CHASANOW, Judge.
Brian Richard Jordan (Jordan) was convicted in the Circuit Court for Carroll County of felony murder, conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery. Jordan received two life sentences and two ten-year [153]*153sentences for the respective offenses, all sentences to run consecutively.1
The events that culminated in Jordan’s arrest and trial are as follows: Jordan and two other companions, Brian Matthew Tracy (Tracy) and Dawn Torres (Torres), with an ultimate goal of running away to California, plotted an escape from the Sykesville Shelter Home, a juvenile facility where they were being detained. On November 22, 1987, they discussed a plan whereby Tracy and Jordan would kill Richard Purman (Purman) and steal his car. Later that day, Tracy called Purman and asked him to drive to the shelter and pick up Tracy, Torres and Jordan. Purman complied. Tracy instructed Purman to drive to Tracy’s house, where Tracy obtained a gun. Next, Tracy directed Purman to a wooded area at Mail and Sam’s Creek Roads and told Purman that he had a surprise for him. Upon their arrival and after unloading the personal belongings of the runaways into a weeded area, Tracy shot Purman to death.2 The rest of the escape scheme did not go as planned, and the three ultimately returned to the Sykesville Shelter.
On November 23, 1987, at approximately 3 a.m., Jordan, age 16, and Tracy were arrested at the Sykesville Shelter Home. Jordan was handcuffed, Miranda3 warnings were read to him, and he then was placed under arrest. During this time, Jordan complained to the officers that the handcuffs were too tight, but no corrective measures were taken. Jordan was transported to the Westminster Barracks of the Maryland State Police. Although the tempera[154]*154ture was 23 degrees outside and there was ice and snow on the ground, Jordan was taken wearing only a tee shirt and jeans, with no shoes or socks on his feet. Miranda warnings were read again to Jordan by Corporal James Leete. Before making a statement about the events and circumstances surrounding Richard Purman’s death, Jordan asked whether he could have a lawyer but was told that none was presently available. He also was not permitted to contact his mother. Jordan subsequently made a 95 minute incriminatory statement.
A hearing was held prior to trial on a motion to suppress Jordan’s statement. Jordan claimed that his statement was involuntarily made and that he did not waive his right to counsel. Several factors were asserted as to why the trial judge should find Jordan’s prior statement involuntary: 1) Jordan was a juvenile being detained in a juvenile facility; 2) he complained of discomfort from the handcuffs being too tight, but was only given instructions on how to attempt to alleviate the pressure on his wrists; 3) he was inadequately dressed for the inclement weather conditions, i.e., “shoeless, sockless, hatless, and jacketless,” when transported to the Maryland State Police Barracks; and 4) he was forced to walk barefoot over an icy gravel parking lot to the barracks. The trial court held that Jordan had been properly advised of his rights and that his statement was voluntarily made, but that the State had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Jordan had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Therefore, when and if Jordan took the stand, his statement could only be used for the purpose of impeachment.
At trial, after the State had concluded its case, Jordan’s counsel requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling on the voluntariness of Jordan’s statement and proffered that the defendant would take the stand if his prior statement could not be used for impeachment purposes. The trial court declined to reconsider its ruling on the motion to suppress. Jordan elected not to testify and, after being convicted, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. He maintained that his statement was not voluntarily given [155]*155because of the conditions and circumstances that he was exposed to immediately prior to interrogation, as well as his young age at the time of arrest and his detainers’ refusal to allow him to speak with his mother either at the shelter or police barracks. The State argued that the issue had not been preserved for appeal since Jordan did not testify and, therefore, the statement was never utilized or placed into evidence. The Court of Special Appeals decided that the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
“The [trial] court ruled that the State’s failure to prove compliance with Miranda rendered [Jordan’s] statement inadmissible in the State’s case in chief. On the other hand, its ruling that the statement was voluntarily made allowed the State to use it to challenge [Jordan’s] credibility should he testify in his own behalf. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). [Jordan], as we have seen, elected not to testify; hence, the statement was never used in the case for any purpose. Therefore, the issue simply has not been properly presented for our review. See Offutt v. State, 44 Md.App. 670, 410 A.2d 611 (1980), cert. denied, 291 Md. 780 (1981). See also Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984).” (Footnote omitted.)
Jordan v. State, 82 Md.App. 225, 231, 571 A.2d 238, 241 (1990).
I. DECISION TO ADMIT JORDAN’S CONFESSION NOT PRESERVED
This Court must decide whether a trial court’s ruling that the defendant’s prior statement was voluntary is preserved for appeal if the defendant fails to testify on his own behalf and proffers to the court that, but for its ruling, he would have exercised his right to testify.
The fundamental constitutional right of a criminal defendant to testify in his own defense is deeply entrenched in our modern system of jurisprudence. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-50, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708, 97 L.Ed.2d 37, 44-45 (1987). “It is one of the rights that 'are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.’ ” Id. at 51, [156]*156107 S.Ct. at 2708-09, 97 L.Ed.2d at 46 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572 n. 15 (1975)). Allowing a defendant to testify promotes both the “ ‘ “detection of guilt” ’ ” and the “ ‘ “protection of innocence.” ’ ” Rock, 483 U.S. at 50, 107 S.Ct. at 2708, 97 L.Ed.2d at 45 (quoting Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 581, 81 S.Ct. 756, 762, 5 L.Ed.2d 783, 790 (1961), in turn quoting 1 Am.L.Rev. 396 (1867)).
It is axiomatic that courts have traditionally reviewed decisions that permit the admission of evidence in criminal trials only where the evidence is used to convict. We are not inclined to review a trial court’s decision authorizing the State to use particular evidence when, as a result of a tactical decision by the defendant, the State ultimately was precluded from utilizing that same evidence.
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CHASANOW, Judge.
Brian Richard Jordan (Jordan) was convicted in the Circuit Court for Carroll County of felony murder, conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery. Jordan received two life sentences and two ten-year [153]*153sentences for the respective offenses, all sentences to run consecutively.1
The events that culminated in Jordan’s arrest and trial are as follows: Jordan and two other companions, Brian Matthew Tracy (Tracy) and Dawn Torres (Torres), with an ultimate goal of running away to California, plotted an escape from the Sykesville Shelter Home, a juvenile facility where they were being detained. On November 22, 1987, they discussed a plan whereby Tracy and Jordan would kill Richard Purman (Purman) and steal his car. Later that day, Tracy called Purman and asked him to drive to the shelter and pick up Tracy, Torres and Jordan. Purman complied. Tracy instructed Purman to drive to Tracy’s house, where Tracy obtained a gun. Next, Tracy directed Purman to a wooded area at Mail and Sam’s Creek Roads and told Purman that he had a surprise for him. Upon their arrival and after unloading the personal belongings of the runaways into a weeded area, Tracy shot Purman to death.2 The rest of the escape scheme did not go as planned, and the three ultimately returned to the Sykesville Shelter.
On November 23, 1987, at approximately 3 a.m., Jordan, age 16, and Tracy were arrested at the Sykesville Shelter Home. Jordan was handcuffed, Miranda3 warnings were read to him, and he then was placed under arrest. During this time, Jordan complained to the officers that the handcuffs were too tight, but no corrective measures were taken. Jordan was transported to the Westminster Barracks of the Maryland State Police. Although the tempera[154]*154ture was 23 degrees outside and there was ice and snow on the ground, Jordan was taken wearing only a tee shirt and jeans, with no shoes or socks on his feet. Miranda warnings were read again to Jordan by Corporal James Leete. Before making a statement about the events and circumstances surrounding Richard Purman’s death, Jordan asked whether he could have a lawyer but was told that none was presently available. He also was not permitted to contact his mother. Jordan subsequently made a 95 minute incriminatory statement.
