Jorge Luis Rodriguez Sosa v. Marc Fields et al.

District Court, E.D. Kentucky·Decided July 6, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-00245·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY NORTHERN DIVISION AT COVINGTON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-245-DLB

JORGE LUIS RODRIGUEZ SOSA PETITIONER

v. MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

MARC FIELDS et al. RESPONDENTS

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before the Court on Jorge Luis Rodriguez Sosa’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. # 1). On June 5, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to respond to the Petition. (Doc. # 3). Respondents Tammy Marich, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin, and Todd Blanche (collectively, the “Federal Respondents”) filed their Response on June 19, 2026. (Doc. # 4). Respondent Marc Fields did not file a response and the time for doing so has passed. On June 26, 2026, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Immediate Release.” (Doc. # 5). After reviewing this filing, the Court will construe it as a Reply to the Federal Respondents’ Response. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for the Court’s review. For the following reasons, Sosa’s Petition (Doc. # 1) is denied. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Sosa is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Doc. # 1-1 at 1). It is unclear when Sosa first entered the United States. However, there is no question that on July 15, 2024, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Sosa removed. (Doc. # 4-1 at 17). Although Sosa initially appealed this order of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), he moved to withdraw his appeal on April 22, 2026. (Doc. # 1-1 at 1). The BIA granted this motion on May 13, 2026. (Doc. # 4 at 2). Although the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is unable to remove Sosa to his native Cuba, DHS has arranged for Sosa’s removal to Mexico. (Id.). Pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Mexico, Mexico will accept Cuban nationals provided they are fully compliant with their

removal. (Id.). On June 8, 2026, DHS served Sosa with a Notice of Removal to Mexico, but Sosa refused to sign this document. (Id.). By virtue of his refusal to sign his Notice of Removal, Mexico does not consider Sosa fully compliant and, consequently, will not accept him. (Id.). On October 20, 2025, while his appeal was pending before the BIA, Sosa was arrested in Louisville, Kentucky for driving under the influence and domestic violence. (Id.). Three days later, the Louisville Department of Corrections released Sosa into the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. # 4-2 at 2). Sosa remains in ICE custody, and he is detained at the Kenton County Jail in Covington,

Kentucky. (Doc. # 1 at 1). On June 4, 2026, Sosa filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus requesting that the Court order his immediate release. (Doc. # 1). The Federal Respondents having filed their Response (Doc. # 4) and Sosa having filed what the Court construes as his Reply (Doc. # 5), this matter is ripe for the Court’s review. III. ANALYSIS Sosa claims that he has been subjected to unreasonably prolonged detention by ICE. (Doc. # 1-1 at 2-3). Specifically, Sosa argues that because he is no longer appealing his order of removal, the Federal Respondents “do[] not have a valid excuse for his detainment.” (Id. at 1). And Sosa notes that he has been in ICE custody since October 23, 2025, a timeline which exceeds the six-month window during which detention is presumptively reasonable. (Doc. # 5 at 1-2 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001))). Sosa asserts that DHS’s proposal to remove him to Mexico is unlawful “because it violates [a] noncitizen’s right to seek fear-based relief under the [C]onvention [Against

Torture] (CAT).” (Id. at 2). As a result, Sosa claims that “ICE has made no attempt to show it has a plan in place to lawfully remove the Petitioner.” (Id.). The Federal Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Sosa is detained because he is subject to a final order of removal. (Doc. # 4 at 3). When an order of removal becomes final, the government has a ninety-day “removal period” to effect removal. (Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A))). However, detention may extend beyond the removal period, the Federal Respondents continue, where an alien “fail[s] to cooperate with his removal.” (Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C))). If an alien refuses to take the steps necessary to bring about his removal, the removal period may be “extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in detention during such extended period[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). The Federal Respondents note that Sosa’s refusal to cooperate is the sole obstacle to his removal. (Doc. # 4 at 8). Although the Sixth Circuit “has not had occasion to review this particular situation,” the Federal Respondents note that at least three other Circuit Courts have held that § 1231(a)(1)(C) mandates detention when an alien’s refusal to cooperate is the sole barrier to removal. (Id. at 4-7 (citing Pelich v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003); Oladokun v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 479 F. App’x 895 (11th Cir. 2012); and Mytyuk v. Young, 347 F. App’x 50 (5th Cir. 2009))). So, the Federal Respondents conclude that Sosa’s removal period is still in effect and his detention is mandatory. (Id. at 8). Whatever the merits of the Federal Respondents’ argument, Sosa’s detention is lawful for a separate reason: the initial ninety-day removal period has not elapsed. There is no dispute that, because he has been ordered removed, Sosa is detained

under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. And § 1231 states that during the ninety-day removal period, an alien must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). The removal period begins on the latest of: (1) the date the order of removal becomes administratively final, (2) if the removal order is judicially reviewed and a court stays the alien’s removal, the date of the court’s final order, or (3) if the alien is detained in a non-immigration context, the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Relatedly, “[a]n order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) ‘a determination by the BIA affirming such order,’ or (2) ‘the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to’ petition the BIA for review of the order.” Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 260

(2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)). Sosa’s detention is lawful because he is still in the ninety-day removal period during which detention is mandatory. Although Sosa was originally ordered removed on July 15, 2024, he filed a timely appeal. (See Doc. # 4-4 at 1). By filing this appeal, Sosa prevented his removal order from becoming “administratively final” as contemplated by § 1231. Indeed, Sosa’s removal order was not “administratively final” as long as he had an appeal pending before the BIA. However, Sosa moved to withdraw his appeal, and the BIA granted his motion on May 13, 2026. (Doc. # 4-4). Thus, although it has been nearly two years since Sosa was ordered removed, he did not become subject to a final, executable order of removal until May 13, 2026. See Phadael v. Ripa, No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Jorge Luis Rodriguez Sosa v. Marc Fields et al., (E.D. Ky. 2026).

Jorge Luis Rodriguez Sosa v. Marc Fields et al. (Jorge Luis Rodriguez Sosa v. Marc Fields et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Mytyuk v. Young
347 F. App'x 50 (Fifth Circuit, 2009)
Robert Lee Caver v. Dennis M. Straub, Warden
349 F.3d 340 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
David Olusola Oladokun v. U.S. Attorney General
479 F. App'x 895 (Eleventh Circuit, 2012)
Zadvydas v. Davis
533 U.S. 678 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Walter Melara Martinez v. Christopher LaRose
968 F.3d 555 (Sixth Circuit, 2020)