1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 JOSÉ ORLANDO TORRES-CRUZ,
5 Plaintiff,
6 CIVIL NO. 25-1408 (HRV) v. 7
Commissioner of Social Security, 9 10 Defendant.
11 OPINION AND ORDER1 12
13 José Orlando Torres-Cruz (“Plaintiff” and/or “Mr. Torres-Cruz”) seeks review of 14 the final administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the 15 Commissioner”) that denied his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act 16 (“the Act”). The Commissioner argues in his brief that the decision should be affirmed 17 because it is supported by substantial evidence. After careful consideration of the record, 18 19 and for the reasons outlined below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. 21 A. Standard of Review 22 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), any individual may obtain review of a final 23 decision of the Commissioner. Under said statutory provision, the Court is empowered 24 25 26 27 1 Eduardo Martín-Quiñones, a second-year law student at the Inter American University of Puerto Rico School of Law, provided significant assistance in the research and drafting of this Opinion and Order. 28 1 1 “to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, 2 modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner….” Id. In addition, the statute 3 provides that if supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the Commissioner as 4 to any fact, shall be conclusive. Id. 5 A reviewing court must uphold the decision of the Commissioner as long as the 6 7 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied the correct legal principles, and the 8 determination is supported by substantial evidence. Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 9 (1st Cir. 2001). The scope of my review is, therefore, limited. I am tasked with 10 determining whether the ALJ employed the proper legal standards and focused facts 11 upon the proper quantum of evidence. See Ward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 12 13 655 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 76 14 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). 15 To meet the evidentiary benchmark, more than a scintilla of evidence is required. 16 Purdy v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2018). But the threshold for evidentiary 17 sufficiency is not particularly high; if after looking at the existing administrative record, 18 19 the court is persuaded that it contains sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s 20 factual and legal determinations, the decision is bound to be affirmed. See Biestek v. 21 Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019); see also Mosconas v. Saul, No. 19-2049, 2020 WL 22 6255298, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 33755, at *2 (1st Cir. Sept. 15, 2020) (citation omitted) 23 (“Substantial evidence does not require preponderant evidence; it merely requires 24 evidence that reasonably supports the finding on the record as a whole.”) Indeed, 25 26 substantial evidence exists “if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record, 27 could accept it as adequate to support [the] conclusion.” Irlanda-Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health 28 2 1 & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). The ALJ’s decision must be reversed, 2 however, if it was arrived at “by ignoring evidence, misapplying law, or judging matters 3 entrusted to experts.” Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). 4 B. The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process 5 To be eligible for social security benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that he or 6 7 she is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, 107 8 (1987). The Act defines disability in pertinent part as the inability “to engage in any 9 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 10 impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 11 less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment 12 13 or impairments must be severe enough that “he is not only unable to do his previous 14 work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists [in 15 significant numbers] in the national economy….” Id., § 423(d)(2), § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see 16 also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). 17 The Commissioner follows a five-step evaluation process to determine disability. 18 19 See Mills v. Apfel, 244 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). These steps must 20 be followed in order, and if a person is determined not to be disabled at any step, the 21 inquiry stops. Id. The Plaintiff has the burden of proof at the first four steps of the process. 22 Freeman v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 2001). 23 Step one considers work activity, that is, whether the Plaintiff is currently “doing 24 substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the person is, then he is not 25 26 disabled under the Act. Id. Step two asks whether Plaintiff has a physical or mental 27 impairment, or a combination of impairments, that is severe and meets the Act’s 28 3 1 duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Step three considers the medical 2 severity of the Plaintiff’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At this step, if 3 Plaintiff is determined to have an impairment that meets or equals an impairment listed 4 in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpt. P., app. 1, and meets the duration requirements, he is 5 disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). On the other hand, if the Plaintiff is not found 6 7 to be disabled at this step, his Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) is assessed. 