Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 14, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court CHADWICK JORDAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-1116 (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-02660-RM-JPO) DAVID STEWARD, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before McHUGH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge. _________________________________
Chadwick Jordan, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against an official with the
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Mr. Jordan proceeds pro se, we construe his arguments liberally, but we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 2
University of Colorado, Denver (UCD). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Jordan is now serving a 32-year prison sentence in Colorado. He began
serving this sentence in 2022, after he commenced this lawsuit but before the district
court entered final judgment dismissing it. Mr. Jordan sued several UCD officials in
their individual and official capacities under § 1983, alleging violations of his
procedural due process rights in connection with four student-conduct cases that
resulted in his suspension and subsequent expulsion.
Mr. Jordan filed a first, second, and third amended complaint to correct
pleading deficiencies the district court identified in each preceding complaint.
Unprompted, he also filed a fourth amended complaint, which the district court
allowed in part and dismissed in part. Following a motion to dismiss, the court
dismissed all claims against all defendants save for one. The district court declined
to dismiss a single claim alleging a procedural due process violation against
Dr. David Steward, the UCD Director of Student Conduct and Community Standards
who made the decision to suspend and then expel Mr. Jordan. This single remaining
claim revolved around the allegation that Dr. Steward was unconstitutionally biased
in the two most recent student-conduct cases against Mr. Jordan.
Dr. Steward answered the complaint, and Mr. Jordan moved to amend it again.
Mr. Jordan’s proposed fifth amended complaint reasserted many of the
since-dismissed claims against many of the since-dismissed defendants. Following
2 Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 3
the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court denied the motion to
amend for untimeliness and futility. Dr. Steward filed a motion for summary
judgment, and Mr. Jordan filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. But, although
the parties fully briefed Mr. Jordan’s cross-motion, Mr. Jordan never filed a formal
response to Dr. Steward’s motion for summary judgment.
Initially, the district court entered a minute order striking Dr. Steward’s
summary judgment motion for “failure to provide a separate statement of undisputed
material facts as required by Judge Raymond P. Moore’s Civil Practice Standards
(Section IV.C.2 and Exhibits 1 & 2).” R. vol. 1 at 15. But, later the same day, the
court entered another minute order stating: “This matter is before the Court
sua sponte. In light of Plaintiff's status as a pro se prisoner, the Court accepts
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as filed.” Id. at 16.
The district court granted the Dr. Steward’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding UCD afforded Mr. Jordan all the process he was due before it expelled
him. The court’s summary judgment order liberally construed all of Mr. Jordan’s
pleadings and submissions—including those he submitted in support of his own
motion for summary judgment—in an effort to determine whether there still existed a
viable claim of decisionmaker bias that would amount to a Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process violation. But the court concluded there did not. The district
court entered final judgment, and this appeal followed.
3 Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 4
DISCUSSION
Mr. Jordan raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the district court’s
“minute order did not overrule [its prior] order [striking Dr. Steward’s motion for
summary judgment], and courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings only.”
Aplt. Opening Br. at 1 (capitalization omitted). Second, he argues the district court
“should not [have] denied [his] fifth [motion for leave to amend his complaint.]”
Id. at 3 (capitalization omitted). Mr. Jordan does not challenge the merits of the
underlying summary judgment order.
We reject the first argument. The district court’s minute order very clearly
reversed the preceding minute order that struck Dr. Steward’s motion, and the court
did not abuse its discretion when it entered an order correctly applying its own rules.
The court initially struck Dr. Steward’s motion for summary judgment the
motion based on its mistaken conclusion that it did not comply with section IV.C.2 of
the court’s practice standards. But section IV.C.2.k of the court’s practice standards
stated cases with pro se prisoners “are exempt from” the requirements of section
IV.C.2, and Mr. Jordan was a pro se prisoner at the time Dr. Steward filed the
motion., so the court’s second minute order corrected the erroneous first minute
order. “Although a district court’s local rules of practice are technically binding on
both the court and the parties, considerable deference is accorded to the court’s
interpretation and application of its own rules of practice and procedure.” Bylin
v. Billings, 568 F.3d 1224, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). Mr. Jordan offers no reason to conclude, and we see none, that the
4 Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 5
district court’s prompt, sua sponte reversal of its own initial erroneous order runs
afoul of the “considerable deference” it is due in interpreting and applying its own
rules of practice and procedure. Id.
We reject the second argument because the district court acted within its
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Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 14, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court CHADWICK JORDAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-1116 (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-02660-RM-JPO) DAVID STEWARD, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before McHUGH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge. _________________________________
Chadwick Jordan, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against an official with the
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Mr. Jordan proceeds pro se, we construe his arguments liberally, but we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 2
University of Colorado, Denver (UCD). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Jordan is now serving a 32-year prison sentence in Colorado. He began
serving this sentence in 2022, after he commenced this lawsuit but before the district
court entered final judgment dismissing it. Mr. Jordan sued several UCD officials in
their individual and official capacities under § 1983, alleging violations of his
procedural due process rights in connection with four student-conduct cases that
resulted in his suspension and subsequent expulsion.
