Jose Escobedo v. El Rinconcito Mexican Grill, LLC, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE ESCOBEDO, Case No. 1:24-cv-01457 JLT SKO

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 13 v. (Doc. 32) 14 EL RINCONCITO MEXICAN GRILL, 15 LLC, et al.,

16 Defendants. 17 18 Jose Escobedo asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act related to barriers 19 he encountered at a restaurant in Madera, California. The defendants move to dismiss the action 20 for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 32.) Escobedo’s allegations do not 21 show he has standing, so the Court cannot adjudicate his claims as they are currently presented. 22 The motion is therefore GRANTED with leave to amend. 23 ALLEGATIONS 24 Escobedo has trouble moving his joints without pain as a result of rheumatoid arthritis. 25 (Doc. 22 at 2.) He uses a cane to get around, and in his words, he “walks slowly.” (Id. at 3.) His 26 joint pain and a finger amputation also limit his dexterity. (Id. at 2.) 27 According to his complaint, Escobedo went to the El Rinconcito Mexican Grill in Madera 28 for lunch in July 2024. (Id.) He says he could not find an accessible parking space when he 1 arrived. (Id. at 3.) He needs a “clear and level space to get and get out of his vehicle using his 2 cane,” so he parked some distance away from the restaurant’s front door, away from other cars. 3 (Id.) He describes the pavement on the parking lot as “cracked and uneven,” and he says this 4 “made it difficult” for him to walk to the front door without losing his balance. (Id.) He later 5 came to believe that an accessible spaces was actually available. (Id.) He thinks he did not notice 6 it because it was not clearly marked. (Id.) 7 Be that as it may, when Escobedo got to the restaurant’s front door, he found it was 8 “heavy” and “closed too quickly.” (Id.) This made it difficult for him to open and walk through 9 in time. (Id.) Inside the restaurant, he alleges there was no accessible seating. (Id. at 4.) This 10 was a problem because “although he does not use a wheelchair regularly, it is difficult for him to 11 move his legs and feet around” beneath a table if it has a base. (Id.) The base can cause “pain or 12 discomfort” in his legs. (Id.) He also found the men’s room door difficult to use because he 13 could not easily pinch and twist the “locking mechanism.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, he alleges the grab 14 bars around the toilet, the toilet seat cover dispenser, the toilet paper dispenser, and the soap and 15 paper towel dispensers were all too high, too far away, or obstructed. (Id.) He is unsure whether 16 there are “other barriers” in the restaurant, and he intends to amend his complaint if he discovers 17 any. (Id. at 4.) 18 Escobedo filed this lawsuit in November 2024, asserting claims against both the restaurant 19 and the property owner (Flipside Christian Church) under the Americans with Disabilities Act 20 and California law. (Doc. 1.) The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his 21 state law claims and dismissed those claims without prejudice to refiling in state court. (Docs. 6, 22 9.) The restaurant and church now move to dismiss his ADA claim for lack of jurisdiction under 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 24 (Doc. 32.) They argue Escobedo lacks standing, they contend that his claims are moot because 25 they removed the barriers he encountered, and they contend that his allegations do not support his 26 ADA claims in any event. Escobedo opposes the motion (Doc. 35), and briefing is complete (See 27 Doc. 39.) The Court took the motion under submission without a hearing. (Doc. 46.) 28 /// 1 JURISDICTION 2 The Court begins, as it must, with the jurisdictional motion. A federal court has discretion 3 to “address jurisdictional issues in any order” it chooses. Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 4 U.S. 1, 4 (2023). In this case it is better to start with standing. 5 The church and restaurant note at the outset of their motion that Escobedo has filed many 6 similar lawsuits in the past. (See, e.g., Docs. 32-1 at 2; 32-2 at 2, 8–13.) The Ninth Circuit has 7 held that “a plaintiff’s motive for visiting a place of public accommodations is ‘irrelevant to the 8 question of standing.’” Langer v. Kiser, 57 F.4th 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Civil Rights 9 Educ. & Enf. Ctr., 867 F.3d at 1101). Plaintiffs need not be “bona fide” customers, in other 10 words. Id. They can have standing even if they are “testers,” “professional” plaintiffs, or “serial” 11 litigators. Id. at 1093–94. Filings in other lawsuits may very well be relevant, such as when they 12 show that one person has claimed to have been in many places at the same time, see, e.g., Langer, 13 57 F.4th at 1097, but the defendants do not contend that this is such a case. 14 The next question is whether the defendants’ motion raises a “facial” or “factual” 15 challenge. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation 16 omitted). A facial challenge “accepts the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations but asserts that they 17 are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 974 18 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court 19 presumes the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true “and draw all reasonable inferences in his 20 favor.” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). “By contrast, a factual attack 21 contests the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the 22 pleadings.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis, 23 quotation marks, and citations omitted). 24 Richard Wright, a parishioner and the church’s financial advisor, believes Escobedo is 25 mistaken in his allegation that the men’s room could not be locked without a difficult pinching 26 and twisting motion. (Doc. 32-4 at 2.) In a declaration attached to the defendants’ motion to 27 dismiss, Wright attests under penalty of perjury that the property has always had a “lever” on the 28 men’s restroom door. (Id.) The church’s access consultant also submitted a declaration, which 1 attaches photos of the door handle in question. (Doc. 32-3 at 16.) He confirms that it could be 2 opened and locked without any twisting or pinching. (Id.) The portion of the defendants’ motion 3 related to the restroom door is a therefore “factual” challenge. 4 Escobedo does not offer evidence contradicting Wright’s or the consultant’s declarations, 5 and he does not contend that the pictured lever would require a pinching or twisting motion that 6 would be difficult for him to execute as a result of his disability. He does argue, however, that it 7 would be inappropriate to decide now whether any of his allegations are true or correct. (See 8 Doc. 35 at 4–5.) He urges the Court not to consider any “extrinsic evidence” whatsoever. (Id. 9 at 4.) 10 In general, when a motion includes a factual attack on the court’s jurisdiction, the court 11 “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a 12 motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 13 2004). “The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. If a 14 defendant brings a factual motion and submits “affidavits or other evidence,” then the plaintiff 15 “must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject 16 matter jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 17 (9th Cir. 2003)). 18 If this process reveals a genuine dispute of fact, and if that dispute is “intertwined” with 19 the merits, then it is “inappropriate” to resolve it under Rule 12. Id. at 1039–40 (quoting Sun 20 Valley Gas., inc. v, Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983)). Jurisdictional and merits 21 questions are intertwined if “a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of 22 the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for relief.” Id. at 1039 (quoting Sun Valley, 23 711 F.2d at 139). A dismissal is an option only if the disputed federal claim is “insubstantial and 24 frivolous” or “appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal 25 jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)). 26 In ADA cases, the presence of a “physical barrier” is usually both a jurisdictional and 27 merits question. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176–76, 1178–79 (9th 28 Cir. 2021); Johnson v. Reimal Fam. Ltd. P’ship, No. 20-01192, 2021 WL 428631, at *3 (N.D. 1 Cal. Feb. 8, 2021). District courts have generally declined to dismiss ADA claims for lack of 2 subject matter jurisdiction if there are genuine disputes about whether a physical barrier remains. 3 See Johnson, 2021 WL 428631, at *3 (collecting authority). If there is no factual dispute, 4 however, then there is no reason for a court to stay its hand. See id. at *3–5 (dismissing an ADA 5 claim for lack of jurisdiction when the facts were not “meaningfully in dispute”); Brooke v. Patel, 6 No. 20-0101, 2022 WL 209737, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2022) (dismissing claims about an 7 inaccessible concierge desk in a hotel lobby because the undisputed evidence showed that there 8 was no concierge desk in the lobby). 