Joseph Hewitt v. The B.F. Goodrich Co., a Foreign Corporation and T.G. & Y. Stores, Co., a Foreign Corporation

732 F.2d 1554, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 400, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22123
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedMay 29, 1984
Docket83-3174
StatusPublished
Cited by106 cases

This text of 732 F.2d 1554 (Joseph Hewitt v. The B.F. Goodrich Co., a Foreign Corporation and T.G. & Y. Stores, Co., a Foreign Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Hewitt v. The B.F. Goodrich Co., a Foreign Corporation and T.G. & Y. Stores, Co., a Foreign Corporation, 732 F.2d 1554, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 400, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22123 (11th Cir. 1984).

Opinion

FAY, Circuit Judge:

The appellant, Joseph Hewitt, was injured when a tire he was mounting exploded. He sued the manufacturer, B.F. Goodrich Company, the retailer, T.G. & Y. Stores Company and American Motorists Insurance Company in a Florida court. 1 The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida based on diversity of citizenship. A jury trial was held before a visiting Senior District Judge, sitting by assignment. The case was tried on theories of negligence, warranty and strict liability. In July, 1982 the case was submitted to the jury solely on the strict liability theory. The jury found for the appellant and awarded damages of $450,000. B.F. Goodrich moved for a directed verdict, judgment N.O.V., a remittitur, or a new trial. The trial judge found that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and ordered a new trial. At retrial in January 1983, a jury found against the appellant. 2 We find that the district court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial, therefore, we reverse the order granting a new trial and reinstate the first jury’s verdict.

On April 8, 1978, the appellant was working at his uncle’s Standard Station in Inverness, Florida. Mr. Louis Mennella bought two new F-78 Brunswick tires at a local T.G. & Y. store and brought them to Hewitt’s Standard Station to be mounted. The task fell to the appellant. While inflating one of the new tires, it exploded injuring the appellant’s right arm and damaging his eyesight. The Brunswick tire is a private label tire manufactured by B.F. Goodrich for sale by T.G. & Y. At trial, the appellant attempted to show the explosion was caused by a manufacturing defect. The appellees tried to prove the accident was caused by improper mounting of the tire and that appellant’s negligence caused or contributed to his injuries.

The only issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge erred by setting aside the jury verdict and granting a new trial. The district court found that “[i]n this case, there is little credible evidence that the tire in question was defective and substantial evidence that if there was a defect plaintiff’s own actions played a predominate role in causing his injuries.” The trial judge considered appellant’s expert witness’ testimony “suspect” and “tenuous” when compared to the testimony of defense experts. He found that “[t]he jury’s conclusion that there was a manufacturing defect in the tire is not supported by any credible evidence and flies in the face of the great weight of the evidence to the *1556 contrary.” On the issue of comparative negligence, the district judge found “that great weight of the evidence indicates ... that the plaintiffs own negligence, if not the sole cause, was a contributing proximate cause of his injury.”

When ruling on a motion for a new trial, a trial judge must determine “if in his opinion, ‘the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence ... or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.’ ” United States v. Bucon Construction Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir.1970), 3 quoting, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 352-53 (4th Cir.1941). “[T]o assure that the judge does not simply substitute his judgment for that of the jury, ... we have noted that new trials should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is against the great-— not merely the greater — weight of the evidence.” Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir.1980), citing, Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 620 (5th Cir.1976).

A district court ruling on a motion for a new trial is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. When the trial court grants a new trial our review is broader and requires a stringent application of the same standard. Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964, 974 & n. 8 (11th Cir.1982); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 796-97 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Conway, 610 F.2d at 363-63. This is because when the jury verdict is set aside usual deference to the trial judge conflicts with deference to the jury on questions of fact. When a new trial is granted on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence our review is particularly stringent to protect the litigant’s right to a jury trial. Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir.1982); Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838, 96 S.Ct. 67, 46 L.Ed.2d 57 (1975). Three factors, the simplicity of the issues, the extent to which the evidence is in dispute, and the absence of any pernicious or undesirable occurrence at trial, tend to indicate that this court should defer to the jury as factfinder. Conway, 610 F.2d at 363; Love v. Sessions, 568 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir.1978); Spurlin, 528 F.2d at 620. When these three factors are not present it is more appropriate to affirm the trial court’s decision, recognizing his first-hand knowledge of the course of the trial.

To decide this appeal, we closely read the transcript of the first trial to determine if the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. It is undisputed that the bead bundle in the tire had been broken prior to the explosion. The bead bundle consists of 18-20 steel bands in a tire that form its strength. The issue before the jury was whether the broken bead bundle was attributable to a manufacturing defect or was due to appellant’s own conduct while mounting the tire.

Appellant testified that he first placed the tire and rim on a tire-changing machine 4 and secured the safety cone. 5 He then lubricated the tire and rim with a tire lubricant that aids in the mounting process. His initial attempt to seat the tire 6 was unsuccessful so the appellant applied a high pressure ring 7

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732 F.2d 1554, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 400, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-hewitt-v-the-bf-goodrich-co-a-foreign-corporation-and-tg-y-ca11-1984.