Jose Alejandro Lopez Rosada v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility

• Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 16, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00572
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JOSE ALEJANDRO LOPEZ ROSADA : Petitioner, 3:26-cv-572 : (JUDGE MARIANI) v. WARDEN PIKE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On March 9, 2026, Petitioner Jose Alejandro Lopez Rosada, a citizen of Peru residing in the United States since October 2023, with no criminal record and a pending asylum application, filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner is currently detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Petition names as the Respondent the Warden of the Pike County Correctional Facility. Petitioner alleges he “was unlawfully detained by ICE on 02/04/2026 while | had a pending asylum claim and was fully complying with all immigration requirements.” (/d. at 3). He further alleges that, at the time of his arrest, he had a “final asylum hearing scheduled for 09/29/2027” before an Immigration Judge. (/d.).

Petitioner alleges he is being unlawfully detained by Respondent without a bond hearing under the mandatory detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), instead of the discretionary detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This distinction matters because noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not entitled to a bond hearing, whereas noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Patel v. O’Neil, 2025 WL 3516865, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (citations omitted). As directed by the Court, the Respondent filed a response to the Petition on March 16, 2026. (Doc. 5). The Respondent does not dispute the factual allegations contained in the Petition. Rather, the Respondent sets forth legal arguments as to why Petitioner's detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). But, as discussed more fully below, Respondent's interpretation of the INA—the same one it advances here—has already been rejected by this Court and the overwhelming majority of federal judges to address this issue. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at “4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 (collecting cases). ll. | STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal district court may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner's immigration detention is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It is well established that a federal habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a

discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted); accord Patel, 2025 WL 3241212, at *2. lil. ANALYSIS A. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Petitioner’s Habeas Petition. Before addressing the merits, the Court must first address the Respondent's previous position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the writ. Although Respondent does not seek dismissal of the Petition on jurisdictional grounds, Respondent has in prior habeas petitions directed the Court to three subparagraphs of the INA: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g),1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) which they claim divest this Court of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions. The Court need not dwell on the jurisdictional issues because it has previously rejected the Respondent's jurisdictional arguments, and federal district courts to consider this issue have almost universally held that they have jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions like the one filed by Petitioner. In short, Section 1252(g) does not apply since Petitioner “does not attempt by this petition to address the commencement, adjudication, or execution of removal orders and their proceedings.”’ Soumare v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3461542, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (jurisdiction stripping under § 1252(g)(2)

1 Section 1:252(g) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that: “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

applies “only to [these] three discrete actions”); see also Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (Section 1252(g) does not bar jurisdiction because the petitioner “seeks a bond hearing; he does not challenge the commencement, adjudication, or execution of his removal (which may not even occur)’). Section 1252(b)(9) also does not divest this Court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition, because it “does not reach claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process.”2 E.0.H.C. v. Sec’y United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d. Cir. 2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, § 1252(b)(9) “does not strip jurisdiction when aliens seek relief that courts cannot meaningfully provide alongside review of a final order of removal.” /d. (‘If ‘later’ is not an option, review is available now.”); see also Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (“Later is not

an option here, because the Court of Appeals could not ‘meaningfully’ redress Demirel’s purported unlawful denial of release on bond should his final removal be ordered.”). The

same logic applies here: later is not an option here because the Court of Appeals could not meaningfully address Petitioner's unlawful detention without a bond hearing.

2 Section 1252(b)(9) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including the interpretation and application of constitutional or statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). These claims must be filed “with an appropriate court of appeals.” /d. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 3 The Third Circuit recent opinion in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026), interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), does not divest this Court of jurisdiction. The Court agrees with other district courts that have addressed this issue and concludes that Khalil and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) do not divest this court of jurisdiction to rule on Petitioner's habeas petition. See Giyosov v. Jamison, 2026 WL 209839, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2026) (“The Court concludes that Khalil is distinguishable because

And section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is inapposite because the Respondent's “statutory detention power is ‘not a matter of discretion’ to which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies." Soumare, 2025 WL 3461542, at *2 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)); see also Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (“Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) thus also does not apply here.”). In sum, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g),1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) do not divest this Court of jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's habeas petition. In addition, although Respondent no longer appears to be advancing an exhaustion of administrative remedies argument, the Court feels it prudent to nevertheless address exhaustion as it has been raised by the Respondent in numerous similar petitions. While habeas petitioners are “ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies,” Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996), they “need not exhaust administrative remedies where the issue presented involves only statutory construction.” Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 434-35 (3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, exhaustion of administrative remedies is also not required when doing so would be futile. Demirel 2025