20 C.F.R. 8 § 404.1520(a)(4), (e). Once the ALJ determines the RFC, the inquiry proceeds to step 9 four. Step four compares Plaintiff’s RFC to his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the Plaintiff can still do his past relevant work, he is not disabled. 11 Id. Finally, at step five, the Plaintiff’s RFC is considered alongside his “age, education, 12 13 and work experience to see if he can make an adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R. § 14 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If he can make an adjustment to other work, he is not disabled; if he 15 cannot, he is disabled. Id. At this step, it is the Commissioner who has the burden “to 16 come forward with evidence of specific jobs in the national economy that the applicant 17 can still perform.” Freeman v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d at 608 (citing Arocho v. Sec’y of 18 19 Health & Human. Servs., 670 F.2d 374, 375 (1st Cir. 1982)). 21 Mr. Torres-Cruz filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability 22 insurance benefits on September 26, 2023, with an alleged onset date of August 21, 2023. 23 See Transcript of Social Security Proceedings (“Tr.”), Docket No. 13 at 708-14). The claim 24 was initially denied on March 20, 2024 (Tr. 480-91), and upon reconsideration on June 25 26 27, 2024. (Tr. 492-500). Plaintiff moved for a hearing on July 31, 2024. (Tr. 501-05). A 27 telephone hearing was held on December 18, 2024, where Plaintiff appeared alongside 28 4 1 his attorney David L. Torres. (Tr. 83-116). Aracelis Figueroa, an impartial vocational 2 expert (“VE”), was also present. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ granted 3 Plaintiff 30 days to submit additional medical evidence, which was promptly tendered 4 by his representative on December 23, 2024, and admitted into evidence as Exhibits 29F 5 through 32F. (Tr. 1309-1345). A supplemental telephone hearing was later held on April 6 7 9, 2025. (Tr. 50-82). Present during said hearing were Plaintiff, his attorney, and 8 impartial VE María de León. Id. The ALJ rendered her decision on April 21, 2025. (Tr. 9 20-49). I briefly summarize below the ALJ’s written decision. 10 The ALJ determined at Step One of the five-step sequential process that Plaintiff 11 did not engage in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, that is, August 12 13 21, 2023. (Tr. 26). At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 14 impairments: obesity, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, status-post release surgeries on 15 both hands, severe obstructive sleep apnea, lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, 16 generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe without 17 psychotic symptoms. (Id.). 18 19 With respect to Step Three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an 20 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity 21 of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, specifically 22 listing 20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. (Tr. 27-31). For this finding, the 23 ALJ concluded that the record did not establish the medical signs, laboratory findings, 24 or degree of functional limitation required to meet or equal the criteria of listings (1) 1.15 25 26 Disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in compromise of a nerve roots, (2) 1.18 27 28 5 1 Abnormality of a major joint(s) in any extremity, (3) 3.02 Chronic respiratory disorders, 2 (4) 11.14 Peripheral neuropathy, or (5) 14.09 Inflammatory Arthritis. (Tr. 27-28). 3 As to Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ found that he did not meet or 4 medically equal the criteria in listings 12.04 and 12.06. (Tr. 29). To reach her conclusion, 5 the ALJ considered if Paragraph B criteria was satisfied. To satisfy “Paragraph B” criteria, 6 7 the mental impairment must result in one extreme limitation 2 or two marked 8 limitations3 in a broad area of functioning. (Id.). The ALJ assessed a moderate limitation 9 in the area of understanding, remembering, or applying information because despite 10 several challenges noted in his functional report, Plaintiff “reported that he did not need 11 reminders to take care of his personal hygiene,” and “demonstrated good appearance 12 13 and adequate hygiene, a logical, relevant, and coherent thought process, and adequate 14 attention and concentration” during mental examinations. (Tr. 29-30). As to Mr. Torres- 15 Cruz’ ability to interact with others, the ALJ determined he has only a mild limitation 16 given he reported “having no problems getting along with family, friends, and neighbors, 17 and no issues interacting with individuals in positions of authority” as well as a socially 18 19 active lifestyle. (Tr. 30). A moderate limitation was assessed in the area of concentrating, 20 persisting, and maintaining pace because despite difficulties in concentrating and paying 21 attention, Mr. Torres-Cruz reported being able to follow both written and verbal 22 23 24 25 2 An extreme limitation is the inability to function independently, appropriately, or effectively, and 26 on a sustained basis. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P. app 1.
