Jose Murguia v. Langdon

District Court, E.D. California·Decided September 28, 2023·No. 1:19-cv-00942·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JOSE MURGUIA, for himself and for the Case No. 1:19-cv-00942-ADA-BAM Estates of Mason and Maddox Murguia, 10 ORDER GRANTING CITY OF TULARE Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY 11 PENDING PETITION FOR REVIEW v. BEFORE SUPREME COURT 12 HEATHER LANGDON, et al., (Doc. 71) 13 Defendants. 14 15 Currently pending before the Court is City of Tulare Defendants’ motion for stay of this 16 action pending resolution of a petition for review by the United States Supreme Court. (Doc. 71.) 17 Defendants County of Tulare, Ricardo Cerda, Jeffrey Lewis and Roxanna Torres (collectively 18 “County Defendants”) joined in the motion to stay proceedings. (Doc. 72.) Plaintiffs opposed 19 the motion on August 25, 2023, and City of Tulare Defendants replied on August 28, 2023.1 20 (Docs. 76, 77.) The Court found the matter suitable for resolution without oral argument, and the 21 matter was submitted on the papers. L.R. 230(g) 22 Having considered the briefing and record in this matter, and for the reasons that follow, 23 City of Tulare Defendant’s motion for stay of this action will be granted. 24 BACKGROUND 25 The parties are familiar with the factual background of this action, which has been 26

27 1 Defendant Heather Langdon did not file a response due to issues with her address for service. The Court finds a response from Defendant Langdon unnecessary as she will not be prejudiced by the requested stay 28 of this action. 1 discussed at length by the district court and in the published opinion of the Ninth Circuit. (See 2 Docs. 57, 66.) Relevant here, on October 1, 2021, the district court determined that Plaintiffs 3 failed to state any federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their 4 constitutional rights against the individual defendants and the municipal entity defendants. The 5 district court therefore granted dismissal with prejudice of the federal claims and declined to 6 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. (Doc. 57.) Plaintiffs 7 appealed on October 13, 2021. (Doc. 59.) 8 On March 15, 2023, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on application of the “state- 9 created danger” doctrine. (Doc. 66.) The Ninth Circuit (1) reversed the district court’s dismissal 10 of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against defendants Garcia and Torres under the state-created danger 11 doctrine; (2) vacated the district court’s dismissal order as to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against 12 defendants Lewis and Cerda and remanded with instructions to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend; 13 and (3) reversed and remanded for further proceedings Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the 14 County of Tulare and the City of Tulare, as well as all state law claims. (Doc. 66.) 15 On March 22, 2023, defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc to the Ninth Circuit. 16 (Doc. 67.) The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on 17 July 18, 2023. (Doc. 69.) Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on August 1, 2023. 18 (Doc. 70.) 19 On August 11, 2023, City of Tulare Defendants filed the instant motion for a stay of 20 proceedings, indicating that they are currently preparing a petition for writ of certiorari to the 21 United States Supreme Court, which will be filed on or before October 16, 2023. The petition 22 will seek resolution of the state-created danger doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 Defendants believe that definitive guidance on the issue will have a direct impact on all future 24 proceedings in this court. Defendants assert that there is a reasonable probability certiorari will 25 be granted, that there is a reasonable probability that the Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth 26 Circuit, and that defendants and the public will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted. 27 City of Tulare Defendants point out that if the Supreme Court denies the petition, then any delay 28 in Plaintiffs’ ability to pursue their claims will be minimal. 1 Plaintiffs opposed the motion on August 25, 2023, arguing that defendants have not met 2 their burden to justify a stay as they have not made out a clear case of hardship or inequity in 3 being required to go forward. Plaintiffs assert that any further delay, beyond the previous four 4 years that have passed since the filing of the complaint, will be unduly prejudicial, causing more 5 damage from the loss of memory and other consequences of the passage of time. Plaintiffs 6 further contend that the probability of the Supreme Court taking this case is quite low and that the 7 probability of reversal is even lower. Plaintiffs believe that there is nothing inherently unfair 8 about requiring defendants to proceed having lost their appeal. (Doc. 76.) 9 City of Tulare Defendants filed a reply on August 28, 2023. (Doc. 77.) There is no 10 indication that defendants sought a stay of proceedings from either the Ninth Circuit or the U.S. 11 Supreme Court. 12 DISCUSSION 13 As a preliminary matter, the parties appear to dispute the standard the Court is to apply in 14 considering whether to stay proceedings pending the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with 15 the Supreme Court. City of Tulare Defendants contend that the Court should apply the factors of 16 Packwood v. Senate Select Committee on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1319-20 (1994). (Doc. 71 at p. 17 5.) In Packwood, a United States Senator applied to a single Supreme Court Justice for a stay 18 pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of a decision by the 19 District Court enforcing a subpoena duces tecum issued by respondent Senate Select Committee 20 on Ethics. The Court of Appeals had denied the senator’s emergency motion for a stay pending 21 appeal. Id. at 1319. Justice Rehnquist explained in Packwood that the criteria for deciding 22 whether to grant a stay were well established, requiring the applicant to demonstrate: (1) a 23 reasonable probability that four Justices would vote to grant certiorari; (2) a significant possibility 24 that the Court would reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood of irreparable harm, 25 assuming the correctness of the applicant’s position, if the judgment is not stayed. Id. at 1319-20. 26 In identifying this standard, Justice Rehnquist cited Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & 27 Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1991). According to Barnes, the standard cited in 28 Packwood is applicable to motions for stay brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f). Barnes, 501 U.S. 1 at 1302 (“The authority for a single Justice to issue a stay of the sort requested here is conferred 2 by 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f).”). Indeed, Barnes explained that “[t]he practice of the Justices has settled 3 upon three conditions that must be met before issuance of a § 2101(f) stay is appropriate. There 4 must be a reasonable probability that certiorari will be granted (or probable jurisdiction noted), a 5 significant possibility that the judgment below will be reversed, and a likelihood of irreparable 6 harm (assuming the correctness of the applicant’s position) if the judgment is not stayed.” Id. 7 However, the “vast majority of cases . . .

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