A hearing was held prior to trial on a motion to suppress Jordan’s statement. Jordan claimed that his statement was involuntarily made and that he did not waive his right to counsel. Several factors were asserted as to why the trial judge should find Jordan’s prior statement involuntary: 1) Jordan was a juvenile being detained in a juvenile facility; 2) he complained of discomfort from the handcuffs being too tight, but was only given instructions on how to attempt to alleviate the pressure on his wrists; 3) he was inadequately dressed for the inclement weather conditions, i.e., “shoeless, sockless, hatless, and jacketless,” when transported to the Maryland State Police Barracks; and 4) he was forced to walk barefoot over an icy gravel parking lot to the barracks. The trial court held that Jordan had been properly advised of his rights and that his statement was voluntarily made, but that the State had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Jordan had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Therefore, when and if Jordan took the stand, his statement could only be used for the purpose of impeachment.
At trial, after the State had concluded its case, Jordan’s counsel requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling on the voluntariness of Jordan’s statement and proffered that the defendant would take the stand if his prior statement could not be used for impeachment purposes. The trial court declined to reconsider its ruling on the motion to suppress. Jordan elected not to testify and, after being convicted, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. He maintained that his statement was not voluntarily given [155]*155because of the conditions and circumstances that he was exposed to immediately prior to interrogation, as well as his young age at the time of arrest and his detainers’ refusal to allow him to speak with his mother either at the shelter or police barracks. The State argued that the issue had not been preserved for appeal since Jordan did not testify and, therefore, the statement was never utilized or placed into evidence. The Court of Special Appeals decided that the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
“The [trial] court ruled that the State’s failure to prove compliance with Miranda rendered [Jordan’s] statement inadmissible in the State’s case in chief. On the other hand, its ruling that the statement was voluntarily made allowed the State to use it to challenge [Jordan’s] credibility should he testify in his own behalf. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). [Jordan], as we have seen, elected not to testify; hence, the statement was never used in the case for any purpose. Therefore, the issue simply has not been properly presented for our review. See Offutt v. State, 44 Md.App. 670, 410 A.2d 611 (1980), cert. denied, 291 Md. 780 (1981). See also Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984).” (Footnote omitted.)
Jordan v. State, 82 Md.App. 225, 231, 571 A.2d 238, 241 (1990).
I. DECISION TO ADMIT JORDAN’S CONFESSION NOT PRESERVED
This Court must decide whether a trial court’s ruling that the defendant’s prior statement was voluntary is preserved for appeal if the defendant fails to testify on his own behalf and proffers to the court that, but for its ruling, he would have exercised his right to testify.
The fundamental constitutional right of a criminal defendant to testify in his own defense is deeply entrenched in our modern system of jurisprudence. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-50, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708, 97 L.Ed.2d 37, 44-45 (1987). “It is one of the rights that 'are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.’ ” Id. at 51, [156]*156107 S.Ct. at 2708-09, 97 L.Ed.2d at 46 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572 n. 15 (1975)). Allowing a defendant to testify promotes both the “ ‘ “detection of guilt” ’ ” and the “ ‘ “protection of innocence.” ’ ” Rock, 483 U.S. at 50, 107 S.Ct. at 2708, 97 L.Ed.2d at 45 (quoting Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 581, 81 S.Ct. 756, 762, 5 L.Ed.2d 783, 790 (1961), in turn quoting 1 Am.L.Rev. 396 (1867)).
It is axiomatic that courts have traditionally reviewed decisions that permit the admission of evidence in criminal trials only where the evidence is used to convict. We are not inclined to review a trial court’s decision authorizing the State to use particular evidence when, as a result of a tactical decision by the defendant, the State ultimately was precluded from utilizing that same evidence.
