Jones v. Uttecht

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: July 24, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-05371
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT TACOMA

7 NO. 22-cv-5371 MARTIN A. JONES, 8 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND Petitioner, RECOMMENDATION 9 v. 10 JEFFREY UTTECHT, 11 Respondent. 12

13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United 15 States Magistrate Judge David W. Christel regarding Martin A. Jones’ federal habeas petition, filed 16 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from his state court conviction and sentence. See R&R, 17 ECF No. 13. Judge Christel recommends that the petition be denied and a certificate of appealability 18 not be issued, and Mr. Jones has filed objections. After careful consideration of Mr. Jones’ amended 19 petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. No. 7, the R&R, ECF No. 13, the objections thereto, 20 ECF No. 15, the State’s response, ECF No. 16, the relevant legal authority, and the record of the 21 case, the Court adopts the R&R and denies Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning for the Court’s 22 decision follows. 23

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 The Report and Recommendation provides a thorough background of this case, which the 3 Court does not repeat here. Briefly summarized, in February 2010, Washington State Patrol Trooper 4 Scott Johnson was shot while attempting to impound a vehicle owned by Mr. Jones and his wife. 5 Trooper Johnson recovered and later identified Mr. Jones as the shooter. In February 2011, a jury 6 found Mr. Jones guilty of attempted murder in the first degree. Mr. Jones challenged his conviction 7 and sentence, and ultimately, the state court of appeals issued a certificate of finality on June 2, 8 2022. Mr. Jones filed the pending habeas corpus petition, raising four grounds for relief. Judge 9 Christel reviewed each of the four grounds in detail in the R&R and concluded that Mr. Jones has 10 not shown that the state courts’ adjudication of Grounds 1-3 was contrary to, nor an unreasonable 11 application of, clearly established federal law. He further found that Ground 4 is not cognizable

12 under § 2254. Mr. Jones has filed objections and asks the Court to reject the R&R as to the first 13 two grounds: (1) the State’s reliance on a highly suggestive and unreliable identification procedure; 14 and (2) the trial court’s exclusion of “critical evidence” during the trial proceedings. Objs. 2, ECF 15 No. 15; R&R 7-16, 17-21. Mr. Jones contends that the Magistrate Judge inappropriately deferred 16 to the conclusions of the Washington Court of Appeals by failing to recognize that the state 17 appellate court’s rulings were contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent, and because 18 many of the critical factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Objs. 1-2. 19 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 20 A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation on 21 dispositive matters. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in

22 whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 23 The Court reviews de novo those portions of the report and recommendation to which specific written

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 objection is made. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Fed. 2 R. Civ. P. 72(b). 3 IV. DISCUSSION 4 Petitioner has submitted specific written objections and asks the Court to reject the R&R as 5 to Claims 1 and 2. Accordingly, the Court will review the portions of the R&R related to these two 6 claims de novo. Importantly, however, there are several limits on the power of a federal court to 7 grant a habeas petition under the circumstances present here. A habeas petition by a person in 8 custody pursuant to a state court judgment 9 shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 10 the claim— 11 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 12 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 13 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 14 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Further, the State court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct and are 15 rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2254 (e)(1). 16 “This is a difficult to meet, and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, 17 which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 18 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citations omitted). When reviewing state court decisions, the Court is 19 “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id. 20 at 180–81. “[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law . . . is the holdings (as 21 opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision.” Hedlund v. 22 Ryan, 854 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “If Supreme Court ‘cases give no clear 23

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 answer to the question presented, . . . it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied 2 clearly established Federal law.’” Id. at 565–66 (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 3 (2008)). When a petitioner challenges a state court’s application of clearly established federal law, 4 the federal court decides only whether the law was applied reasonably, not whether it was applied 5 correctly. Id. at 566. “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary 6 conclusion was unreasonable.” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (Harrington v. 7 Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). The reviewing court may not “treat[ ] the unreasonableness 8 question as a test of its confidence in the result it would reach under de novo review.” Harrington, 9 562 U.S. at 102. 10 A. Claim 1 – Suggestive Identification Procedure 11 Mr. Jones contends that the State’s evidence against him hinged largely upon Trooper

12 Johnson’s in-court identification of him as the assailant, but he asserts that the identification should 13 have been suppressed because it was the product of highly suggestive and unreliable identification 14 procedures. Objs. 3. He argues that the stipulation of facts presented to the state judge ruling on 15 the suppression motion demonstrated that Trooper Johnson was predisposed to conclude that Mr. 16 Jones was the assailant. Id. at 3-5; Stip. Facts, Ex. A, ECF No. 15-1). 17 The last reasoned decision1 from the state court is that of the Washington Court of Appeals 18 on June 4, 2013. State v. Jones, 175 Wn. App. 87, 108 (2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 185 19 Wn.2d 412 (2016).2 The state court of appeals concluded that although the photo identifications 20 21 1 See Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803– 22 04 (1991)). 2 The Washington Supreme Court, en banc, reviewed an appeal on other grounds related to the selection of alternate jurors. State v. Jones, 185 Wn.2d 412 (2016). The Court held that the random drawing to designate alternate jurors 23 during a court recess did not violate Mr. Jones’ right to a public trial. Id.

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 employed by law enforcement in this case were impermissibly suggestive, Mr. Jones’ due process 2 rights were not violated when the trial court permitted evidence of Trooper Johnson’s eyewitness 3 identification. Id. The state court cited the relevant precedent of the United States Supreme Court 4 in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113–14 (1977) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 5 (1972), which provide several factors to determine an identification’s reliability. Mr. Jones argues 6 that the state court did not analyze those factors before concluding that the identification in this case 7 was reliable enough to be given to the jury. Objs. 7. 8 The factors to be considered include 9 the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior 10 description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. 11 Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. 12 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200). Here, the state court of appeals 13 found that the trial court had carefully weighed each of these factors based on the parties’ stipulated 14 facts. Jones, 175 Wn. App. at 108. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its 15 discretion when it denied Mr. Jones’ motion to suppress. See id. (“The trial court permitted evidence 16 of Trooper Johnson’s eyewitness identification, noting that any defects in the evidence go to the 17 evidence’s weight, not its admissibility. . . leaving for the jury the question of how much credence 18 such evidence deserved.”). 19 With regard to the factors, the trial court found that Trooper Johnson’s opportunity to view 20 had been satisfied. ECF No. 12-7 at 436 (noting that Trooper Johnson had an opportunity and spoke 21 face-to-face as well as from the profile). The trial court found that Trooper Johnson’s degree of 22 attention, the accuracy of the description prior to viewing the photo, the level of certainty 23

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 demonstrated by Trooper Johnson, and the time between the crime and confrontation also supported 2 the reliability of the identification. Id. at 436–37. In weighing the circumstances, the trial court 3 found that “the substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification is not present.” Id. The Court 4 notes that in addition to analyzing the reliability factors, the trial court also granted Mr. Jones’ 5 motion to allow his identification expert to testify regarding the eyewitness identification 6 procedures and their reliability. See ECF No. 12-7 at 435–43. 7 Based on the record before the Court, and the highly deferential standard that this Court 8 applies to state court decisions in a habeas review, the Court cannot agree with Mr. Jones that the 9 state court’s factual and legal determinations were not supported by the underlying record or that 10 the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Nor does the Court agree that the 11 Washington Court of Appeals “announced a new rule” to the effect that the identification was “best

12 left to the jury.” See Objs. 11. The state court quoted the United States Supreme Court in Brathwaite 13 when it stated that the reliability of eyewitness identification was “best left to the jury.” 174 Wn. 14 App. at 108 (quoting 432 U.S. at 116). 15 Accordingly, Petitioner’s objections to the R&R on Claim 1 are overruled, and the Court 16 will adopt the well-reasoned decision in the R&R on this claim. 17 B. Claim 2 – Exclusion of Defense Evidence 18 Mr. Jones contends that the state court deprived him of the right to present the defense that 19 someone else may have committed the crime by excluding Trooper Green’s observation of a 20 pedestrian at the site of the shooting. Objs. 14 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302- 21 03 (1973)). The trial court “ruled that Trooper Greene could not testify about seeing another

22 individual unless the defendant was able to show the necessary foundation connecting another 23 suspect to the shooting.” 175 Wn. App. at 108. As discussed by the state court of appeals, under

