Jones v. Scnider Electrics

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 17, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-07347
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 SAN JOSE DIVISION 4 5 KEVIN LAWRENCE JONES, Case No. 5:24-cv-07347-BLF

6 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S 7 v. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915; AND 8 SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA, INC., et DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS al., 9 [Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 19, 21] Defendants. 10 11 12 Plaintiff Kevin Lawrence Jones (“Plaintiff” OR “Jones”) is proceeding in this case pro se 13 and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). He sues Schneider Electric USA, Inc., Volt Management Corp., 14 and Brandon Puffer for alleged violations of employment and antidiscrimination statutes, as well 15 as for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to 16 proceed IFP, Dkt. No. 12, and permitted Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint, which the 17 Court noted would be screened in due course, Dkt. No. 17. 18 Before the Court screened the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended 19 Complaint. Dkt. No. 21 (“SAC”). As with Plaintiff’s filing of the First Amended Complaint, see 20 Dkt. No. 17, the Court construes Plaintiff’s filing of a new complaint as a motion for leave to file 21 an amended pleading, which is again GRANTED in light of the fact that the matter has not yet 22 been served and the Court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires. See Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court now proceeds to screen Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and 24 concludes that it must be dismissed. If desired, Plaintiff may file a Third Amended Complaint on 25 or before July 17, 2025. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiff initially filed this action on September 27, 2024 in the United States District Court 1 simultaneously filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. On October 15, 2024, 2 United States Magistrate Judge Sean C. Riordan issued an order transferring the case to the United 3 States District Court for the Northern District of California, in light of the fact that the claim(s) 4 arose in Alameda County. Dkt. No. 8. The case was transferred on October 22, 2024. Dkt. No. 9. 5 On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 13, and a Motion to 6 Compel Arbitration, Dkt. No. 14. His Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis was granted on 7 February 26, 2025, Dkt. No. 12, and then the action was reassigned to the undersigned on March 8 11, 2025, Dkt. No. 16. 9 On March 31, 2025, the Court granted leave to file the First Amended Complaint and 10 noted that it would be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in due course. Dkt. No. 17. By that 11 same Order, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration as premature, since the 12 Court had not yet screened the Complaint. Id. at 2. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Equitable 13 Tolling, Dkt. No. 18, a Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dkt. No. 19, and a Second Amended 14 Complaint, Dkt. No. 21. 15 The facts as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint are as follows: Plaintiff was 16 previously employed by Defendants Schneider Electric USA, Inc. d/b/a Schneider Electric 17 (“Schneider”) and Volt Management Corp. d/b/a Volt Workforce Solutions (“Volt”). SAC ¶ 3. 18 Defendant Brandon Puffer (“Puffer”) is or was a Warehouse Manager at Schneider Electric who 19 supervised Plaintiff while Plaintiff was working there as a temporary employee. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff 20 alleges that, shortly after the start of his shift on the day that he ended up being terminated, Puffer 21 “sent a racist group text . . . to his subordinate employees which targeted African Americans.” Id. 22 ¶ 12. Plaintiff, who is Black, also asserts that Puffer “made racist, offensive comments to and 23 about” Plaintiff starting on Plaintiff’s first day at work for Schneider. Id. ¶ 16. For example, 24 Puffer “said to a group of employees that [Plaintiff] was not ‘black enough’ because of how he 25 conducted himself during his job interview.” Id. ¶ 17. He also “made [a] racist joke . . . about all 26 African Americans eating watermelon.” Id. ¶ 19. Puffer made other comments associating 27 Plaintiff with slavery and with gang activity, id. ¶¶ 21, 23, used the n-word in front of groups of 1 chat, see id. ¶¶ 25–27. Plaintiff further alleges that Puffer engaged in racially discriminatory 2 conduct on social media. Id. ¶ 12. In addition, Puffer allegedly made sexual comments to and 3 about Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 25. 4 On June 15, 2021, Plaintiff “erroneously sent a text to his coworker Brandon rather than 5 PUFFER (who is also named Brandon) stating that he would be late for work that day.” Id. ¶ 30. 6 Shortly thereafter, Puffer terminated Plaintiff, stating that Plaintiff was a “no call/no show.” Id. 7 ¶ 31. In the wake of that termination, Jones’s final paycheck from Schneider and Volt was late 8 and did not include all compensation to which he was entitled. Id. As a result of the foregoing 9 incidents, Plaintiff alleges that he experienced significant emotional distress. Id. ¶ 32. 10 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint asserts six causes of action: (1) race discrimination 11 and harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, SAC at 2; (2) race discrimination in violation of 12 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq., SAC ¶¶ 33–40; (2) sexual harassment in violation of Cal. Gov’t 13 Code § 12940 et seq., SAC ¶¶ 41–48; (3) failure to prevent harassment in violation of Cal. Gov’t 14 Code § 12940 et seq., SAC ¶¶ 49–63; (4) failure to timely pay wages upon discharge in violation 15 of Cal. Labor Code §§ 201 and 202, SAC ¶¶ 64–69; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional 16 distress, SAC ¶¶ 70–75. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Plaintiff’s SAC must be screened, and must be dismissed if it “is frivolous or malicious,” 19 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 20 defendant who is immune from relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 21 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). If the SAC survives the initial screening, the court 22 must “order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person 23 specially appointed by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The 24 officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases.”). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 27 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), so this Court is under “a continuing independent obligation to 1 Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 976 n.12 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, it appears that the Court 2 has “federal question” jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which states: “The district courts 3 shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 4 of the United States.” Under that provision, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction if a 5 federal claim appears on the face of a plaintiff’s complaint. Armstrong v. N. Mariana Islands, 576 6 F.3d 950, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Court has consistently interpreted jurisdictional statutes 7 with an ‘arising under’ qualification, including § 1331, as giving the lower federal courts 8 jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well- 9 pleaded complaint establishes either that [1] federal law creates the cause of action or that [2] the 10 plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal 11 law.” (quoting Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold and 12 Easement in the Cloverly Subterranean Geological Formation, 524 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 13 2008)) (cleaned up)). One federal claim appears on the face of Plaintiff’s Second Amended 14 Complaint: his first cause of action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. SAC at 2. 15 In order to state a claim for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Plaintiff must 16 allege that “(1) he is a member of a racial group, (2) some contractual right with defendant was 17 impaired, (3) defendant intentionally discriminated against him based on race, and (4) his race was 18 a but-for cause of the contractual impairment.” Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 19 1279 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 20 327, 341 (2020)). The Court understands Plaintiff to base this claim on the termination of his 21 employment by Puffer. Although Plaintiff adequately states facts going to the first three elements 22 of this claim, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint undermine his showing on 23 the fourth element of the claim. “Under th[e] [but-for causation] standard, a plaintiff must 24 demonstrate that, but for the defendant’s unlawful conduct, its alleged injury would not have 25 occurred.” Comcast Corp., 589 U.S. at 331. Here, however, Plaintiff specifically alleges that he 26 was late to work on the day on which he was terminated, that he accidentally failed to notify his 27 supervisor that he was running late, and that his supervisor then terminated him based upon his 1 there was a reason for his termination separate and apart from Puffer’s alleged race discrimination, 2 which means that the race discrimination was not the but-for cause of the contractual impairment 3 (i.e., the termination). 4 In the absence of Plaintiff’s section 1981 claim, there are no other claims over which the 5 Court has original jurisdiction. This is not a case in which there is federal subject matter 6 jurisdiction based on “diversity of citizenship.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court has 7 jurisdiction if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest 8 and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The party 9 asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that such jurisdiction exists, though, so 10 Plaintiff’s “failure to specify [his] state citizenship [is] fatal” to any attempted assertion of federal 11 diversity jurisdiction. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 Moreover, this basis for jurisdiction requires “complete diversity,” meaning that “the citizenship 13 of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 14 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Presuming that Plaintiff’s domicile is California, complete diversity does not 15 exist here: the state of citizenship for a business entity is based on the entity’s state of 16 incorporation and/or principal place of business, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), and Plaintiff here 17 specifically alleges that Defendant Volt is headquartered in California. SAC ¶ 11. 18 If a district court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it may 19 “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over” other claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see 20 Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law 21 claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the [United Mine 22 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),] doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, 23 fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state- 24 law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Accordingly, the 25 Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s five state-law claims in the 26 absence of a valid federal claim. 27 Although there is only a “low threshold for proceeding past the screening stage,” Wilhelm 1 met in this case. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint must be 2 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If desired, Plaintiff may file a Third Amended 3 Complaint on or before July 17, 2025. 4 || IV. ORDER 5 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to the Court’s 6 screening required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is 7 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff may file a Third 8 || Amended Complaint on or before July 17, 2025. The Court will not order service of process by 9 || the United States Marshals Service unless Plaintiff states a viable federal claim. 10 Because Plaintiff's operative complaint has been dismissed, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel ll Arbitration (Dkt. No. 19) and Motion for Equitable Tolling (Dkt. No. 18) are both DENIED AS 12 |} MOOT WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

a 16 Dated: June 17, 2025 foie TH LABSON FREEMAN 2 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28