Jordan’s alleged injury is rather remote and speculative. If Jordan had testified, it is possible, depending on how he testified, that the State might have elected not to use his statement to impeach him and thus not open the door to the issue of voluntariness. It is also possible that Jordan might have taken the stand and given testimony consistent with his statement to the police, thus precluding use of the statement since it would have no “impeachment” value; or Jordan might have taken the stand and given testimony so similar to his statement to the police that use of the statement to impeach, even if improper, would be harmless error.4
Just as Jordan’s potential injury is speculative, the right he is asserting is also speculative. If we assume Jordan is [157]*157correct and the trial judge erroneously ruled that the confession was voluntary, then it is not clear how Jordan’s constitutional rights were violated. His right against self-incrimination was not infringed upon, as he elected not to testify. His right to take the witness stand could ultimately be preserved since, if he testified and was improperly impeached with an involuntary statement, any conviction would be reversed on appeal. What Jordan really seems to be asking for is that, when a trial judge improperly rules that an involuntary confession can be used to impeach, the defendant ought to be able to avoid the effect of the ruling by not taking the stand, but still have his conviction reversed because evidence that ultimately was never introduced should not even have been available for introduction.
In New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979), the Supreme Court held that impeachment by prior statements made to a grand jury under a grant of immunity would violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. The Portash trial judge had ruled in limine that the defendant could be impeached with the grand jury testimony, and as a result, the defendant elected not to testify. The Supreme Court held that it could review the trial court’s ruling since the New Jersey appellate court had considered the suppression ruling properly before it and federal law did not prohibit New Jersey from following this procedure.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist, Justice Powell acknowledged that since this was a state case, the procedural question was within the authority of the state to decide. He said, “requiring that the claim [that the confession could not be used to [158]*158impeach] be presented only by those who have taken the stand will prevent defendants with no real intention of testifying from creating artificial constitutional challenges to their convictions.” Id. at 462, 99 S.Ct. at 1299, 59 L.Ed.2d at 512 (Powell, J., concurring).
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Black-mun stated that since the defendant did not take the stand, the court should not have reached the issue of whether the grand jury testimony could have been used to impeach. He wrote that the result of the court’s ruling was to render “an advisory opinion, informing respondent what the State would have been permitted to do or not do had respondent ever taken the stand.” Id. at 468, 99 S.Ct. at 1301, 59 L.Ed.2d at 515 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Five years later, the Supreme Court decided Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), where the defendant made a motion in limine to exclude the use of a prior conviction to impeach if he elected to testify. The trial judge ruled that the conviction would be admissible to impeach. As a result, the defendant elected not to testify. The Supreme Court held that in order to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify at trial and be impeached. In order to properly weigh probative value against prejudicial effect, a reviewing court “must know the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony, which is unknowable when ... the defendant does not testify.” Id. at 41,105 S.Ct. at 463, 83 L.Ed.2d at 447. The Court noted that “[a]ny possible harm flowing” from the court’s ruling would be “wholly speculative” in the absence of the defendant’s testimony. Id.
“When the defendant does not testify, the reviewing court also has no way of knowing whether the Government would have sought to impeach with the prior conviction. If, for example, the Government’s case is strong, and the defendant is subject to impeachment by other means, a prosecutor might elect not to use an arguably inadmissible prior conviction.”
[159]*159Id. at 42, 105 S.Ct. at 463, 83 L.Ed.2d at 448. Although Luce involved the issue of impeachment by prior conviction rather than a ruling grounded on the constitutional right not to be impeached with an involuntary confession, we are persuaded that its reasoning is applicable in the instant case.
Finally, Jordan contends that his right to appellate review is governed by Maryland Rule 4-252(g)(2), which states in pertinent part:
“If the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a party and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise. A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for new trial or on appeal of a conviction." (Emphasis added.)
Apparently his argument is that where a judge improperly denies a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, that ruling is reviewable and the defendant is entitled to a new trial, even if the State decides not to offer the disputed evidence at trial. Rule 4-252(g)(2) obviously was not intended to authorize appellate review of a judge’s preliminary ruling that permits the State to introduce evidence at trial unless the evidence is ultimately introduced at trial. See also State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 786 P.2d 948, 954 (1990) (“Because defendant did not testify, we hold that he may not attack the pretrial ruling conditionally admitting his statements for impeachment in the event he did testify”); State v. Bruneau, 131 N.H. 104, 552 A.2d 585, 592 (1988) (“Only if the defendant had taken the stand and suffered impeachment by the statement’s use would an issue be ripe for adjudication [on appeal]”).