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 Washington law, “[w]hen there is no other evidence tending to connect another person with the 2 crime, such as his bad character, his means or opportunity to commit the crime, or even his 3 conviction of the crime, such other evidence is irrelevant to exculpate the accused.” Id. (quoting 4 State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 857 (2004) (en banc)). 5 Mr. Jones argues that the Magistrate Judge did not follow proper Supreme Court precedent 6 established in Chambers and in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). Objs. 14–15. He 7 asserts that the exclusion of evidence of potential third-party culpability deprived him of a fair trial. 8 Id. at 14 (citing as an example the exclusion of a third-party confession violating due process in 9 Chambers). The Supreme Court has described its holding in Chambers as follows: 10 the holding of Chambers—if one can be discerned from such a fact- intensive case—is certainly not that a defendant is denied “a fair 11 opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations” whenever “critical evidence” favorable to him is excluded, but rather that 12 erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to the level of a due process violation. 13 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996). The Court also clarified its holding in Crane: 14 Our holding that the exclusion of certain evidence in that case 15 violated the defendant’s constitutional rights rested not on a theory that all “competent, reliable evidence” must be admitted, but rather 16 on the ground that the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s sole rationale for the exclusion (that the evidence “did not relate to the credibility 17 of the confession,” Crane v. Commonwealth, 690 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1985)) was wrong. See 476 U.S., at 687, 106 S. Ct., at 2144–2145. 18 Crane does nothing to undermine the principle that the introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the State for a “valid” reason. 19 Id. Certainly, “the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present 20 a complete defense.” Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. But the Supreme Court has also recognized that “state 21 and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding 22 evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting United 23

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). Of course, the state rule of evidence must be rational. 2 Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013). In Holmes, the Supreme Court specifically noted its 3 approval of state rules limiting other suspect evidence when the evidence fails to “sufficiently 4 connect the other person to the crime,” such as where the evidence is “speculative or remote, or 5 does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact.” 547 U.S. at 327. 6 Mr. Jones does not argue that the state rule of evidence is not rational, but rather that the 7 proffered evidence was excluded with little explanation. Objs. 16. However, the state court of 8 appeals explained: 9 Jones’s proposed presentation of Trooper Greene’s testimony would have shown only that when Trooper Greene 10 stopped Susan Jones’s car, Greene saw someone else on the street who may have had an opportunity to shoot Trooper Johnson. But 40 11 minutes elapsed between Trooper Greene’s observation and the shooting. Thus, Trooper Greene’s testimony would not demonstrate 12 the required connection between the person Trooper Greene saw and the shooter, only that this other person walked by 40 minutes earlier. 13 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Trooper Greene’s observation of the unidentified pedestrian. 14 175 Wn. App. at 108. The record further reveals that the trial court heard proffers regarding Trooper 15 Greene’s testimony related to another potential suspect, considered the arguments, and held that the 16 case law does not support other suspect evidence without something more specific than had been 17 proffered. See ECF No. 12-7 at 398-413. Although Mr. Jones disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s 18 analysis that there is no clearly established Supreme Court law for evaluating such exclusions, Objs. 19 15, he also does not provide any clearly established federal law to show that the state court’s 20 decision is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. 21 Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Mr. Jones has failed to demonstrate that the 22 state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 23

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. As a result, Mr. Jones 2 is not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His objections as to Claim 2 are overruled, 3 and the Court adopts the R&R. 4 C. Certificate of Appealability 5 In the alternative, Mr. Jones asks the Court to issue a certificate of appealability as to Claims 6 1 and 2. Objs. 17-18. “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the [petitioner] has made 7 a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Buck v. 8 Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017). Here, Mr. Jones’ Objections to the R&R do not satisfy the 9 standard set forth for appeal of claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, because they do not 10 demonstrate that the adjudication in state court was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 11 application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

12 States, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 13 in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Mr. Jones has failed to make a substantial 14 showing of the denial of his constitutional rights and is, therefore, not entitled to a certificate of 15 appealability. 16 17 18 19 20 21

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24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 3 1. The Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 13; 4 2. Petitioner’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; 5 3. Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability is DENIED; and 4. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to the parties and to Judge 6 Christel. 7

8 DATED this 24th day of July 2023. 9

A 10 11 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein U.S. District Court Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION