Joseph M. Joyner v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Joseph M. Joyner v. United States

320 F.2d 798, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 76, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4907

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJune 20, 1963

Docket17472

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 320 F.2d 798 (Joseph M. Joyner v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Joseph M. Joyner v. United States, 320 F.2d 798, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 76, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4907 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

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Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, charged with robbery,¹ was convicted of assault with intent to commit robbery. Since “robbery, under the District statute, is possible without assault,”² he maintains that assault with intent to commit robbery is not “an offense necessarily included in” a charge of robbery. Rule 31(c), F.R.Cr.P.

The District robbery statute denounces several kinds of acts taking the property of another, at least one of which apparently does not require an assault.³ Appellant was charged in the full language of the statute, substituting, of course, the conjunctive and for the disjunctive or where necessary.⁴ Thus, under the indictment, assault may not have been a necessarily included lesser offense as'to all kinds of takings charged. But on the facts as developed during the trial, assault with intent to rob was clearly proved. Since the indictment did charge a taking by force and violence, appellant’s conviction of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to rob was permissible. Rule 31(c), F.R.Cr.P.

In effect what appellant is attempting to do here, through his very competent court-appointed counsel, is to attack the indictment for duplicity. The attack, however, comes too late. See Rule 12(b) (2), F.R.Cr.P.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant, charged with robbery,¹ was convicted of assault with intent to commit robbery. Since “robbery, under the District statute, is possible without assault,”² he maintains that assault with intent to commit robbery is not “an offense necessarily included in” a charge of robbery. Rule 31(c), F.R.Cr.P.

The District robbery statute denounces several kinds of acts taking the property of another, at least one of which apparently does not require an assault.³ Appellant was charged in the full language of the statute, substituting, of course, the conjunctive and for the disjunctive or where necessary.⁴ Thus, under the indictment, assault may not have been a necessarily included lesser offense as'to all kinds of takings charged. But on the facts as developed during the trial, assault with intent to rob was clearly proved. Since the indictment did charge a taking by force and violence, appellant’s conviction of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to rob was permissible. Rule 31(c), F.R.Cr.P.

In effect what appellant is attempting to do here, through his very competent court-appointed counsel, is to attack the indictment for duplicity. The attack, however, comes too late. See Rule 12(b) (2), F.R.Cr.P.

Affirmed.

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320 F.2d 798, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 76, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4907, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-m-joyner-v-united-states-cadc-1963.

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