Joseph Draper v. Warden Rarden

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedApril 16, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-10250
StatusUnknown

This text of Joseph Draper v. Warden Rarden (Joseph Draper v. Warden Rarden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Draper v. Warden Rarden, (E.D. Mich. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH DRAPER,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 25-cv-10250 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH WARDEN RARDEN,

Respondent. _____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Dkt. 1)

This is a pro se habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Federal prisoner Joseph Draper, currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan, challenges the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) determination that he is ineligible to earn credits toward his federal sentence under the First Step Act (FSA) as well as the calculation of his release date under the Second Chance Act (SCA). (Dkt. 1.) Respondent filed an answer, contending that the petition should be dismissed. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the petition. I. BACKGROUND On February 8, 2022, Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of actual methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. United States v. Joseph Draper, No. 21-cr-00081, Dkt. 20, (E.D. Tenn.). The court sentenced Petitioner to 70 months imprisonment and 4 years supervised release. (Dkt. 6, PageID.37–38.) In January 2025, Petitioner initiated this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He primarily challenges the BOP’s calculation of his release date and argues that the BOP is not applying his time credits in accordance with the First Step Act and the Second Chance Act. He seeks transfer to prerelease custody. His projected release date is July 8, 2026. II. ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion A federal habeas corpus petitioner is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit has indicated that “the habeas exhaustion requirement is not without exception,” nor “statutorily required.” Fazzini v. Northeast Ohio Corr. Ctr., 473 F.3d 229, 236, 235 (6th Cir. 2006). “If a petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a § 2241 petition, the District Court may in its discretion either excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits, or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” Ridley v. Smith, 179 F. App’x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2006)

(punctuation modified). Dismissal of habeas corpus petition without prejudice is inappropriate, where any further attempt by a prisoner to exhaust the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative procedures would be futile. See Bauer v. Henman, 731 F. Supp. 903, 906 (S.D. Ill. 1990). Respondent argues that the petition is subject to dismissal because Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before initiating this habeas action. However, the Court will not address the exhaustion requirement because Petitioner’s claims do not warrant habeas corpus relief, and it would be a waste of time and resources to require exhaustion of administrative remedies or to address Petitioner’s argument that it would be futile to do so. The Court therefore excuses the exhaustion requirement and will proceed to address the merits of the claims. B. Merits A petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a federal inmate under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is proper where the inmate is challenging the manner in which his or her sentence is being executed. Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998). Petitioner’s application is properly brought under § 2241 because he is challenging the manner in which his sentence is

being executed. Eligible federal inmates, those whose convictions do not exclude them from receiving FSA benefits, may earn FSA time credits or FTCs. An eligible inmate can earn 10 FTCs “for every 30 days of successful participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). An inmate can earn an additional 5 FTCs during those 30 days if (i) his or her recidivism-risk rating is minimum or low and (ii) his or her risk of recidivism has not increased for two consecutive recidivism assessments by the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(c)(2). A federal prisoner may lose earned FTCs for violating the requirements or rules of programs or as a sanction for a prohibited act. 28

C.F.R. § 523.43(a). A maximum of 365 days of FTCs may be applied towards a prisoner’s early transfer to supervised release, basically shortening their sentence by up to one year. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(d). Eligible prisoners may have any remaining FTCs applied towards early transfer to pre-release custody, either in a residential reentry center or home confinement. 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c). Because certain requirements must be met before FTCs can be applied toward an inmate’s sentence, the BOP makes a distinction between “earned” FTCs and “applied” FTCs. For earned FTCs to be applied to a sentence, an eligible prisoner must have (i) earned FTCs in an amount equal to his or her remaining term of imprisonment, (ii) shown through periodic risk assessments, a demonstrated reduction in recidivism risk or maintaining a low or minimum risk during his or her incarceration, and (iii) had the remainder of his term computed under applicable law. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1); 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.44(b)–(d). Only “earned” FTCs “shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C).

In addition to the FTCs, the BOP also assesses each inmate individually under the SCA to determine whether they might qualify for up to 365 additional days of early transfer to prerelease custody. The SCA gives the BOP the authority to determine an inmate’s eligibility for residential re-entry center (RRC) placement. See SCA of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 251(a), 122 Stat. 657, 692–693 (April 9, 2008), 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).

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Related

Hansard v. Barrett
980 F.2d 1059 (Sixth Circuit, 1992)
Leonard Louis Capaldi v. Stephen Pontesso, Warden
135 F.3d 1122 (Sixth Circuit, 1998)
Witham v. United States
355 F.3d 501 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
James Luedtke v. David Berkebile
704 F.3d 465 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Demis v. Sniezek
558 F.3d 508 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Bauer v. Henman
731 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Illinois, 1990)
Moore v. Hofbauer
144 F. Supp. 2d 877 (E.D. Michigan, 2001)
Foster v. Ludwick
208 F. Supp. 2d 750 (E.D. Michigan, 2002)
Ridley v. Smith
179 F. App'x 109 (Third Circuit, 2006)
Sotherland v. Myers
41 F. App'x 752 (Sixth Circuit, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
Joseph Draper v. Warden Rarden, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-draper-v-warden-rarden-mied-2026.