OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Jose Cabada, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at FCI-Fort Dix in New Jersey, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he claims that time-credit miscalculations by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) have kept in him custody beyond the time authorized by his sentence. We agree with the District Court that Cabada is not entitled to credit towards his current sentence the time spent in custody pursuant to his 1994 federal sentence. We also agree with the District Court that the BOP awarded Cabada the correct amount of prior custody credit for the time leading up to his escape. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I.
Cabada was convicted more than thirty years ago in a Texas federal court of trafficking heroin across the border. On March 28, 1977, Cabada was sentenced by that court to fifteen years of imprisonment. With credit for time spent in presentence custody — from October 27, 1976, to March 27, 1977 — Cabada’s max-out date was set by the BOP at October 27, 1991. However, Cabada escaped from prison on October 6, 1980.
On November 17, 1993, a man using the name “Heriberto Moneada” was arrested by the DEA and eventually convicted in an Illinois federal court for attempting to sell cocaine. On June 28, 1994, Moneada was sentenced by that court to 188 months of imprisonment. Unbeknownst to the Government during those proceedings, Moneada was actually the false identity of Cabada. And because Cabada never divulged his true identity, the Illinois court had no occasion to consider Cabada’s prior conviction for trafficking heroin, nor his escape from prison, during the sentencing of Moneada.
On July 13, 2007, Cabada completed his 1994 sentence as Moneada. He was released to immigration authorities, who promptly discovered the ruse and who transferred Cabada on July 17, 2007, to the custody of the United States Marshals Service, which returned him to federal prison. The BOP then recalculated Cabada’s 1977 sentence so that he could finish serving it; Cabada’s Expiration Full Term (EFT) date was set at August 1, 2018.
In arriving at the recalculated sentence, the BOP figured that Cabada did not cease to be on “escape status”
until the date he finished serving his 1994 sentence (July 13,
2007), as opposed to the date Cabada was arrested as Moneada (November 17, 1993).
After exhausting his administrative appeals, Cabada filed this habeas petition under § 2241, raising two related claims: “Whether the Federal Bureau of Prisons has unlawfully miscalculated the application of credit toward this case for prior jail time spent in federal custody served [from October 27, 1976] through October 7, 1980?”; and “Whether under Program Statement 5880.28 I should be released of federal custody immediately as the instant ... sentence of 15 years of imprisonment [has] been served out?” (DC dkt # 1, pgs. 4-5.) The District Court denied those claims on the merits, and Cabada appealed.
II.
The District Court had subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). A certificate of appealability is not required for Cabada’s appeal.
See Burkey v. Marberry,
556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir.2009). We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.
McGee v. Martinez,
627 F.3d 933, 935 n. 2 (3d Cir.2010). The District Court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
Vega v. United States,
493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir.2007). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
Fairview Twp. v. EPA,
773 F.2d 517, 525 n. 15 (3d Cir.1985).
III.
The authority to calculate a federal prisoner’s period of incarceration for the sentence imposed is delegated to the Attorney General, who acts through the BOP.
United States v. Wilson,
503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992). We have the authority to correct a computational error by the BOP through a writ of habeas corpus.
See Barden v. Keohane,
921 F.2d 476, 479 (3d Cir.1990). The central issue in this case is, at bottom, whether the BOP has correctly recalculated the date on which Cabada will finish serving his 1977 sentence. We conclude that it has.
Cabada’s credit for time served as Moneada
The District Court determined that Cabada remained on escape status until July 13, 2007, notwithstanding the fact that, physically speaking, he returned to BOP custody on November 17, 1993. This determination is at first glance significant because if Cabada were given approximately fourteen years of custody credit — the time spent incarcerated as Moneada — toward the unserved portion of his 1977 sentence, we would have to order his immediate release from BOP custody.
We need not explore any further the question of when Cabada ceased to be on escape status; regardless of whether that date was November 17, 1993, or July 13, 2007, Cabada could not begin serving the remainder of his 1977 sentence until the latter date because the sentences were not ordered to run concurrently with one another.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”).
Moreover, because Cabada was sentenced in 1977, the “old law” sentencing-credit regime
requires only
that credit be awarded for “any days spent in custody
in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.” Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50, 59, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (emphasis added, citation omitted). As a result of his deception, Cabada’s time spent in BOP custody as Moneada was wholly unrelated to the 1977 sentence.
Cabada’s arguments in support of his claim are unavailing. In particular, we reject Cabada’s reliance on PS 5880.28(CN-03), pg.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Jose Cabada, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at FCI-Fort Dix in New Jersey, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he claims that time-credit miscalculations by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) have kept in him custody beyond the time authorized by his sentence. We agree with the District Court that Cabada is not entitled to credit towards his current sentence the time spent in custody pursuant to his 1994 federal sentence. We also agree with the District Court that the BOP awarded Cabada the correct amount of prior custody credit for the time leading up to his escape. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I.
Cabada was convicted more than thirty years ago in a Texas federal court of trafficking heroin across the border. On March 28, 1977, Cabada was sentenced by that court to fifteen years of imprisonment. With credit for time spent in presentence custody — from October 27, 1976, to March 27, 1977 — Cabada’s max-out date was set by the BOP at October 27, 1991. However, Cabada escaped from prison on October 6, 1980.
On November 17, 1993, a man using the name “Heriberto Moneada” was arrested by the DEA and eventually convicted in an Illinois federal court for attempting to sell cocaine. On June 28, 1994, Moneada was sentenced by that court to 188 months of imprisonment. Unbeknownst to the Government during those proceedings, Moneada was actually the false identity of Cabada. And because Cabada never divulged his true identity, the Illinois court had no occasion to consider Cabada’s prior conviction for trafficking heroin, nor his escape from prison, during the sentencing of Moneada.
On July 13, 2007, Cabada completed his 1994 sentence as Moneada. He was released to immigration authorities, who promptly discovered the ruse and who transferred Cabada on July 17, 2007, to the custody of the United States Marshals Service, which returned him to federal prison. The BOP then recalculated Cabada’s 1977 sentence so that he could finish serving it; Cabada’s Expiration Full Term (EFT) date was set at August 1, 2018.
In arriving at the recalculated sentence, the BOP figured that Cabada did not cease to be on “escape status”
until the date he finished serving his 1994 sentence (July 13,
2007), as opposed to the date Cabada was arrested as Moneada (November 17, 1993).
After exhausting his administrative appeals, Cabada filed this habeas petition under § 2241, raising two related claims: “Whether the Federal Bureau of Prisons has unlawfully miscalculated the application of credit toward this case for prior jail time spent in federal custody served [from October 27, 1976] through October 7, 1980?”; and “Whether under Program Statement 5880.28 I should be released of federal custody immediately as the instant ... sentence of 15 years of imprisonment [has] been served out?” (DC dkt # 1, pgs. 4-5.) The District Court denied those claims on the merits, and Cabada appealed.
II.
The District Court had subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). A certificate of appealability is not required for Cabada’s appeal.
See Burkey v. Marberry,
556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir.2009). We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.
McGee v. Martinez,
627 F.3d 933, 935 n. 2 (3d Cir.2010). The District Court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
Vega v. United States,
493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir.2007). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
Fairview Twp. v. EPA,
773 F.2d 517, 525 n. 15 (3d Cir.1985).
III.
The authority to calculate a federal prisoner’s period of incarceration for the sentence imposed is delegated to the Attorney General, who acts through the BOP.
United States v. Wilson,
503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992). We have the authority to correct a computational error by the BOP through a writ of habeas corpus.
See Barden v. Keohane,
921 F.2d 476, 479 (3d Cir.1990). The central issue in this case is, at bottom, whether the BOP has correctly recalculated the date on which Cabada will finish serving his 1977 sentence. We conclude that it has.
Cabada’s credit for time served as Moneada
The District Court determined that Cabada remained on escape status until July 13, 2007, notwithstanding the fact that, physically speaking, he returned to BOP custody on November 17, 1993. This determination is at first glance significant because if Cabada were given approximately fourteen years of custody credit — the time spent incarcerated as Moneada — toward the unserved portion of his 1977 sentence, we would have to order his immediate release from BOP custody.
We need not explore any further the question of when Cabada ceased to be on escape status; regardless of whether that date was November 17, 1993, or July 13, 2007, Cabada could not begin serving the remainder of his 1977 sentence until the latter date because the sentences were not ordered to run concurrently with one another.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”).
Moreover, because Cabada was sentenced in 1977, the “old law” sentencing-credit regime
requires only
that credit be awarded for “any days spent in custody
in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.” Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50, 59, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (emphasis added, citation omitted). As a result of his deception, Cabada’s time spent in BOP custody as Moneada was wholly unrelated to the 1977 sentence.
Cabada’s arguments in support of his claim are unavailing. In particular, we reject Cabada’s reliance on PS 5880.28(CN-03), pg. 1-14C, ¶2, because PS 5880.28 applies only with regard to sentencing calculations for “new law” sentences, and because, in any event, it does not appear that Cabada’s escape from federal custody resulted in a separate conviction for that offense.
See id.
We likewise reject Cabada’s reliance on PS 5880.28 (CN-03), pg. 1-29, ¶ 1, again because PS 5880.28 applies only to “new law” sentences and further because that specific section is applicable only in the event that “the new sentence and the escape sentence are aggregated.” For all these reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not err in denying habeas relief for Cabada on this claim.
Cabada’s credit for time served prior to his escape
As noted above, Cabada entered federal custody on October 27, 1976, and escaped on October 6, 1980. The District Court concluded that “the BOP properly awarded [Cabada] prior custody credit for the period from October [27], 1976, the date of his arrest, until March 27, 1977, the date before sentence was imposed,” and further that “the BOP properly awarded [Cabada] credit for the period from March 28, 1977, through October 6, 1980, the date of his escape.” (DC Op. at 7.)
Based on those dates, and pursuant to the directives of § 3568, the District Court found that Cabada had 4,038 days left to serve on his fifteen-year sentence at the time of the escape. Thus, the District Court stated, the BOP’s “renewed sentence calculation resulted in a new Expiration Full Term Date of August 1, 2018. [Cabada’s] projected release date is May 5, 2013.” (DC Op. at 4-5.)
We use as our guideposts the same dates used by both the BOP and the District Court,
see United States v. Pungitore,
910 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir.1990) (federal sentence for pre-November 1, 1987 offense does not start running until defendant is delivered to site where sentence will be served); PS 5880.30, Chapter V, pg. 2, ¶ 2.a.(l) (“If the prisoner was serving a sentence at the time of escape, then the sentence will become inoperative beginning the day after the escape ...”); PS 5880.30, Chapter VI, pg. 3, ¶ 7.b.(1) (“Presentence time credit shall be given for time spent in the custody of the Attorney General (whether actual or constructive) as a direct result of the acts or offenses that led to the federal sentence.”), and conclude that the District Court’s findings concerning Cabada’s EFT date are not clearly erroneous.
A fifteen-year sentence imposed on March 28, 1977, means that Cabada was to be imprisoned until March 27, 1992, for his heroin trafficking conviction.
See Yokley v. Belaski,
982 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir.1992) (“For purposes of sentencing ... we conclude that when an inmate is incarcerated for a term of years it makes no difference that a year contains 365 or, in the case of a leap year, 366 days.”);
accord United States v. Tawab,
984 F.2d 1533, 1534 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam). Subtracting 152 days that Cabada spent in pre-sentence custody (October 27, 1976 through March 27, 1977), the BOP determined that Cabada’s EFT would be October 27, 1991. At the time of his escape, Cabada had served 1,289 days in post-sentence custody (March 28, 1977 through October 6, 1980), leaving 4,038 total days left to serve (the time difference between and including October 7, 1980, and October 27, 1991). Counting forward 4,038 days after July 12, 2007 (the last day Cabada’s 1977 sentence was inoperative), leads to August 1, 2018, which is the date used by the BOP for Cabada’s EFT.
IV.
For the reasons given in this opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.