Jorge Rodriguez Lopez v. Warden, Florida Soft Side South, U.S. Attorney General

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

JORGE RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-559-KCD-NPM

v.

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants. /

ORDER Petitioner Jorge Rodriguez Lopez is a noncitizen without legal status who is subject to a final order of removal. (Doc. 1 at 3.)1 He was recently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 1.)2 The Government opposes the petition. (Doc. 3.) For the reasons below, the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

1 The habeas petition is not paginated, so the Court uses the page numbering generated by its electronic filing system.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. I. Background Lopez, a citizen of Cuba, was paroled into the United States in 2016,

spent time in federal prison for possession of stolen mail in 2022, and was ordered removed from the United States in 2023. (Doc. 3-1 at 1-3, 14.) He was not immediately removed but instead placed on an order of supervision. (See Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 3-1 at 8-11.) That status recently ended. On December 30,

2025, ICE revoked Lopez’s supervision order and detained him to execute his removal order. (Doc. 3-1 at 1-4, 12-15.) Lopez then filed this habeas petition, arguing that his removal to Cuba is not reasonably foreseeable and seeking immediate release. (Doc. 1 at 8.)

II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At

its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration

detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). III. Discussion A. Jurisdiction

The analysis begins with a jurisdictional challenge. Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips this Court of jurisdiction to even hear Lopez’s plea because it arises from the “execution” of a removal order. (Doc. 3 at 3.) We need not spend long here. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned

that § 1252(g) is narrowly tailored to three discrete actions, and it does not operate as a blanket ban on habeas review for prolonged detention. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018). Indeed, if the Government’s sweeping interpretation were correct, Zadvydas v. Davis—the

seminal case where the Supreme Court held it could consider a habeas challenge to unlawful, prolonged immigration detention—would have been stopped in its tracks before ever reaching the merits. The Court is satisfied it has jurisdiction to decide whether Lopez’s detention is lawful. Zadvydas, 533

U.S. 683, 688 (2001) (citing § 1252(g) yet concluding “that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention”). Respondents also argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars judicial review.

(Doc. 3 at 4.) Not so. The Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1252(b)(9) “only affects cases that involve[] review of an order of removal.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020). Lopez is not challenging his removal proceedings—he is challenging the antecedent detention. So “the Government’s reliance on §

1252(b)(9) is misplaced.” Fernandez-Garcia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 1-20-CV- 23599-UU, 2021 WL 8821923, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2021). B. Zadvydas That leaves the merits, which, as noted, concern Lopez’s continued

detention pending removal from the United States. The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period,

detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to

detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court

established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v.

Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Applied here, Lopez cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on December 30, 2025. (Doc. 3-1 at 1-4.) Because his confinement remains well short of the six-month mark, he sits squarely

within the presumptively reasonable window. See Guerra-Castro v. Parra, No. 1:25-CV-22487, 2025 WL 1984300, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”); see also Jiang v. Mukasey, No. 208-CV-773-FTM-

29DNF, 2009 WL 260378, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2009); Noel v. Glades Cnty. Sheriff, No. 2:11-CV-698-FTM-29, 2011 WL 6412425, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011). Seemingly recognizing this problem, his petition jumps to the burden-

shifting framework, claiming that his removal to Cuba is not likely. (Doc. 1 at 4.) This argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV- 22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of

Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026). Lopez attempts another workaround. He points to an earlier, “beyond 90-day period” of detention, arguing that the Court should aggregate his past

and present stints in ICE custody. (Doc. 1 at 4.) By combining these distinct periods of confinement, Lopez contends that his total time in civil immigration detention exceeds the six-month threshold, which he asserts is sufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and trigger Zadvydas

review. District courts are split on whether prior time in ICE custody should be aggregated to satisfy the six-month Zadvydas clock. Some have firmly rejected this cumulative approach. They reason that if “detentions [are

counted] in the aggregate, any subsequent period of detention, even one day, would raise constitutional concerns.” Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025). Because the executive branch is tasked with great deference in effectuating removals, these courts

warn that constantly adjudicating the constitutionality of every brief re- detention would improperly obstruct that statutory discretion. Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 4:14-CV-42 (CDL), 2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). Under this view, Zadvydas does not function as a “Get Out of Jail Free Card that may be redeemed at any time just because an alien was

detained too long in the past.” Id.; see also Flores-Reyes v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., No. 26-CV-20226, 2026 WL 406708, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2026). Conversely, other courts have treated the Zadvydas period as cumulative. Chen v. Holder, No. CV 6:14-2530, 2015 WL 13236635, at *2

(W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015). This approach is driven by the constitutional imperative to prevent the government from indefinitely detaining noncitizens through a loophole of release and re-detention. Krechmar v. Parra, No. 2:25- CV-01095-SPC-DNF, 2025 WL 3620802, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2025). To

consider only the current, isolated period of confinement—ignoring all prior custody—would allow the government to bypass Zadvydas through successive detentions. For these courts, aggregation is the only way to safeguard against the precise danger of indefinite detention that the Supreme Court sought to

prevent. See Rodriguez Romero v. Ladwig, No. CV 25-1106-JWD-EWD, 2026 WL 321437, at *12 (M.D. La. Feb. 6, 2026). This Court declines to endorse a blanket rule that all prior periods of confinement automatically aggregate to satisfy the Zadvydas six-month

clock. Such a categorical approach is practically unworkable and effectively penalizes the government for its past lawful actions. If every prior day spent in immigration custody simply rolled over into the present calculus, the government’s statutory authority to briefly re-detain a noncitizen to finalize a removal would be severely restricted, if not eliminated entirely. The six-

