Jorge Duran-Quezada v. Clark Construction Group, LLC

Fourth Circuit

Jorge Duran-Quezada v. Clark Construction Group, LLC

582 F. App'x 238

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedAugust 29, 2014

Docket14-1069

StatusUnpublished

This text of 582 F. App'x 238 (Jorge Duran-Quezada v. Clark Construction Group, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jorge Duran-Quezada v. Clark Construction Group, LLC, 582 F. App'x 238 (4th Cir. 2014).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Jorge Duran-Quezada, Carlos Gallegos, and Marcelino Mercado Castro (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs argue that the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3144, 3146, 3147 (West 2005 & Supp.2014), confers a private cause of action. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, assuming that all well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint are true. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir.2011). When determining whether a statute implicitly creates a private cause of action, we focus on Congressional intent. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988). “[UJnless this congressional intent [to create a private cause of action] can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.” Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981).

The majority of our sister Circuits to address this question have concluded that “neither the language, the history, nor the structure of the [Davis-Bacon Act] supports the implication of a private right of action.” United States ex rel. Glynn v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309, 1317 (5th Cir.1980); see Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 85 (2d Cir.2003) (collecting cases); Bane v. Radio Corp. of Am., 811 F.2d 1504 (4th Cir.1987) (No. 86-2036) (agreeing with Capeletti Bros.). While the decisions of other circuits are not binding, their reasoning is persuasive, and we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before this court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

Jorge Duran-Quezada, Carlos Gallegos, and Marcelino Mercado Castro (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs argue that the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3144, 3146, 3147 (West 2005 & Supp.2014), confers a private cause of action. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, assuming that all well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint are true. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir.2011). When determining whether a statute implicitly creates a private cause of action, we focus on Congressional intent. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988). “[UJnless this congressional intent [to create a private cause of action] can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.” Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981).

The majority of our sister Circuits to address this question have concluded that “neither the language, the history, nor the structure of the [Davis-Bacon Act] supports the implication of a private right of action.” United States ex rel. Glynn v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309, 1317 (5th Cir.1980); see Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 85 (2d Cir.2003) (collecting cases); Bane v. Radio Corp. of Am., 811 F.2d 1504 (4th Cir.1987) (No. 86-2036) (agreeing with Capeletti Bros.). While the decisions of other circuits are not binding, their reasoning is persuasive, and we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before this court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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