27 3 A marked limitation is a seriously limited ability to function independently, appropriately, or effectively, and on a sustained basis. Id. 28 6 1 instructions, if he was able to read them multiple times or have them repeated to him, 2 and mental examinations also indicated he possessed a logical, relevant, and coherent 3 thought process, intact immediate, recent, and remote memory, and adequate attention, 4 concentration, judgment and introspection. (Tr. 30). Lastly, regarding adapting or 5 managing himself, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff has a mild limitation. Again, mental 6 7 examinations “indicated the claimant demonstrated good appearance and adequate 8 hygiene, a logical, relevant, and coherent thought process, and adequate attention, 9 concentration, judgment, and introspection” despite reports of changes in behaviors, 10 anxiety, depression and fears. (Id.).4 11 Next, and prior to moving to Step Four of the sequential process, the ALJ 12 13 concluded that Plaintiff had an RFC 14 to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except lifting and/or carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 15 pounds frequently; sitting for six hours, standing and/or 16 walking for six hours. The claimant can push and pull as much weight as he can lift and carry limited to frequently in the 17 bilateral upper extremities. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform less than full range of light 18 work except frequently reaching overhead to the left and/or to 19 the right. He can handle items frequently with the left hand and/or with the right hand. He has fingering limitations 20 frequently with the left hand and/or the right hand. The claimant is limited to perceive attributes of objects, such as 21 size, shape, temperature, or texture, by touching with skin, particularly that of fingertips limited to frequently on the left 22 and/or on the right. The claimant can climb ramps and stairs 23 occasionally, kneel occasionally, crouch occasionally, and crawl occasionally. The claimant can occasionally work in 24 high, exposed places. The claimant can occasionally have 25 26 27 4 The ALJ likewise found that the evidence fell short of establishing the relevant Paragraph C criteria. (Tr. 31). 28 7 1 proximity to moving mechanical parts. The claimant can occasionally drive or operate machines or equipment. The 2 claimant retains the capacity to understand, remember and 3 carryout simple instructions. He can use judgment limited to perform simple work-related decisions and is limited to deal 4 with occasional changes in a routine work setting.
5 (Tr. 31). 6 In addition, the ALJ explained that in determining the RFC, she considered all of 7 Plaintiff’s symptoms to the extent they can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the 8 objective medical evidence as required by 20 CFR § 404.1529 and Social Security Ruling 9 10 (“SSR”) 16-3p, as well as medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings as 11 mandated by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. In following the required two-step process (first 12 determining if the physical or mental impairments could reasonably be expected to 13 produce the pain and/or symptoms alleged and, second, evaluating the intensity, 14 persistence, and limiting effects of said symptoms to determine the extent to which they 15 16 limit Plaintiff’s work-related activities), the ALJ concluded after a thorough and detailed 17 explanation (Tr. 31-40), that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could 18 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [his] statements 19 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 20 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” (Tr. 21 32). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff does not have any past relevant work (Step Four), 22 23 and that considering his age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs 24 existing in significant numbers in the national economy he could perform (Step Five), 25 such as Routing Clerk, Router, and Marker. (Tr. 40-42). Accordingly, the ALJ held that 26 Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 41). 27 28 8 1 On July 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Social Security Complaint, along with an 2 application to proceed in forma pauperis before this Court. (Docket Nos. 1 and 2). On 3 July 31, 2025, this case was formally referred to the undersigned for all further 4 proceedings, including the entry of judgment. (Docket No. 7). Mr. Torres-Cruz filed his 5 social security brief on January 14, 2026. (Docket No. 18). The Commissioner’s brief was 6 7 filed on February 12, 2026. (Docket No. 20). Plaintiff replied on February 25, 2026. 8 (Docket No. 21). 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 Mr. Torres-Cruz raises two issues. First, he contends that the ALJ erred in 11 rejecting all medical source opinions and “issuing an RFC based on a lay assessment of 12 13 the raw medical evidence and without sufficient explanation for the conclusions reached.” 14 (Docket No. 18 at 10). As a sub issue, Plaintiff claims that the error includes not properly 15 considering the evidence of his use of a cane. (Id.). Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ 16 did not sufficiently consider his alleged pain and the limitations that stem from his 17 physical impairments when discrediting his subjective allegations. The Commissioner 18 19 responds that substantial evidence, including the opinions and findings of state agency 20 medical consultants, support the RFC determination. Relatedly, the Commissioner 21 posits that Mr. Torres-Cruz does not point to evidence that would establish greater 22 limitations than those assessed by the ALJ. As to the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s 23 subjective symptoms, the Commissioner insists that substantial evidence supports the 24 finding that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not entirely consistent with the 25 26 evidence in the record. I discuss each issue in turn. 27 28 9 1 A. Residual Functional Capacity 2 As noted, Mr. Torres-Cruz maintains that the ALJ erred because she supposedly 3 discredited all medical source opinions and based the RFC determination on her own 4 interpretation of the raw medical data. Plaintiff complains about the sufficiency and 5 completeness of the ALJ’s explanations. He also cries foul about the fact that his use of 6 7 an assistive device (cane), did not factor at all in the RFC determination. 8 The Commissioner pushes back, contending that Plaintiff is incorrect when he 9 says that no medical opinions support the ALJ’s decision. According to the 10 Commissioner, the RFC is indeed supported by the findings of the state agency medical 11 consultants, who the ALJ found partially persuasive only because they assessed fewer 12 13 limitations than the ALJ ultimately adopted. The Commissioner further argues that 14 Plaintiff has failed to establish that a cane was medically necessary under Social Security 15 Ruling 96-9p, which requires “medical documentation establishing the need for a hand- 16 held assistive device to aid in walking or standing, and describing the circumstances for 17 which it is needed.” (Docket No. 20 at 6). Although Plaintiff cites a prescription for a 18 19 four-pronged cane (Tr. 281; 1096), the Commissioner notes that “the prescription does 20 not specify the circumstances for which the cane is needed.” (Docket No. 20 at 6). 21 After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record, I find 22 that the Commissioner has the better argument. To be sure, in evaluating a claimant’s 23 RFC, an ALJ cannot rely on raw medical data; rather, he or she must look to physician’s 24 opinions to translate that evidence into functional terms. See Vega Valentín v. Astrue, 25 26 725 F. Supp. 2d 264, 271 (D.P.R. 2010) (citing Berríos López v. Sec’y of Health & Human 27 Servs., 951 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1991) and Rosado v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 28 10 1 807 F.2d 292, 293 (1st Cir. 1986)). Here, the only medical sources in the record that 2 provided opinions on exertional and non-exertional limitations were state-agency 3 consultants Dr. Cindy J. Ramírez and Dr. Brenda Concepción.5 The ALJ credited their 4 opinions for the most part, finding that the opinions were “supported by their perspective 5 [sic] analyses of the evidence, including the claimant’s surgical history, obesity, and use 6 7 of a cane [and that] [t]heir conclusions [were] generally consistent with the overall 8 medical record, particularly the most recent documentation from the SIF, which reflects 9 some improvement in the claimant’s condition.” (Tr. 37). Where the ALJ partially 10 disagreed with said opinions, it was to impose greater RFC restrictions in order to give 11 Mr. Torres-Cruz the benefit of the doubt. See Bowden v. Colvin, No. 13-201, 2014 U.S. 12 13 Dist. LEXIS 57695, 2014 WL 1664961, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 25, 2014) (“[A] claimant may 14 not obtain a remand on the basis of an RFC that is more favorable to him or her than the 15 evidence would otherwise support.”). What’s more, none of the treating sources offered 16 opinions regarding Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations and how they impacted his 17 ability to perform work-related activities. Therefore, the contention that the ALJ’s RFC 18 19
21 5 In her decision, the ALJ noted as follows:
22 The undersigned has considered the opinions of Dr. Cindy J. Ramírez, and Dr. Brenda Concepción, who are doctors hired by the state agency. Dr. 23 Ramírez initially reviewed the record on February 26, 2024, and Dr. Concepción reviewed the record on June 26, 2024, at the reconsideration 24 level. Dr. Ramírez opined the claimant was limited to the light exertional level, had postural and manipulative limitations, and no visual, 25 communicative, or environmental limitations. However, Dr. Concepción provided a similar assessment of the claimant s limitations, with the 26 exception that she also identified environmental restrictions (Exs. 1A at 6- 8; 3A at 6-9). 27 (Tr. 36). 28 11 1 determination is based on her own interpretation of raw medical data is meritless. See 2 Rodríguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 401, 403 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding 3 that the ALJ did not impermissibly assess RFC himself, but instead relied on the RFC 4 assessment provided by the non-examining medical advisor); see also Valentin- 5 Rodriguez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-CV-1488 MEL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83144, 6 7 2014 WL 2740410, at *7 (D.P.R. June 17, 2014) (finding no indication that the ALJ 8 interpreted raw data in determining a nuanced RFC for the plaintiff, instead of adopting 9 completely either (1) the RFC determined by the agency doctors, or (2) the RFC 10 determined by the treating physician). 11 I also find that there was no error committed by the ALJ when she did not consider 12 13 the necessity of an assisted device when determining the RFC. The record shows that the 14 ALJ considered Mr. Torres-Cruz’ use of a cane as part of the overall analysis. For instance, 15 the ALJ explained: 16 As for the use of the cane, although the claimant has been seen 17 using one, the file contains no documentation of balance problems or a history of falls. Notably, while the claimant 18 alleges difficulty with hand use his manipulative tasks, there 19 is no evidence of difficulty grasping or holding the cane. Moreover, the claimant did not report using a cane during 20 visits to his sleep specialist (Exs. 10F; 24F) or while receiving treatment at INSPIRA. He was also not observed using a cane 21 during consultative examinations conducted by Dr. Roberto Irizarry-Rivera and Dr. Claudio Santos-García. Although the 22 claimant reported beginning to use the cane in March 2024, 23 Dr. Santos-García observed only two months earlier that his gait was normal, and that he did not rely on walls or require 24 assistance for support.
