Jose Huazo-Marroquin v. Todd Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE MANUEL HUAZO-MARROQUIN, No. 20-71227

Petitioner, Agency No. A205-671-653

v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 30, 2026**

Before: GOULD, RAWLINSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge VANDYKE.

Petitioner Jose Manuel Huazo-Marroquin (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen

of Mexico, petitions for vacatur of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

decision dismissing the appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying

Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioner also challenges the BIA’s

denial of his motion to remand to consider cancellation of removal. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and grant in part, and

remand.

1. We review the denial of applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052,

1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021). The substantial evidence standard is deferential,

allowing reversal only when “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)).

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen or remand for abuse of

discretion. Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Partap

v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (analogizing motions to reopen with

motions to remand). “The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily,

irrationally, or contrary to the law, and when it fails to provide a reasoned

explanation for its actions.” Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1252–53 (9th

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Petitioner’s

2 20-71227 applications for withholding of removal and relief under CAT.1 “[W]ithholding of

removal under § 1231(b)(3) … prohibits removal to a country where the noncitizen’s

‘life or freedom would be threatened’ on account of his ‘race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Iraheta-Martinez v.

Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)).

Petitioner argues that he is a member of two proposed particular social groups

(“PSGs”): “Mexicans who are perceived as wealthy because of their years residing

in the U.S.” or “individuals who have spent a lengthy period in the U.S.” The agency

properly concluded that neither group is a socially-distinct group in Mexican society

and that our caselaw has rejected similarly broad PSGs as not legally cognizable.

See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(holding that PSG “returning Mexicans from the United States,” was “too broad to

qualify as a cognizable social group”); Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226,

1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting “imputed wealthy Americans” as a PSG); Barbosa

v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting “individuals ‘returning

to Mexico [from] the United States [who] are believed to be wealthy’” as a PSG).

To establish protection under CAT, a petitioner must show that “it is more

likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” Akosung v. Barr, 970

1 Because Petitioner did not challenge the IJ’s denial of asylum before the BIA, we do not have jurisdiction to consider that issue on appeal. See Cortez-Acosta v. INS, 234 F.3d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 2000).

3 20-71227 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). And, the torture

must be with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. Zheng v. Ashcroft,

332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s

conclusion that Petitioner did not meet his burden to show that he will “more likely

than not” suffer future torture if returned to Mexico. Petitioner testified that two of

his cousins were kidnapped and tortured in 2010 but did not point to any specific

instances of violence against Petitioner or his family since then. Although the

agency found that Petitioner’s testimony and the country conditions data supported

a possibility of torture, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner

is “more likely than not” to suffer torture if returned to Mexico.

3. The BIA abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion to

remand to adjudicate cancellation of removal. Petitioner contends that the BIA

relied on an interpretation of the “stop-time-rule” that is no longer viable after the

Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018); see also 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) & (d)(1)(A). We agree with Petitioner.

The BIA erred in relying on Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes,

27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) for the proposition that a subsequent notice to appear

specifying the time and/or place of a hearing can perfect a previously deficient notice

because that decision is contradicted by the text of the statute and has since been

overruled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (“[A]ny period of continuous residence

4 20-71227 or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . .

except . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear[.]” (emphasis added)); Niz-

Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 158–69 (2021) (holding that a “notice to appear”

sufficient to trigger the time-stop rule must be contained in a single document); see

also Lopez v. Garland, 998 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc); Posos-Sanchez v.

Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2021); Quebrado Cantor v. Garland, 17

F. 4th 869, 871 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Matter of M-F-O-, 28 I&N Dec. 408, 416

n.3 (BIA 2021) (overruling Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes).

Nor are we persuaded that the BIA gave a “reasoned explanation” regarding

Petitioner’s prima facie eligibility. Tadevosyan, 743 F.3d at 1253. Although the

BIA reasoned that a concern about Petitioner’s son did not show “exceptional or

extremely unusual hardship,” it is unclear to which son the BIA was referring in this

sentence and unclear whether the BIA considered all evidence as to Petitioner’s sons

and wife. The BIA abused its discretion by denying the motion to remand on the

issue of cancellation of removal without giving a “reasoned explanation” evaluating

Petitioner’s prima facie eligibility. Id.

We grant the petition solely as to Petitioner’s cancellation of removal claim

and remand to the BIA for further proceedings on this issue consistent with this

disposition.

DENIED IN PART; GRANTED IN PART AND REMANDED. Each

5 20-71227 party shall bear its costs on appeal.

6 20-71227 FILED Huazo-Marroquin v. Blanche, No. 20-71227 JUL 13 2026 VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

I join the majority’s denial of the petition with respect to Petitioner’s requests

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

Torture. But I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the BIA abused

its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion to remand to adjudicate cancellation of

removal. Although brief—which BIA decisions almost always are—the explanation

provided by the BIA for its denial of Petitioner’s motion to remand was sufficiently

reasoned, and any error was harmless in any event.

In reviewing the BIA’s decision to deny a motion to remand or a motion to

reopen, we apply a “deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Chandra

v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S.

233, 242 (2010)). If the BIA has not “act[ed] arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to

the law” and has “provide[d] a reasoned explanation for its actions,” we uphold the

BIA’s decision. Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1252–53 (9th Cir. 2014)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Providing a “reasoned explanation”

does not require anything like a full-throated discussion of all Petitioner’s evidence.

“[I]f evidence is neither highly probative nor potentially dispositive” the BIA need

not “individually identify and discuss every piece of evidence in the record.”

Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 770–71 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified)

(citation omitted); see also Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) 1 (“The BIA does not have to write an exegesis on every contention. What is required

is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms

sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and

not merely reacted.” (alterations omitted) (quoting Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899,

908 (5th Cir. 2002))). A general statement by the agency that it has considered the

evidence can suffice. See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006).

And in evaluating the BIA’s decision, we “apply a presumption that the BIA did

review the record.” Hernandez, 52 F.4th at 771 (quoting Fernandez v. Gonzales,

439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds, Lemus-Escobar v.

Bondi, 158 F.4th 944 (9th Cir. 2025)).

The bar to show sufficient hardship to warrant cancellation of removal is

demanding: an alien must establish “that removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of

the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). That means showing hardship “substantially different from, or

beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation’ of a ‘close

family membe[r].” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024) (alteration in

original) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001)). So

in order for Petitioner’s hardship evidence here to be “highly probative or potentially

dispositive”––such that the BIA’s decision not to explicitly enumerate and rebut it

2 might be an abuse of discretion—it would need to support some hardship

“deviat[ing], in the extreme, from the norm.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th

996, 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 2025).

None of Petitioner’s hardship evidence here comes close to that description.

Petitioner’s motion spent five sentences on the hardship analysis, referencing only

five pages from the record before the Immigration Judge. Ultimately, Petitioner

raises two potential hardships: (1) his two sons losing his emotional and financial

support, which he argues is particularly necessary because of his younger son’s dairy

allergy and resulting inability to process infant formula; and (2) his wife’s temporary

deferred-removal status, which he asserts she would have to give up if she visited

him in Mexico.

The BIA “recognize[d] [Petitioner’s] concerns about the hardship his United

States citizen son would experience should [Petitioner] be removed” and concluded

that Petitioner “ha[d] not presented evidence of exceptional or extremely unusual

hardship that would meet the hardship standard.” The majority criticizes the BIA on

two grounds: for not indicating whether it considered all Petitioner’s evidence, and

for not specifying which son it was referring to.

Petitioner’s hardship evidence is not “highly probative or potentially

dispositive” such that the BIA was obligated to address each piece of evidence

individually. Hernandez, 52 F.4th at 770 (citation omitted). Petitioner’s sons losing

3 his emotional and financial support is hardly “out of the ordinary and exceedingly

uncommon” in immigration cases, and does not “deviate, in the extreme, from the

norm.” Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006; see also Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales,

423 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that deportation commonly results

in emotional distress to family members). And Petitioner’s sons would not be left

without financial support in any event: the record indicates that Petitioner’s wife

worked before and after the birth of her second son. Given the generality of

Petitioner’s evidence, the BIA was not obligated to explicitly list and then rebut all

Petitioner’s hardship evidence for each family member. Applying the presumption

that the BIA considered all the evidence, the agency’s general acknowledgment of

the hardship evidence sufficed to show that the BIA “ha[d] heard and thought and

not merely reacted.” Lopez, 366 F.3d at 807 n.6 (quoting Efe, 293 F.3d at 908); see

Almaghzar, 457 F.3d at 922. No more was required.

The only relevant detail Petitioner mentions that even arguably could make

the emotional and financial distress to his sons “out of the ordinary and exceedingly

uncommon” is his younger son’s difficulty processing infant formula. Petitioner’s

younger son is now eight years old. Difficulty processing infant formula is no longer

relevant. Remanding so that the BIA could further consider that evidence would be

“an idle and useless formality.” Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019)

(citation omitted).

4 Hardship to Petitioner’s wife is similarly irrelevant. By its terms,

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) considers only hardship to family members who are “citizen[s] of

the United States” or “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(20) (defining “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” as “the status

of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United

States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not

having changed”). The record indicates that Petitioner’s wife belongs to neither

group: her removal was deferred on a temporary basis. Evidence that she might

suffer hardship is not a basis for remand.

The majority’s second criticism––that the BIA did not specify which son it

was referring to––fares no better. The only atypical hardship identified by

Petitioner—the dairy allergy—related to his younger son, so there is no reason to

assume that the BIA had any other rationale for singling out one son in its analysis.

The majority’s attempt to read ambiguity into the BIA’s statement is the opposite of

the deferential approach we should take in a case like this. But even if we assume,

as the majority does, that the BIA may have only considered the hardship evidence

for one son, remand would still not be warranted because, again, any error would be

harmless. See Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that

the harmless error rule applies in reviewing BIA decisions). Except for the younger

son’s now-irrelevant inability to process infant formula, Petitioner’s evidence of

5 hardship for his two sons was identical—the same general concern for emotional

and financial support. Whichever son the BIA was referring to, Petitioner suggests

no relevant reason why the analysis for the other son would have been any different.

Remanding so that the BIA could perform the exact same hardship analysis for the

second son would, once again, be “an idle and useless formality.” Singh, 935 F.3d

at 827 (citation omitted).

Applying the presumption that the BIA considered the record, I would find

that the BIA sufficiently explained its hardship analysis to satisfy the deferential

abuse of discretion standard. Any shortcoming was harmless in any event.1 I would

therefore deny the petition in its entirety, and I respectfully dissent from the

majority’s grant of the petition with respect to Petitioner’s cancellation of removal

claim.

1 Because the BIA’s hardship analysis suffices to dispose of this case, the BIA’s application of time-stop rule precedent inconsistent with Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), was harmless error. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (eligibility for cancellation of removal requires exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to family members even if the ten-year physical presence requirement is satisfied). 6