Jorge Baez-Sanchez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 10, 2017
Docket16-3784
StatusPublished

This text of Jorge Baez-Sanchez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III (Jorge Baez-Sanchez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jorge Baez-Sanchez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III, (7th Cir. 2017).

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 16‐3784 JORGE BAEZ‐SANCHEZ, Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. __________________

No. 17‐1438 DAVID BISHOP and ERIC LISH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL, Defendant‐Appellee. ____________________

JURISDICTIONAL SCREENING ORDERS ____________________

JULY 10, 2017 2 Nos. 16‐3784, 17‐1438

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, in chambers. WOOD, Chief Judge. This court carefully screens all appeals and other matters filed with it to ensure that there are no ju‐ risdictional problems, either at the district court or agency level or before us. In conducting this screening, we rely on the jurisdictional information furnished by the parties. Seventh Circuit Rule 3(c)(1) requires the docketing statement filed by the appellant (or petitioner, as the case may be) to “comply with the requirements of Circuit Rule 28(a).” Seventh Circuit Rule 28(a) addresses the later briefing stage, but the net effect of Circuit Rules 3(c)(1) and 28(a) is to require the same juris‐ dictional information for both docketing and briefing. With the important exception of pro se submissions, the court screens all briefs once they are filed to ensure that they in‐ clude all the necessary information about the jurisdiction of both the district court (or agency) and the court of appeals. FRAP 28(b) addresses the appellee’s brief; it allows the appel‐ lee to omit the jurisdictional statement “unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the appellant’s statement.” These requirements may seem straightforward, but a dis‐ tressing number of briefs filed in this court do not comply with the requirements of FRAP 28, as fleshed out in Circuit Rule 28. The two matters before me illustrate some common mistakes. I am issuing this opinion in the hope that attorneys practicing in the Seventh Circuit, as well as our pro se litigants, will take heed and avoid these errors in the future. I begin with a review of the rules governing jurisdictional statements in briefs. FRAP 28(a)(4) describes the jurisdictional statement required for an appellant or someone petitioning Nos. 16‐3784, 17‐1438 3

from an agency order; as FRAP 20 provides, all references in this opinion to appellants or appellees apply equally to peti‐ tioners and respondents. FRAP 28(a)(4) sets out the four criti‐ cal points that must be included in all jurisdictional state‐ ments: (1) the basis for the district court or agency’s jurisdic‐ tion; (2) the basis of the appellate court’s jurisdiction; (3) the relevant dates demonstrating that the appeal or petition is timely; and (4) information establishing either finality or the existence of a relevant exception to the final‐judgment rule. Circuit Rule 28(a) explains what information is needed to sat‐ isfy these requirements. Although this part of the rule is ra‐ ther long, it is worth reproducing in full here: (a) Appellantʹs Jurisdictional Statement. The jurisdic‐ tional statement in appellant’s brief, see FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(4), must contain the following details: (1) The statement concerning the district court’s ju‐ risdiction shall identify the provision of the consti‐ tution or federal statute involved if jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question. If juris‐ diction depends on diversity of citizenship, the statement shall identify the jurisdictional amount and the citizenship of each party to the litigation. If any party is a corporation, the statement shall iden‐ tify both the state of incorporation and the state in which the corporation has its principal place of business. If any party is an unincorporated associa‐ tion or partnership the statement shall identify the citizenship of all members. The statement shall sup‐ ply similar details concerning the invocation of supplemental jurisdiction or other sources of juris‐ diction. 4 Nos. 16‐3784, 17‐1438

(2) The statement concerning appellate jurisdiction shall identify the statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction on this court and the following particulars: (i) The date of entry of the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed. (ii) The filing date of any motion for a new trial or alteration of the judgment or any other mo‐ tion claimed to toll the time within which to ap‐ peal. (iii) The disposition of such a motion and the date of its entry. (iv) The filing date of the notice of appeal (to‐ gether with information about an extension of time if one was granted). (v) If the case is a direct appeal from the decision of a magistrate judge, the dates on which each party consented in writing to the entry of final judgment by the magistrate judge. (3) If the appeal is from an order other than a final judgment which adjudicates all of the claims with respect to all parties, counsel shall provide the in‐ formation necessary to enable the court to deter‐ mine whether the order is immediately appealable. Elaboration will be necessary in the following cases although the list is illustrative rather than exhaus‐ tive: (i) If any claims or parties remain for disposition in the district court, identify the nature of these claims and the ground on which an appeal may be taken in advance of the final judgment. If Nos. 16‐3784, 17‐1438 5

there has been a certificate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or if this is an appeal by permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), give the particulars and de‐ scribe the relation between the claims or parties subject to the appeal and the claims or parties remaining in the district court. (ii) If the ground of jurisdiction is the “collateral order doctrine,” describe how the order meets each of the criteria of that doctrine: finality, sep‐ arability from the merits of the underlying ac‐ tion, and practical unreviewability on appeal from a final judgment. Cite pertinent cases es‐ tablishing the appealability of orders of the character involved. (iii) If the order sought to be reviewed remands a case to a bankruptcy judge or administrative agency, explain what needs to be done on re‐ mand and why the order is nonetheless “final.” (iv) Whenever some issues or parties remain be‐ fore the district court, give enough information to enable the court to determine whether the or‐ der is appealable. Appeals from orders granting or staying arbitration or abstaining from deci‐ sion as well as appeals from the grant or denial of injunctions require careful exposition of juris‐ dictional factors. The rules for an appellee’s jurisdictional statement do not consume as much space, but they are equally important. As noted above, FRAP 28(b) exempts the appellee from filing a 6 Nos. 16‐3784, 17‐1438

jurisdictional statement unless it is “dissatisfied” with the ap‐ pellant’s statement. Circuit Rule 28(b) directs that “[t]he ap‐ pellee’s brief shall state explicitly whether or not the jurisdic‐ tional summary in the appellant’s brief is complete and correct.

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Bluebook (online)
Jorge Baez-Sanchez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jorge-baez-sanchez-v-jefferson-b-sessions-iii-ca7-2017.