25 26 27 28 12 1 (Tr. 36). However, the use of a cane did not need to be considered as part of the RFC 2 determination because Mr. Torres-Cruz has failed to show that the use of a hand-held 3 assistive device was medically required. 4 To find that a hand-held assistive device is “medically required,” SSR 96-9p, 1996 5 SSR LEXIS 6 requires “medical documentation establishing the need for a hand-held 6 7 assistive device to aid in walking or standing, and describing the circumstances for which 8 it is needed.” SSR 96-9p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 6 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996), 1996 WL 374185. 9 Moreover, there must be (1) medical documentation establishing the need for said device 10 to aid in walking or standing and (2) the medical documentation must also “describ[e] 11 the circumstances for which it is needed (i.e., whether all the time, periodically, or only 12 13 in certain situations; distance and terrain; and any other relevant information).” SSR 96- 14 9p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 6, [WL] at *7. “If both requirements are met, the ALJ must conclude 15 that the cane is medically necessary and consider that limitation in [her] decision.” 16 Linabel G.N. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-cv-1016 (GLS), 2025 WL 957732, 2025 U.S. 17 Dist. LEXIS 62966, at *&20 (D.P.R. Mar. 31, 2025) (citing Simpkins v. Berryhill, 2017 18 19 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140373, 2017 WL 3821684, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2017)). 20 As stated, Plaintiff underscores that the record contains a prescription for a “quad 21 cane”, (Tr. 281; 1096), and that he has been observed using one. Putting aside the fact 22 that the prescription is undated6 (something that the Commissioner highlights), the 23 24 25 26 6 In his reply, Plaintiff mentions that the issue was discussed at the hearing before the ALJ and that the record shows the prescription “was faxed to the agency on March 11, 2024.” (Docket No. 21 at 4; see 27 also Tr. 114). I need not address the issue of the date as the argument fails on the merits.
28 13 1 prescription is silent as to the circumstances for which it was needed. See Ostolaza v. 2 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-cv-1364 (MEL), 2024 WL 4052157, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3 160966, at *9-10 (D.P.R. Sept. 5, 2024) (finding no error where the prescription vaguely 4 stated “Please give cane for walking” but provided no other information thus failing to 5 describe the circumstances for which it was needed). And the fact that Plaintiff was 6 7 observed using a cane to walk does not establish, without more, the need for a hand-held 8 assisted device. Id. at *10 (citing Figueroa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 19-1069, 2020 9 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265221, 2020 WL 13481006, at *5 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2020)). 10 B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Allegations 11 Mr. Torres-Cruz argues that remand is warranted because the ALJ “did not 12 13 sufficiently consider’ his subjective allegations of pain and limitations. (Docket No. 18 at 14 16). The Act specifically provides that a claimant will not be considered disabled unless 15 he or she furnishes medical and other evidence, such as medical signs and laboratory 16 findings, showing the existence of a medical impairment which could reasonably be 17 expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Pursuant 18 19 to Social Security Ruling 16-3p, ALJs must consider all of the evidence of a claimant’s 20 subjective statements about his or her symptoms, including pain, and determine “the 21 extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the 22 objective medical evidence.” See SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL 4790249, at 23 *49462; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ may not disregard a claimant’s statements 24 about the intensity, persistence, and limited effects of symptoms “solely because the 25 26 objective medical evidence does not substantiate the degree of impairment-related 27 symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL 4790249, at *49465. However, 28 14 1 subjective statements regarding symptoms cannot, by themselves, support a finding of 2 disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Relevantly, in evaluating the intensity, persistence, 3 and limiting effects of a person’s symptoms, SSR 16-3p requires that the ALJ consider, 4 among other things, a claimant’s daily activities. 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL 5180304, 5 at *7. 6 7 According to Mr. Torres-Cruz, the ALJ did not properly consider his allegations 8 of severe lower extremity pain and cramping. He primarily points to MRI findings 9 obtained in the context of Dr. Meléndez-Gómez’s clinical documentation of loss of hair 10 with pain, numbness, and tingling of the lower extremities due to peripheral vascular 11 disease and lower back pain radiating to the lower limbs, arguing that “the decision does 12 13 not explain why Plaintiff’s allegations of significant lumbar spine and leg pain and 14 limitations were rejected in the context of this objective and clinical evidence.” (Docket 15 No. 18 at 17-18). Plaintiff further claims that he “continued to experience hand pain when 16 trying to pick up items, had difficulty maintaining grip on items such as a glass or 17 toothbrush, or turning a doorknob.” (Id. at 18). He faults the ALJ for allegedly not 18 19 explaining why these “allegations of significant lumbar spine and leg pain and limitations 20 were rejected in the context of this objective and clinical evidence.” (Id.). By like token, 21 Mr. Torres-Cruz contends that it was error for the ALJ to consider what he labels “the 22 residual post-surgical limitations affecting Plaintiff’s hands.” (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff 23 claims that the ALJ erred in considering his daily activities to undermine his allegations 24 of significant pain and limitations. (Id. at 19). 25 26 In response, and as to the lumbar spine and lower extremity pain, the 27 Commissioner submits that the ALJ did not err in relying on Plaintiff’s daily activities, 28 15 1 noting that Plaintiff “acknowledged that he could sweep the floor, wash dishes, fold 2 clothes, cook twice per week, attend church twice per week, and drive,” and that disability 3 adjudication may properly rely on circumstantial evidence, including daily activities, to 4 infer an ability to work. (Docket No. 20 at 9-10). As to the subjective complaints of 5 manipulative limitations, the Commissioner says that the ALJ was entitled to consider 6 7 Plaintiff’s improvement following his carpal tunnel surgeries, and that the ALJ in fact 8 found Plaintiff to have “continuing manipulative limitations,” which were incorporated 9 into the RFC. (Id. at 9). The Commissioner emphasizes that Plaintiff, who bears the 10 burden in this case, fails to offer evidence supporting a more restrictive RFC. (Id.). 11 After careful consideration of the record, I find that the ALJ adequately explained 12 13 the basis for her finding that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, 14 and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely consistent with the evidence of 15 record. As the ALJ reasoned: 16 As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, 17 persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms, they are inconsistent because the frequency or extent of the treatment 18 sought by him is not consistent with the degree of his 19 subjective complaints. The record showed sparse treatment notes without continuance and consistency after the alleged 20 onset date which indicated that the claimants physical and mental impairments are not as debilitating as he alleged. 21 **** 22
23 Because the record lacks corroborating opinions that support the claimant’s allegations of his exertional and non-exertional 24 limitations that are caused by his severe physical and mental impairments, the undersigned do [sic] not find the claimant’s 25 statements to be fully consistent with the medical evidence of 26 the record.
27 28 16 1 (Tr. 39). This explanation, together with the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s reported daily 2 activities and his post-surgical improvement, satisfies the substantial evidence standard 3 with respect to the two-step framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p. 4 The ALJ did discuss the findings of the MRI in concluding that Plaintiff suffers from 5 lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, a severe impairment, and subsequently in her 6 7 decision noting that it “further confirmed multilevel degenerative changes” in the lumbar 8 spine. (Tr. 26, 28 and 33). She was also entitled, as the Commissioner correctly points 9 out, to consider the improvement in the condition following the hand surgeries, See 20 10 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v), and Plaintiff’s daily activities to the extent they showed 11 inconsistency with the subjective allegations. See Patoski v. Berryhill, 320 F. Supp. 3d 12 13 283, 290-92 (D. Mass. 2018). 14 Simply put, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s 15 reported symptoms were not entirely consistent with objective medical evidence in the 16 record. Given the deferential standard of review, this conclusion can hardly be deemed 17 error. See Coskery v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Berrios-Lopez v. 18 19 Secretary of HHS, 951 F.2d 427, 429 (1st Cir. 1991). Objective medical evidence is a 20 useful indicator to help make reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence 21 of symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5. Relevant to this case, there is a 22 significant amount of objective medical evidence that conflicts with Plaintiff’s subjective 23 statements, creating inconsistencies. And an ALJ may discount subjective complaints 24 where there is evidence to directly rebut Plaintiff’s testimony. See Sacilowski v. Saul, 959 25 26 F.3d 431, 441 (1st Cir. 2020). 27 28 17 2 In view of the above, I find that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff is not disabled 3 within the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial evidence. For that reason, the 4 Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. Judgment shall be entered. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 31st day of July, 2026. 8 S/Héctor L. Ramos-Vega 9 HÉCTOR L. RAMOS-VEGA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18