9 There is no dispute about the men’s room door in this case. The declarations by Wright 10 and the church’s consultant are the only relevant evidence. Escobedo does not stand by his 11 contrary allegations about the men’s room door. He did not submit a declaration. By all 12 accounts, his allegation was simply incorrect. The defendants have accordingly demonstrated 13 that Escobedo lacks standing to assert an ADA claim about the restroom door. The motion to 14 dismiss that portion of his ADA claim is granted. 15 The remainder of the defendants’ standing arguments proceed from the assumption that 16 Escobedo’s allegations are true. They challenge his standing on the face of his complaint. His 17 standing to assert the balance of his ADA claim thus depends on whether he suffered an injury in 18 fact that was caused by the defendants and that a favorable outcome would redress, assuming his 19 allegations are true. See Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 20 The Ninth Circuit reviewed in detail how this test is applied to ADA claims in Langer v. 21 Kiser, 57 F.4th 1085. First, a plaintiff “must have actual knowledge of an access barrier or ADA 22 violation.” Id. at 1094 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 23 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002)). “But the plaintiff need not personally encounter the barrier or 24 physically visit the place of public accommodation.” Id. (citing Civil Rights Educ. and Enf. Ctr. 25 v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2017)). “And . . . an ADA plaintiff has standing to 26 sue for all barriers, even ones that surface later during discovery, as long as those barriers relate to 27 the plaintiff’s specific disability.” Id. (citing Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th 28 Cir. 2008) and Chapman v. Pier 1 (U.S.) Imports Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 950–53 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 1 banc)). Second, “because private plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief under Title III, 2 encountering an ADA violation in the past at a place of public accommodation is not enough.” 3 Id. (citing Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Instead, a 4 plaintiff must establish a sufficient future injury by alleging that they are either currently deterred 5 from visiting the place of public accommodation because of a barrier, or that they were 6 previously deterred and that they intend to return to the place of public accommodation, where 7 they are likely to reencounter the barrier.” Id. (citing Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944). 8 In Langer, the plaintiff used a wheelchair, and he needed van-accessible parking spaces 9 with an access aisle on the passenger’s side. Id. at 1090. He had standing because he “physically 10 went to a store near his home, saw that there was a lack of accessible parking in violation of the 11 ADA, and spent time taking 52 photos to document the violations.” Id. at 1199. He also 12 established that he was “deterred from patronizing the [defendant’s business] because of this 13 inaccessibility, and that he intend[ed] to return as a customer once the store provides accessible 14 parking.” Id.; see also Whitaker, 985 F.3d at 1179 (“Whitaker’s complaint alleges that he uses a 15 wheelchair for mobility, that he visited the defendant’s premises, that he personally encountered a 16 barrier related to his disability—inaccessible service counters—and that the barrier deters him 17 from returning. These allegations are sufficient to establish injury-in-fact for purposes of 18 standing.”). 19 The Circuit’s en banc opinion in Chapman offers a contrasting example. See 631 F.3d 20 at 954. The plaintiff in that case did not have standing because he had simply listed suspected 21 ADA violations. See id. He did not connect “the alleged violations to [his] disability” or say 22 “whether or not he encountered any one of them in such a way as to impair his full and equal 23 enjoyment” of the defendant’s store. Id. 24 Escobedo did not simply list suspected ADA violations in his complaint. He alleges that 25 he needs a clear and level space to get out of his car after he parks and could not find one when he 26 visited the restaurant. He alleges it was difficult for him to walk across the cracked and uneven 27 parking lot from the more distant parking space he found. He alleges it was difficult for him to 28 pull and open the front door and difficult to get through before it closed. He alleges he could not 1 find a table without a base, which made it difficult for him to sit without pain or discomfort. He 2 alleges the men’s room was difficult for him to use as a result of the misplaced or obstructed grab 3 bars and restroom amenities. These allegations show he has suffered an “injury” at this stage of 4 the case. They connect all of the alleged barriers to his allegations about his joint pain, cane use, 5 and limited dexterity. 