month period established in Zadvydas was designed to provide the government a functional window to negotiate with foreign nations, secure travel documents, and coordinate the complex logistics of deportation. A strict aggregation rule ignores the reality that diplomatic circumstances evolve. If a

foreign government that previously refused repatriation suddenly agrees to issue travel documents, the United States needs a practical opportunity to effectuate that newly viable removal. Mandating an automatic rollover of all past detention would force the immediate release of a noncitizen even when

their current custody is driven by an imminent, foreseeable deportation, ultimately frustrating the core purpose of the removal statute. Instead, the better approach is to afford the government a new six- month presumptively reasonable period for each discrete detention, unless

there are facts suggesting the government is acting with an improper motive. If the record reveals a calculated pattern of catch-and-release designed merely to reset the Zadvydas clock or evade judicial review, aggregation may be entirely appropriate. But absent evidence of such bad faith or a deliberate

strategy of looping confinement, courts should presume that a subsequent detention is a genuine, independent effort to effectuate removal. This standard strikes the appropriate balance. It alleviates constitutional concerns regarding indefinite, cyclical detention by providing a safeguard against abuse, while simultaneously protecting the government’s legitimate,

statutory interest in finalizing deportations when logistical or diplomatic circumstances finally permit. This approach finds support in both Zadvydas’s reasoning and the historical foundations of the vehicle Lopez employs (habeas corpus). In

Zadvydas, the Supreme Court eschewed a rigid, mechanical formula, focusing instead on whether the length of detention remains “reasonably necessary to secure removal.” 533 U.S. at 699. The Court explicitly instructed lower courts to measure reasonableness in light of the specific circumstances of the case

and the actual likelihood of a future deportation. Id. (“It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”). That directive undermines the logic of a blind, automatic aggregation of prior custody days

here. See also Meskini, 2018 WL 1321576, at *3. A flexible standard also aligns with the fundamental principle that habeas corpus is “at its core, an equitable remedy.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). Because habeas relief is governed by equitable principles,

courts are empowered to look beyond a mere mathematical tally to examine the totality of the circumstances. Id.; see also Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 213 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has long recognized that habeas corpus [is] . . . governed by equitable principles[.]”). By inquiring into whether the government has engaged in a deliberate cycle of release and

re-detention, the court exercises its equitable discretion to prevent gamesmanship, all while preserving the executive branch’s necessary flexibility to enforce the immigration laws. Applying this standard here, Lopez’s argument for aggregation falls

short. While he points to his prior period of ICE custody, the record is devoid of evidence that immigration officials manipulated his release and rearrest to bypass the six-month presumption or avoid judicial oversight. Without proof of such tactical maneuvering, this Court treats his present custody as an

independent, good-faith endeavor to secure his deportation. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. So the executive branch gets a

presumptively reasonable six-month runway to do its job, negotiate with foreign governments, and execute a final removal order. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Because Lopez remains inside that window, his current custody does not cross the line into the kind of indefinite, arbitrary lockup the Fifth

Amendment forbids. Until that clock actually runs out, the Government retains the constitutional authority to hold him. Lopez also argues that his clean supervision record precludes ICE from revoking his supervision. (Doc. 1 at 2, 3.) This argument fails. He is subject to

a final removal order that stands uncontested. The INA explicitly authorizes a return to detention to effectuate such orders. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). And the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in doing exactly that— enforcing its laws, ensuring individuals do not flee, and protecting the public.

See Malam v. Adducci, 469 F. Supp. 3d 767, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Here, the Government revoked Lopez’s release specifically to enforce his outstanding removal order, gave him notice that they were doing so, and afforded him an informal interview. (Docs. 3-1 at 8-11.) Returning him to custody thus serves

a recognized, legitimate government objective and was done in compliance with the INA’s regulations. C. Procedural Due Process Lopez also presses a procedural due process claim. (Doc. 1 at 6.) He

argues that he did not violate his supervision, so ICE could not revoke his release, and he did not receive a “meaningful custody review” when ICE detained him. (Id.) For starters, it’s not entirely clear that Lopez is entitled to a

freestanding due process analysis at this time. When the Supreme Court confronted the constitutional perils of indefinite immigration detention in Zadvydas, it did not instruct lower courts to start weighing the process afforded to the detainee. It set a timer. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. So until that timer

goes off, Zadvydas itself seemingly supplies the constitutional metric. Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). “In other words, the Zadvydas standard is due process: a § 1231 detainee who fails the Zadvydas test fails to prove a due process violation.” Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750,

760 (4th Cir. 2024). Because Lopez’s detention is barely out of the starting gate, he is presumably not yet entitled to anything more. But even if we assume the due process clause applies with full force, Lopez still comes up empty. At its core, the Due Process Clause demands that

before the government strips a person of a protected liberty interest, it must provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010). In the context of revoking a noncitizen’s supervised release, ICE’s

regulations strike that constitutional balance by guaranteeing written notice and an informal interview that allows the individual to respond. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i). According to the unrebutted record, Lopez received both. (See Doc. 3-1 at 9-11.) He got exactly what the Fifth Amendment requires—notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The Constitution guarantees a fair process, not a favorable result. Because ICE afforded Lopez the requisite notice and an opportunity to be heard, his procedural due process claim fails.

D. Conditions of Confinement Lastly, Lopez argues that his chronic medical condition renders his continued confinement excessive. (Doc. 1 at 7.) To the extent this is an argument for habeas relief, it is summarily rejected. Challenges to conditions

of confinement are not appropriately raised in the habeas context. See Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a claim challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or

duration of that confinement.”). IV. Conclusion Lopez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition

should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 22, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek United States District Judge