Jose Alberto Molina v. Warden, Alligator Alcatraz et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

JOSE ALBERTO MOLINA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00380-SPC-DNF

WARDEN, ALLIGATOR ALCATRAZ et al.,

Respondents, /

OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Jose Alberto Molina’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 5). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. Molina is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the United States on August 30, 2004. He later adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident. Following a drug conviction, an immigration judge ordered Molina removed on November 23, 2010. Molina was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody from November 5, 2010, to December 29, 2010, when ICE released him under an order of supervision because removal was not foreseeable. Since then, Molina has fully complied with all conditions of supervision. On November 1, 2025, Molina reported to ICE for a routine check-in, and ICE revoked his release and detained him at Alligator Alcatraz. ICE has since moved him to El Paso Camp East Montana. Molina challenges the legality of his detention under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678

(2001). “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably

foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The

Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus

an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id. The respondents argue Molina’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the

removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Molina has

carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government made that determination when it released Molina on supervision in 2010, and it has not been able to secure travel documents for Molina from Cuba or any other country. The burden thus shifts to the respondents, but they make no attempt at rebuttal. The Court finds no significant likelihood Molina will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, ICE

can detain Molina to “assur[e] [his] presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Jose Alberto Molina Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 3) is GRANTED. 1. The respondents shall release Molina within 24 hours of this Order, and they shall provide him telephone access so he may arrange his transportation from the detention facility. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 9, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record