II. SEPARATE SENTENCES FOR CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON
Jordan asserts that the conspiracy was only one crime and thus he should have received only one sentence [160]*160for one conspiracy conviction. He claims that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that this question had not been preserved for appellate review. The intermediate appellate court stated:
“[Jordan] further contends that the State proved only one conspiracy with multiple objects and, consequently, he should only have been sentenced for one conspiracy. This argument is belied by what occurred below. [Jordan] did not object to two conspiracy counts being submitted to the jury, and the issue was not raised when he moved for judgment of acquittal. Moreover, [Jordan] did not except to the conspiracy instructions given the jury. Even when the jury had returned verdicts of guilty as to each of two conspiracies, [Jordan] still did not bring to the court’s attention the contention he now makes that there was only one conspiracy. Notwithstanding, [Jordan] suggests that we treat the court’s failure to present the issue of the number of conspiracies properly to be considered by the jury plain error. We are not persuaded that it is plain error.”
Jordan, 82 Md.App. at 245-46, 571 A.2d at 248 (footnote omitted). The State maintains that defense counsel acquiesced in the separate conspiracy convictions and, therefore, the issue has not been preserved for appellate review. The State asserts that Jordan cannot now raise this argument
“because he (1) did not object to two conspiracy counts being submitted to the jury, (2) did not except to the conspiracy instructions actually given to the jury, and (3) even after the jury found him guilty of two conspiracies, did not make the contention he now makes on appeal with respect to [this] issue.”
While the State urges this Court to hold that Jordan was properly convicted of two separate conspiracies, it concedes that if there was only one conspiracy and if the issue had been preserved for review, then under Tracy v. State, 319 Md. 452, 573 A.2d 38 (1990) (the trial of Jordan’s co-conspir[161]*161ator, Brian Matthew Tracy), only one conspiracy conviction would be upheld. In Tracy we explained:
“It is well settled in Maryland that only one sentence can be imposed for a single common law conspiracy no matter how many criminal acts the conspirators have agreed to commit. The unit of prosecution is the agreement or combination rather than each of its criminal objectives. In Mason v. State, 302 Md. 434, 445, 488 A.2d 955, 960 (1985), we stated that a ‘conspiracy remains one offense regardless of how many repeated violations of the law may have been the object of the conspiracy.’ ”
Id, at 459, 578 A.2d at 41. The facts in the instant case do not support the determination that two conspiracies existed. The imposition upon Jordan of one sentence for conspiracy to commit murder and one sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery was plain error. An illegal sentence resulted.
If we conclude that sentencing Jordan for two conspiracies was unlawful, we must also conclude that Jordan has not waived Ms right to object to the unlawful sentence.
“[WJhen the trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the trial court. Such review and correction of an illegal sentence is especially appropriate in light of the fact that Rule 4-345(a), formerly Rule 774 a, provides that ‘[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.’ Thus, a. defendant who fails to object to the imposition of an Illegal sentence does not waive forever his right to challenge that sentence.”
Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985). See also Osborne v. State, 304 Md. 323, 326 n. 1, 499 A.2d 170, 171 n. 1 (1985).
As we stated in Tracy, “[t]he agreement from its inception was to commit robbery and murder, but there was only one conspiracy since both crimes were the objective of the same agreement.” 319 Md. at 460, 573 A.2d at 41. Jordan can only be sentenced once for the conspiracy that was the product of the agreement and, therefore, the conviction for [162]*162conspiracy to commit robbery will be vacated. Under Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 38, “[t]he punishment of every person convicted of the crime of conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for the offense he or she conspired to commit.” Through the single agreement, Tracy and Jordan conspired to commit murder and robbery. Of the two, murder is the crime that carries the more severe penalty and consequently is the guideline offense under section 38 that Jordan “conspired to commit.” As in Tracy, the conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery must be vacated.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY, AND TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON THE REMAINING COUNTS. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY.