Jones v. Sykes Metal Lath & Roofing Co.

254 F. 91, 165 C.C.A. 501, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1286
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 4, 1918
DocketNo. 3032
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 254 F. 91 (Jones v. Sykes Metal Lath & Roofing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Sykes Metal Lath & Roofing Co., 254 F. 91, 165 C.C.A. 501, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1286 (6th Cir. 1918).

Opinion

DENISON, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). Infringement of both claims is alleged; and, if they receive the construction which we think they must have, infringement is conceded.

[1] Several earlier uses are set up in order to anticipate or otherwise invalidate the second and broader claim. We agree with the District Judge that the claim is invalid; but we think this conclusion is most safely based upon the earlier so-called segmental eutter. Curtis made his constructive reduction to practice by filing his application in October, 1900. He claims to have conceived the invention in June of that year; but the evidence of any definite early conception of the invention embodied in these claims is vague, and there was no dis[94]*94closure until in the course of preparing the application. The defendant’s predecessor experimented in the summer of 1899 with a machine of this general class, and in December of that year let a contract for the building of a commercial machine. This commercial machine was completed in the spring of 1900 and operated by hand sufficiently to demonstrate its effectiveness. This is proved with all the certainty necessary to establish a claim of anticipation. The rolls were not oper-' ated by power at that time, because they were intended to be only a part of the complete machine which should cut and expand, and the expanding part was not ready; but there was no necessary connection between the two parts, and we consider what was done to be a sufficient reduction to practice of the idea involved. It was the same as that later developed by Curtis, with two exceptions: (a) The notches were placed upon the corresponding (say left-hand) edges of each cutting roll, upper and lower, instead of upon both edges of the upper rolls only, as in Curtis’ preferred form; (b) instead of cutting notches in the edges of the body of the roll, defendant’s predecessor made the roll of less diameter than the adjacent spacing disc, and then built it out with a series of so-called segments until it was of the larger diameter required for the cutting roll. Each segment contained a portion of the cutting edge having one notch (two half notches) therein, and was bolted fast to the body of the roll. When they were all in place, they constitute a continuous roll-cutting edge interrupted by notches. This awkward arrangement was adopted because it was thought the cutting edge must be of harder steel than was advisable for the body of the roll, and because it was thought that separable parts would facilitate sharpening and repairs. It was anticipated that notches would break down and wear out, and in this way one part could be replaced without affecting the rest of the roll. When the entire machine was later completed, it was employed for some time to produce the commercial result. It was finally discarded and replaced by the Curtis construction, because the making in this segmental way and the necessary replacements and repairs proved to be too expensive.

[2, 3] This segmental cutter, although it had never been patented or described in any printed publication and was not known to Curtis, yet was a part of the prior art, with reference to which the character of his variatibn therefrom must be judged. If some one else had completely invented and used this segmental cutter, and if what Curtis did involved no invention over what had thus been done, certainly Curtis was not entitled to a patent as the first inventor of the thing which he produced. One cannot be an inventor, if there is no invention. See Package Co. v. Johnson Co. (C. C. A. 6) 246 Fed. 598, 601, 159 C. C. A. 568; Lemley v. Dobson (C. C. A. 6) 243 Fed. 391, 395, 156 C. C. A. 171; and see Buser v. Novelty Co. (C. C. A. 6) 151 Fed. 478, 492, et seq., 81 C. C. A. 16. This is not a case where a prior use, exact or suggestive, had been abandoned, and so perhaps should go into oblivion instead of into the prior art; the segmental cutter was in complete and active existence, when Curtis made his conception, and in commercial use when he filed his application. If the segmental cutter is not generally different from Curtis’ form, then it follows that [95]*95the substance of claim 2 — a square-edged cutting roll notched on one edge only — has been in continuous use by defendant and its predecessor ever since a date earlier than Curtis’ invention, for change in form within the limits of the claim would not interrupt the continuity of the use.

[4] We find thus presented the controlling question whéther Curtis’ integral square-edged cutting roll with notches on the edge involved invention as compared with defendant’s sectional square-edged roll with notches on the edge. The precise question may be clearer by transposing to the more familiar circular saw. L,et it be supposed that saws composed of an integral disc with teeth cut into the edge were common; that defendant had devised a peculiar kind of teeth, and had attached these by removable means to the edge of the disc, thereby producing a saw with these peculiar teeth, each tooth separately removable; and that Curtis then put these same peculiar teeth into the edge of an integral saw by cutting them therein. We are confident that this would not, and that what Curtis did with these cutter rolls did not, involve invention. We have a clear instance of that merely making integrally what had before been made in two parts and then put together, rather than an instance of that uniting into one part which dispenses with a function or gets a new result. See Gould v. Cincinnati Co. (C. C. A. 6) 194 Fed. 680, 685, 115 C. C. A. 74. Curtis’ cutter roll was stronger and simpler than defendant’s, but only as an integral structure is always stronger and simpler than a sectional one. The defendant had passed through and beyond the Curtis form. Curtis simply dropped off what he thought a useless and troublesome refinement, and adopted the remainder, the substance of defendant’s structure. This is especially illustrated by the fact that a sectional view of this segmental cutter and adjacent spacing disc, taken on any selected diameter, cannot be distinguished from a sectional view of the Curtis roll and spacing disc taken on the same diameter, save by the presence of the attaching bolt and the seam between the permanent body and the removable edge.

So far as concerns claim 2, the decree of the court below dismissing the bill must be affirmed.

[5] Claim. 1 presents a different problem. We think it must be interpreted as of specific intent, directed to and limited to Curtis’ preferred form, whereby he put all his interrupting- notches upon the upper rolls, leaving the lower rolls plain, and arranged these notches on the opposite edges of the same roll in staggered relation to each other. Defendant has adopted and used this precise form. It seeks to escape liability by alleging that, if given this specific construction, the claim involves no patentable distinction from claim 2, and is invalid for the same reason, but that it ought not to be so limited, but should be constructed so broadly that it is equivalent to, and is defeated by the same facts which defeat, claim 2.

Putting these notches upon both edges of the same disc, and not opposite each other but staggered, was entirely new and had obvious advantages over the plan of notching one edge of both upper and lower rolls. In the latter case, the ultimate alternate relation of slit [96]

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Bluebook (online)
254 F. 91, 165 C.C.A. 501, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-sykes-metal-lath-roofing-co-ca6-1918.