1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE ISAIAS PEREZ ARGUETA, No. 2:26-cv-0777-DJC-CKD P A #240-500-481, 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION v. 14 WARDEN, California Detention Facility, 15 et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Jose Isaias Perez Argueta proceeds without counsel and seeks a writ of habeas 19 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner alleges he has been detained at California 20 Detention Facility since September 27, 2025, when he was apprehended by immigration 21 authorities in Los Angeles, California. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The pro se petition, respondent’s answer, 22 and petitioner’s reply are before the court. (ECF Nos. 1, 7, 11.) For the reasons set forth below, 23 the undersigned recommends the petition be denied without prejudice to renewal should 24 petitioner become subject to prolonged detention after expiration of the 90-day removal period of 25 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2)(A). 26 I. Background 27 Under the petition’s allegations and petitioner’s declaration, petitioner is a native and 28 citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States on February 10, 2023, seeking refuge and 1 protection after suffering persecution and torture in his home country. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 11-12.) 2 Petitioner has no criminal record in the United States or Guatemala. (Id.) He has been held in 3 custody since he was detained on September 27, 2025, more than 6 months ago. (Id.) Petitioner 4 alleges his detention occurred under abusive conditions, and that his continued detention is 5 causing severe hardship for himself and his family. (Id.) 6 The petition brings two claims: (1) detention without a bond hearing violates the 7 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); and (2) detention without a bond hearing violates Fifth 8 Amendment Due Process. (ECF No. 1 at 8-9.) Petitioner seeks immediate release or a bond 9 hearing. (Id. at 9.) 10 In opposition, respondents contend petitioner is subject to a final order of removal and 11 detained under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2)(A). (ECF No. 7 at 1.) They assert he is in mandatory 12 detention during the 90-day removal period. (Id. at 1-2.) They assert any claim that he should 13 have previously been provided a bond hearing is moot now that his detention authority has clearly 14 shifted to 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2). (Id. at 2.) They argue his detention is not prolonged. (Id. at 2-3.) 15 In reply, petitioner argues he is held in punitive, jail-like conditions without being 16 afforded basic due process required by the Constitution and the INA. (ECF No. 11.) He notes he 17 was apprehended in the interior of the United States, and not at the border, and asserts he is 18 therefore entitled to a bond hearing under INA § 236(a). (Id. at 3.) He argues his detention is 19 prolonged in violation of due process. (Id. at 4-5.) 20 II. Legal Standard 21 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 22 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 23 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner in 24 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s 25 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 26 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 27 //// 28 //// 1 III. Discussion 2 Petitioner does not dispute respondents’ assertion that he is subject to a final order of 3 removal and within the 90-day removal period during which detention is statutorily mandated. 4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(a), (a)(2)(a); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 528 (2021) 5 (“During the removal period, detention is mandatory.” (citing § 1231(a)(2)). Whether continued 6 detention beyond the removal period is authorized is governed by the Supreme Court decision in 7 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. Once a noncitizen has been detained for six months past the final 8 removal order, he may be entitled to conditional release upon a showing that he will be 9 indefinitely detained. See id. at 701. 10 Here, the immigration judge ordered petitioner’s removal to Ecuador, or, in the 11 alternative, Honduras, on January 13, 2026. (ECF No. 7-1 at 3.) Petitioner did not appeal. (ECF 12 No. 7-2 at 2.) 13 The 90-day removal period begins on the latest of the following: 14 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final. 15 (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order. 16 (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration 17 process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. 18 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Since petitioner did not appeal, the 90-day removal period became 19 “administratively final” upon expiration of the time to appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39. The time 20 for appeal is set by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38. Under the statute in effect when petitioner was ordered 21 removed on January 13, 2026, petitioner had 30 days to appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38 (2005) 22 (effective November 14, 2022, to March 8, 2026). Because he did not appeal, his 90-day removal 23 period began on February 12, 2026, and continues until May 13, 2026. 24 Petitioner’s detention during this 90-day “removal period” is mandatory under the INA. 25 See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 528. The Ninth Circuit has determined this 26 statutorily mandated 90-day period of detention “passes constitutional scrutiny.” Khotesouvan v. 27 Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 2004); see also, e.g., Atkinson v. Dep’t of Homeland 28 Sec., No. 2:25-CV-00484-JHC-GJL, 2025 WL 1737017, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 6, 2025), report 1 and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-CV-00484-JHC-GJL, 2025 WL 1736596 (W.D. Wash. 2 June 23, 2025) (“Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief from his mandatory detention 3 during the removal period.”). In Khotesouvan, the Ninth Circuit noted a noncitizen ordered 4 removed cannot raise a colorable claim for release under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 5 Amendment until at least 90 days of detention have passed even when removal is not reasonably 6 foreseeable. Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1299; see also id. at 1301 (“the Zadvydas due process 7 analysis does not extend to § 1231(a)(2)”). 8 In this instance, petitioner is in the 90-day removal period and was detained more than 6 9 months ago, on September 27, 2025. He argues he is entitled to a bond hearing because he was 10 apprehended and detained in the interior of the United States.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE ISAIAS PEREZ ARGUETA, No. 2:26-cv-0777-DJC-CKD P A #240-500-481, 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION v. 14 WARDEN, California Detention Facility, 15 et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Jose Isaias Perez Argueta proceeds without counsel and seeks a writ of habeas 19 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner alleges he has been detained at California 20 Detention Facility since September 27, 2025, when he was apprehended by immigration 21 authorities in Los Angeles, California. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The pro se petition, respondent’s answer, 22 and petitioner’s reply are before the court. (ECF Nos. 1, 7, 11.) For the reasons set forth below, 23 the undersigned recommends the petition be denied without prejudice to renewal should 24 petitioner become subject to prolonged detention after expiration of the 90-day removal period of 25 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2)(A). 26 I. Background 27 Under the petition’s allegations and petitioner’s declaration, petitioner is a native and 28 citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States on February 10, 2023, seeking refuge and 1 protection after suffering persecution and torture in his home country. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 11-12.) 2 Petitioner has no criminal record in the United States or Guatemala. (Id.) He has been held in 3 custody since he was detained on September 27, 2025, more than 6 months ago. (Id.) Petitioner 4 alleges his detention occurred under abusive conditions, and that his continued detention is 5 causing severe hardship for himself and his family. (Id.) 6 The petition brings two claims: (1) detention without a bond hearing violates the 7 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); and (2) detention without a bond hearing violates Fifth 8 Amendment Due Process. (ECF No. 1 at 8-9.) Petitioner seeks immediate release or a bond 9 hearing. (Id. at 9.) 10 In opposition, respondents contend petitioner is subject to a final order of removal and 11 detained under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2)(A). (ECF No. 7 at 1.) They assert he is in mandatory 12 detention during the 90-day removal period. (Id. at 1-2.) They assert any claim that he should 13 have previously been provided a bond hearing is moot now that his detention authority has clearly 14 shifted to 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2). (Id. at 2.) They argue his detention is not prolonged. (Id. at 2-3.) 15 In reply, petitioner argues he is held in punitive, jail-like conditions without being 16 afforded basic due process required by the Constitution and the INA. (ECF No. 11.) He notes he 17 was apprehended in the interior of the United States, and not at the border, and asserts he is 18 therefore entitled to a bond hearing under INA § 236(a). (Id. at 3.) He argues his detention is 19 prolonged in violation of due process. (Id. at 4-5.) 20 II. Legal Standard 21 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 22 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 23 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner in 24 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s 25 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 26 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 27 //// 28 //// 1 III. Discussion 2 Petitioner does not dispute respondents’ assertion that he is subject to a final order of 3 removal and within the 90-day removal period during which detention is statutorily mandated. 4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(a), (a)(2)(a); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 528 (2021) 5 (“During the removal period, detention is mandatory.” (citing § 1231(a)(2)). Whether continued 6 detention beyond the removal period is authorized is governed by the Supreme Court decision in 7 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. Once a noncitizen has been detained for six months past the final 8 removal order, he may be entitled to conditional release upon a showing that he will be 9 indefinitely detained. See id. at 701. 10 Here, the immigration judge ordered petitioner’s removal to Ecuador, or, in the 11 alternative, Honduras, on January 13, 2026. (ECF No. 7-1 at 3.) Petitioner did not appeal. (ECF 12 No. 7-2 at 2.) 13 The 90-day removal period begins on the latest of the following: 14 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final. 15 (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order. 16 (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration 17 process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. 18 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Since petitioner did not appeal, the 90-day removal period became 19 “administratively final” upon expiration of the time to appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39. The time 20 for appeal is set by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38. Under the statute in effect when petitioner was ordered 21 removed on January 13, 2026, petitioner had 30 days to appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38 (2005) 22 (effective November 14, 2022, to March 8, 2026). Because he did not appeal, his 90-day removal 23 period began on February 12, 2026, and continues until May 13, 2026. 24 Petitioner’s detention during this 90-day “removal period” is mandatory under the INA. 25 See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 528. The Ninth Circuit has determined this 26 statutorily mandated 90-day period of detention “passes constitutional scrutiny.” Khotesouvan v. 27 Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 2004); see also, e.g., Atkinson v. Dep’t of Homeland 28 Sec., No. 2:25-CV-00484-JHC-GJL, 2025 WL 1737017, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 6, 2025), report 1 and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-CV-00484-JHC-GJL, 2025 WL 1736596 (W.D. Wash. 2 June 23, 2025) (“Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief from his mandatory detention 3 during the removal period.”). In Khotesouvan, the Ninth Circuit noted a noncitizen ordered 4 removed cannot raise a colorable claim for release under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 5 Amendment until at least 90 days of detention have passed even when removal is not reasonably 6 foreseeable. Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1299; see also id. at 1301 (“the Zadvydas due process 7 analysis does not extend to § 1231(a)(2)”). 8 In this instance, petitioner is in the 90-day removal period and was detained more than 6 9 months ago, on September 27, 2025. He argues he is entitled to a bond hearing because he was 10 apprehended and detained in the interior of the United States. Petitioner’s claim premised on a 11 violation of the INA at the time of detention has become moot now that he is detained under a 12 final order of removal under § 1231. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (an action 13 becomes moot when “it no longer present[s] a case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the 14 Constitution.”); Baires v. Lynch, No. C 15-03635 RS (PR), 2016 WL 4502558, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 15 Aug. 29, 2016) (citing collected cases and holding “[a] petition challenging detention under 16 section 1226 is rendered moot when detention authority shifts to section 1231”). 17 Petitioner also argues his detention is prolonged in violation of due process. It is unclear 18 whether a non-citizen within the mandatory 90-day removal period of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(a) 19 can state a cognizable as-applied procedural due process claim based on prolonged detention. The 20 Supreme Court has left open the question whether due process requires that persons in prolonged 21 mandatory immigration detention receive individualized bond hearings. See Rodriguez v. Marin, 22 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)); see also 23 Marroquin Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Post-Jennings, several 24 courts in this district have conducted an individualized inquiry to determine whether a petitioner’s 25 prolonged detention requires an additional bond hearing.”); Doe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV- 26 00333-JLT-HBK (HC), 2026 WL 797694, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026) (“[Jennings] did not 27 foreclose the ability to raise as-applied challenges to prolonged detention under [§§ 1225(b), 28 1226(a), and 1226(c).]” 1 Assuming, arguendo, such a claim could be cognizable, petitioner here does not show 2 relief is warranted. Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks 3 whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second 4 examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest 5 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 6 460 (1989). 7 Petitioner, whose detention has recently exceeded six months, arguably has a “substantial” 8 private interest in freedom from prolonged detention even though he is within the 90-day removal 9 period. See generally Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting 10 general circuit precedent “that an individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged 11 detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’”). To determine what procedures, if any, are due, the 12 court considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” 13 (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 14 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the 15 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 16 that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 17 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 18 Where petitioner’s detention has exceeded six months but not reached seven months and 19 he is currently within the 90-day removal period, and has not appealed the removal order, the 20 undersigned finds his private interests are “diminished” such that the first factor is neutral. See 21 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (finding non-citizen’s private interest in freedom from 22 prolonged detention “further diminished by the fact that he is subject to [a non-final] order of 23 removal”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (six months is a presumptively reasonable time necessary 24 to bring about a non-citizen’s removal). The second factor also does not favor petitioner because 25 there is no showing he is without meaningful procedural safeguards for prolonged detention. If a 26 non-citizen is not removed within the removal period, the statute provides for release on 27 conditions rather than mandatory detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); Alva v. Kaiser, No. 25- 28 CV-06676-RFL, 2025 WL 2419262, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (“As mandated by 1 || Congress, the default status after the 90-day removal period is therefore release on conditions, not 2 || detention.) The third factor favors the government due to its strong and legitimate interest in 3 || detaining petitioner during the 90-day removal period for the purpose of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 4 | 1231(a)(1)(A) (“the Attorney General shall remove the [non-citizen] from the United States 5 || within... the “removal period”). 6 Petitioner is within the 90-day removal period of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(a). His present 7 || detention is statutorily authorized and does not violate the Fifth Amendment. He is not entitled to 8 | habeas relief at this time. 9 IV. Recommendation 10 In accordance with the above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Jose Isaias Perez Argueta’s 11 | (A #240-500-481) petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be denied without 12 || prejudice. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 14 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 15 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 16 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 17 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 18 || objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 19 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 20 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 | Dated: April 6, 2026 / □□ I / dle ae
23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 95 8 argu0777.mer 26 27 28