[petitioner's] petition does not present legal or factual questions that can be meaningfully reviewed alongside review of a final order of removal.”); Kourouma v. Jamison, 2026 WL 120208, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2026) (“Unlike the challenge to detention in Khalil, Petitioner's challenge here is not ‘inextricably linked’ to his rennoval proceedings.”). The same logic applies here: Khali! does not divest {his Court of jurisdiction cver Petitioner's habeas petition because his challenge is not “inextricably linked” to his rericval proceedings and the Petition does not present factual and legal issues that can be meaningfully reviewed along with afineil order of removal. 4 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review .. . any other decision or action by the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

WL 3218243, at *4. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) “predetermined the statutory issue” Petitioner “has no reasonable prospect of obtaining relief through administrative remedies.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Petition will

not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. B. The Court Will Grant Petitioner's Habeas Petition. Turning to the merits of the Petition, the Court will first consider the two statutory provisions of the INA at issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is a statute entitled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” It provides, in relevant part: (b) Inspection of applicants for admissions (2) Inspection of other aliens (A) In General Subject to subparagraph (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a [removal proceedings] of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, in contrast, is entitled “Appreierision and detention of aliens.” It provides, in relevant part: (a) Arrest, detention, and release On a warrant issued by the Attorney General an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General— (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General: or (B) conditional parole; but (3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondent is currently detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). It is undisputed that Petitioner has not been charged with or convicted of a criminal offense, does not have a final order of removal, and his asylum application is currently pending before an Immigration Judge with a hearing scheduled for September 2027. As the Court previously found, “the overwhelming majority of federal district courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find that

persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b}(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.” Patel, 2025 WL 3519895, at *4 (collecting cases). “These courts have further found that the Statutory provisions of the INA that Respondents’ claim divest this Court of jurisdiction do not apply to persons similarly situated to Petitioner and that there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a habeas petition.” Id.

As before, “the Court finds that the near universal rejection of Respondents’ interpretation of the INA by federal district courts to be highly persuasive and will adopt the

same approach.” /d. at *5. Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful under the INA because the plain language of this provision and the statutory framework of

the INA compels a finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are affirmatively seeking admission to the United States, not noncitizens like Petitioner who have resided in the United States for years.5 See Bethancourt Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2976572, at * 7 (“For all these reasons, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.¢., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the United States. Accordingly, it does not apply to individuals like Petitioner, who has been residing in the United States ‘for over seven years.”); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5 (same). Under the Respondent's approach, Petitioner and those noncitizens residing in the United States who have not committed, or been charged with, a specified crime under the INA could be lawfully detained without a bond hearing consistent with constitutional

5 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “generally governs the process of arresting and detaining ... aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (emphasis added); /d. at 303 (“As noted, § 1226 applies: to aliens already present in the United States.”). In addition, despite the Board of Immigration Appeals holding in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens like Petitioner, “[t]his Court owes no deference to an agency's interpretation that conflicts with the statute’s unambiguous text.” Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400-01 (2024)).

requirements from October 2023 until September 2027 when an Immigration Judge will hear

his asylum petition. And likely for a period much longer, despite Respondent's claim that

the detention is only “temporary.” This prolonged and indefinite detention would continue if

Petitioner exercised his right to appeal the forthcoming decision on his asylum application to

the BIA and then the Court of Appeals. Further, Respondent's approach would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which considered the indefinite detention of the petitioner after a final removal order and finding fewer than six months detention is presumed to be constitutional, and would violate both the INA and Petitioner's due process rights by depriving him of his liberty without due

process of law. Importantly, Respondent does not dispute that there is no final removal order for Petitioner. Accordingly, the Court will grant Petitioner’s habeas petition because his detention under § 1225(b) is unlawful. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted because his mandatory deterition under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing is unlawful. Because the Respondent maintain that a bond hearing is not required and the Respondent's interpretation is inconsistent with the INA, Respondent will be directed to immediately release Petitioner Jose Alejandro Lopez Rosada from the custody of the Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility, and file a declaration o” affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming that Petitioner Jose Alejandro Lopez Rosada has been released

from custody. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (acknowledging that a habeas court has “the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”); see also Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9 (ordering immediate release); Flores Obando, 2025 WL 3452047, at *3 (same); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8 (same); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (same). Respondent will further be permanently enjoined from detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9 (permanently enjoining respondents from detaining petitioner under § 1225 where petitioner did not file a motion for temporary restraining order or motion for preliminary injunction); see also Maldonado, 2025 WL 2985256, at *7 (“The Court grants the writ of habeas corpus and orders Respondents to release Petitioner within 24 hours. . . . Following Petitioner’s release, Respondents are permanently enjoined from rearresting or otherwise detaining Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2).”); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *7. If Respondent elect to later detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the Respondent must provide Petitioner with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a timely individualized bond hearing, where an Immigration Judge will assess whether he is a danger or flight risk. A separate Order follows.

\ be; Mt eda bert D.(Mariani United States District Judge