6 Regardless of any barriers in the parking lot or restaurant, however, the restaurant and 7 church argue Escobedo does not have standing to pursue an ADA claim because his complaint 8 does not show that he will return. (Doc. 32-1 at 12.) As summarized above, there are two ways 9 Escobedo could have standing to obtain relief under the ADA. First, he could allege that he 10 encountered a “noncompliant accommodation” in the past and has an “intent to return.” 11 Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949. Second, he could allege that “he is deterred from visiting a 12 noncompliant public accommodation because he has encountered barriers related to his disability 13 there.” Id. Escobedo relies on a deterrence theory. (See Docs. 22 at 4–5 (“Plaintiff was, and 14 continues to be, deterred from visiting the Facility . . . . Plaintiff enjoys the goods and services 15 offered at the Facility, and will return to the Facility once the barriers are removed.”); 35 at 9 16 (“Plaintiff has alleged that he lives in the vicinity of the Facility, that he enjoys the goods and 17 services offered at the Facility, that he will return when the Facility is made accessible to him, 18 and that until then he is deterred from returning.”).) 19 Federal district courts within the Ninth Circuit have explained in several persuasive orders 20 what plaintiffs must allege (and later prove) to show that barriers deter them from visiting a 21 public accommodation. See, e.g., Strojnik v. Bakersfield Convention Hotel I, LLC, 436 F. Supp. 22 3d 1332, 1341–43 (E.D. Cal. 2020) Strojnik v. Pasadena Robles Acquisition, LLC, No. 19-2067, 23 2019 WL 13436317, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019), aff’d, 801 F. App’x 569 (9th Cir. 2020); 24 Gastelum v. Canyon Hosp. LLC, No. 17-02792, 2018 WL 2388047, at *6–9 (D. Ariz. May 25, 25 2018); Vogel v. Salazar, No. 14-00853, 2014 WL 5427531, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2014). A 26 recurring theme in these decisions is the general rule of federal pleading, i.e., that a complaint 27 must be more than “conjectural” or “hypothetical,” e.g., Vogel, 2014 WL 5427531, at *3, and 28 must include more than a “formulaic recitation” of the relevant legal standard, e.g., Gastelum, 1 | 2018 WL 2388047, at *7 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff cannot simply state 2 | that he is deterred and will return if a barrier is removed. See, e.g., Strojnik, 2021 WL 75693, at 3 | *4; Strojnik, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 1342. 4 Escobedo relies on this type of formulaic recitation. Aside from his allegation that he 5 | lives within fifteen miles of the restaurant, he offers only a boilerplate statement: he “enjoys the 6 || goods and services offered at the Facility, and will return to the Facility once the barriers are 7 | removed.” (Doc. 22 at 5.) His allegations are indistinguishable from the generalized professions 8 | of intent that the Supreme Court found wanting in Lujan. See 504 U.S. at 564 (“[The] profession 9 | ofan intent to return... is simply not enough. Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any 10 | description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do 11 | not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our cases require.” (other quotation 12 | marks and alterations omitted)). They do not suffice to show Escobedo has standing to assert a 13 | claim under the ADA. 14 The result would likely be different if Escobedo could allege, for example, that the 15 | restaurant is in a convenient location, serves a favorite dish, or is on the way to another place he 16 | visits regularly, among a variety of other factual allegations that might support his generic 17 | allegation that he will return if the barriers in question are removed. See, e.g., Doran, 524 F.3d at 18 | 1040 (finding a plaintiff had standing based on similar allegations); D’Lil v. Best W. Encina 19 | Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1135 (same). 20 | The Court will accordingly permit Escobedo to file a second amended complaint if he chooses 21 | and can do so within the limits imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 22 CONCLUSION 23 The motion to dismiss (Doc. 32) is GRANTED with leave to amend. Any second 24 | amended complaint must be filed within thirty days. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 | Dated: _May 8, 2026 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28