Jorrell Lambert v. City of Saginaw, Mich.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: June 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1611
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0302n.06

Case No. 24-1611

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 16, 2025 JORRELL LAMBERT, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CITY OF SAGINAW, MICHIGAN, and ) MICHIGAN OFFICER JONATHON BEYERLEIN, ) Defendants-Appellants. ) OPINION

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Jorrell Lambert called the police after getting into a dispute with his

girlfriend. Police arrested Lambert and took him to jail. The officers’ body cameras captured a

video of the booking process. Police led Lambert into a hallway. While standing in the hallway

with his hands cuffed behind his back, Lambert cursed at Officer Jonathon Beyerlein and called

him a liar. Seconds later, Beyerlein slammed Lambert headfirst into the ground. Lambert sued

Officer Beyerlein, bringing state and federal claims for excessive force. He also brought a Monell

claim against the City of Saginaw, alleging that the city failed to train its police officers on how to

use force against handcuffed suspects. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978). The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and they now

appeal. No. 24-1611, Lambert v. City of Saginaw

We begin with Beyerlein’s claim that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Lambert’s

federal excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Beyerlein argues that he was entitled to

take Lambert to the ground because Lambert was actively resisting arrest. Appellants’ Br. at 3;

see also Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 641–42 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining the concept of active

resistance).

To the extent Beyerlein disputes the plaintiff’s record-supported facts, this court lacks

jurisdiction to resolve those disputes. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). But

Beyerlein can secure this court’s jurisdiction by arguing that, “even assessing the facts in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, there was no violation of the plaintiff’s clearly-established rights.”

Anderson-Santos v. Kent County, 94 F.4th 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2024). Beyerlein has made that

argument. He argues that the video footage of the incident, even viewed in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, shows that he didn’t violate Lambert’s constitutional rights. And the video “gives

us a clear view of what happened” during the booking process, providing an “uncontroverted set

of facts” for the excessive-force claim. Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900, 910 (6th Cir. 2024). So

we have jurisdiction to review Beyerlein’s appeal of the qualified-immunity denial. Id. at 911.

On the merits, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Construing the

facts in the light most favorable to Lambert, Officer Beyerlein and two other officers led him

through a hallway to the booking area. Beyerlein opened the door to the booking area and put his

hands on Lambert’s arms to guide him through the door. Lambert pulled on his handcuffs and

stepped away from Beyerlein. Beyerlein then pulled Lambert down from the back in a leg-sweep

suplex, throwing him onto the ground headfirst. Lambert lost consciousness. Officers transferred

Lambert to a hospital after a nurse saw blood coming out of his ear. Lambert suffered a broken

eardrum, skull fractures, hearing loss, and the loss of several teeth.

-2- No. 24-1611, Lambert v. City of Saginaw

Under these facts, a jury could find that Beyerlein violated Lambert’s clearly established

rights. Existing precedent held that an officer could not throw down a generally cooperative

handcuffed arrestee who briefly ignores a lawful order, at least when that arrestee does not resist

arrest and poses no risk of violence or escape.

Consider Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2009). There we held that a

handcuffed inmate was not actively resisting when he stepped away from an officer who tried to

take off his necklace. Id. at 366. We also held that he was not actively resisting when he failed to

“kneel down” after the officer told him to. Id. So the officer’s subsequent takedown was

excessive. Id. at 360.

We followed this same approach in several subsequent cases, finding other takedowns on

handcuffed inmates excessive, even when those inmates briefly ignored a lawful order. Austin v.

Redford Twp. Police Dep’t, 690 F.3d 490, 497–99 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Burgess v. Fischer,

735 F.3d 462, 474 (6th Cir. 2013). These cases are similar enough to Lambert’s conduct to create

a rule clear enough to give officers like Beyerlein notice not to throw a generally compliant

handcuffed arrestee headfirst to the floor. So the district court correctly denied summary judgment

to Beyerlein.

We also affirm Officer Beyerlein’s appeal of the district court’s denial of Michigan

governmental immunity from Lambert’s state-law claims. Gillman v. City of Troy, 126 F.4th 1152,

1161 (6th Cir 2025). Beyerlein forfeited the claim of governmental immunity by failing to present

it to the district court. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Health & Welfare Fund of N.C. v. Law Off. of

Michael A. DeMayo, LLP, 21 F.4th 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2021).

Finally, we dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the City of Saginaw’s appeal of the district

court’s denial of summary judgment on Lambert’s Monell claim. Appellate courts can review

-3- No. 24-1611, Lambert v. City of Saginaw

such denials only when the Monell claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a qualified-immunity

claim. Shumate v. City of Adrian, 44 F.4th 427, 450 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Those

claims are intertwined if resolving the qualified immunity appeal “necessarily resolves” the Monell

claim as well. Id. (emphasis in original). Here, Lambert’s Monell claim isn’t inextricably

intertwined with the qualified-immunity claim. Our holding on the qualified-immunity claim—

that a jury could conclude Officer Beyerlein violated Lambert’s constitutional rights by taking him

to the ground—doesn’t “determine the extent, if any,” of the city’s liability to Lambert for failing

to train Officer Beyerlein. See id. So we lack jurisdiction over the city’s appeal of the denial of

summary judgment on the Monell claim.

* * *

We affirm the district court’s denial of Officer Beyerlein’s motion for summary judgment

on Lambert’s federal- and state-law claims against Officer Beyerlein. The city’s appeal of the

denial of summary judgment on Lambert’s Monell claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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