id. at 598. Joseph afterwards returned to the district court, where he moved to invalidate

the firearm conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (S.D. Fla. Case No. 19-60055, ECF No. 118). On this go-around, Joseph asserted that his trial attorney failed to inform him about relevant Supreme Court authority that would have impacted his decision to plead guilty. (Id., PageID.9, 21, ¶ 18). The district court rejected this

contention outright. Concluding that Joseph received effective assistance of counsel, the district court found that:

Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to inform him about the Davis decision is belied by the record. The Supreme Court decided Davis on June 24, 2019, two months after Petitioner’s change-of-plea hearing. More so, following the Davis decision, but prior to sentencing, trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss the § 924(c) charge (Count Three) in the Indictment on the basis that it relied on an invalid predicate offense.

(ECF No. 131, PageID.13). The district court denied the section 2255 motion and entered judgment. (Id., PageID.16). Joseph never appealed. Now, Joseph petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.2 (ECF No. 1). He seeks to overturn the firearm offense conviction, yet again, on the same grounds asserted previously. III. Analysis “A federal prisoner must challenge the legality of his detention by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but may challenge the manner or execution of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2012).

There is an exception, however. Section 2255’s savings clause allows a prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence under section 2241 so long as he can demonstrate “that his remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective.” Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

The standard is a rigorous one. United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th

2 Joseph filed the habeas petition in this district because he is currently incarcerated at FCI Milan, which is located in the Eastern District of Michigan. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004) (requiring petitioners to file section 2241 habeas petitions “in the district of confinement.”). Cir. 2001); cf. Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 2019). It’s even tougher now that the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S. Ct. 1857

(2023). In Jones, the Court held that Supreme Court decisions which (1) post-date the conclusion of the petitioner’s initial section 2255 proceeding, and (2) adopt a new

interpretation of the statute of conviction supporting the petitioner’s claim for relief, do not render section 2255’s remedies “inadequate or ineffective.” Id. at 1869. Joseph relies upon Supreme Court decisions that either pre-date the conclusion of his initial section 2255 proceeding or fall squarely within Jones’s parameters.3 (ECF

No. 1, PageID.13-15). So he cannot establish that the remedies afforded under section 2255 are “inadequate or ineffective.” See 28 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rumsfeld v. Padilla
542 U.S. 426 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Wooten v. Cauley
677 F.3d 303 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
William Andrew Wright v. Stephen Spaulding
939 F.3d 695 (Sixth Circuit, 2019)
Ramon Hueso v. J.A. Barnhart
948 F.3d 324 (Sixth Circuit, 2020)
Derrick Taylor v. Angela Owens
990 F.3d 493 (Sixth Circuit, 2021)
United States v. Peterman
249 F.3d 458 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Donzell McKinney
60 F.4th 188 (Fourth Circuit, 2023)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Joseph v. Hemingway, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-v-hemingway-mied-2024.