Mr. Jordan filed a first, second, and third amended complaint to correct
pleading deficiencies the district court identified in each preceding complaint.
Unprompted, he also filed a fourth amended complaint, which the district court
allowed in part and dismissed in part. Following a motion to dismiss, the court
dismissed all claims against all defendants save for one. The district court declined
to dismiss a single claim alleging a procedural due process violation against
Dr. David Steward, the UCD Director of Student Conduct and Community Standards
who made the decision to suspend and then expel Mr. Jordan. This single remaining
claim revolved around the allegation that Dr. Steward was unconstitutionally biased
in the two most recent student-conduct cases against Mr. Jordan.
Dr. Steward answered the complaint, and Mr. Jordan moved to amend it again.
Mr. Jordan’s proposed fifth amended complaint reasserted many of the
since-dismissed claims against many of the since-dismissed defendants. Following
2 Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 3
the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court denied the motion to
amend for untimeliness and futility. Dr. Steward filed a motion for summary
judgment, and Mr. Jordan filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. But, although
the parties fully briefed Mr. Jordan’s cross-motion, Mr. Jordan never filed a formal
response to Dr. Steward’s motion for summary judgment.
Initially, the district court entered a minute order striking Dr. Steward’s
summary judgment motion for “failure to provide a separate statement of undisputed
material facts as required by Judge Raymond P. Moore’s Civil Practice Standards
(Section IV.C.2 and Exhibits 1 & 2).” R. vol. 1 at 15. But, later the same day, the
court entered another minute order stating: “This matter is before the Court
sua sponte. In light of Plaintiff's status as a pro se prisoner, the Court accepts
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as filed.” Id. at 16.
The district court granted the Dr. Steward’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding UCD afforded Mr. Jordan all the process he was due before it expelled
him. The court’s summary judgment order liberally construed all of Mr. Jordan’s
pleadings and submissions—including those he submitted in support of his own
motion for summary judgment—in an effort to determine whether there still existed a
viable claim of decisionmaker bias that would amount to a Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process violation. But the court concluded there did not. The district
court entered final judgment, and this appeal followed.
3 Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 4
DISCUSSION
Mr. Jordan raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the district court’s
“minute order did not overrule [its prior] order [striking Dr. Steward’s motion for
summary judgment], and courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings only.”
Aplt. Opening Br. at 1 (capitalization omitted). Second, he argues the district court
“should not [have] denied [his] fifth [motion for leave to amend his complaint.]”
Id. at 3 (capitalization omitted). Mr. Jordan does not challenge the merits of the
underlying summary judgment order.
We reject the first argument. The district court’s minute order very clearly
reversed the preceding minute order that struck Dr. Steward’s motion, and the court
did not abuse its discretion when it entered an order correctly applying its own rules.
The court initially struck Dr. Steward’s motion for summary judgment the
motion based on its mistaken conclusion that it did not comply with section IV.C.2 of
the court’s practice standards. But section IV.C.2.k of the court’s practice standards
stated cases with pro se prisoners “are exempt from” the requirements of section
IV.C.2, and Mr. Jordan was a pro se prisoner at the time Dr. Steward filed the
motion., so the court’s second minute order corrected the erroneous first minute
order. “Although a district court’s local rules of practice are technically binding on
both the court and the parties, considerable deference is accorded to the court’s
interpretation and application of its own rules of practice and procedure.” Bylin
v. Billings, 568 F.3d 1224, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). Mr. Jordan offers no reason to conclude, and we see none, that the
4 Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 5
district court’s prompt, sua sponte reversal of its own initial erroneous order runs
afoul of the “considerable deference” it is due in interpreting and applying its own
rules of practice and procedure. Id.
We reject the second argument because the district court acted within its
discretion when it denied Mr. Jordan’s motion for leave to amend his complaint for a
fifth time. “This court reviews the decision of the district court to deny leave to
amend for abuse of discretion.” U.S. ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
558 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009). “Where the party seeking amendment knows
or should have known of the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based but
fails to include them in the original complaint, the motion to amend is subject to
denial.” State Distributors, Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 738 F.2d 405, 416
(10th Cir. 1984).
Mr. Jordan filed the motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint over
three years after he first initiated suit. He did not explain to the district court—nor
does he satisfactorily argue to this court—how the allegations he raised in the
proposed fifth amended complaint came from newly discovered information. Neither
does he articulate how the allegations in the proposed fifth amended complaint would
cure the deficiencies the district court identified in its prior dismissal orders. And he
does not challenge those dismissal orders on appeal. Under these circumstances, we
discern no abuse of discretion.
5 Appellate Case: 24-1116 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/14/2025 Page: 6
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge