Jones v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 28, 2024
Docket2:22-cv-00364
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company (Jones v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ERIC JONES and HERBERT BOWENS,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 22-cv-364-pp v.

PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY and ARTISAN AND TRUSCKERS CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE MATERIALS UNDER SEAL (DKT. NOS. 42, 64, 97), DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO RESTRICT DOCUMENT (DKT. NOS. 45, 77, 90) AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ RULE 7(H) EXPEDITED NON-DISPOSITIVE MOTION TO FOR LEAVE TO FILE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY (DKT. NO. 81)

Plaintiffs Eric Jones and Herbert Bowens totaled their vehicles and received less than they expected from the defendants. They have asked the court to certify a class of all individuals who received a payment where the defendants used valuation reports prepared by Mitchell International to determine the actual cash value (ACV) of the loss. Dkt. No. 19 at ¶1. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants rely on a “Projected Sold Adjustment” (PSA), which results in a downward adjustment to the base values of comparable vehicles used to calculate the ACV of the plaintiffs’ “total loss” vehicles and is contrary to appraisal standards and methodologies. Id. at ¶¶5, 31. The plaintiffs assert that “car dealerships simply do not negotiate off of Internet advertised prices” and accuse the defendants of ignoring market realties to pay below-market prices for totaled vehicles. Id. at ¶¶8, 28. The plaintiffs allege breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at ¶¶61-74. They also seek a declaration that in paying total-loss claims, by first-party insureds, it is a breach of Defendants’ insurance contract for Defendants to base the valuation and payment of claims on values of comparable vehicles that have been reduced by arbitrary Projected Sold Adjustment that are (a) arbitrary, and (b) contrary to industry practices and consumer experiences (and therefore not reflective of the vehicle’s fair market value).

Id. at ¶¶61-80. The parties have filed six motions to seal or restrict documents. Dkt. Nos. 42, 45, 64, 77, 90, 97. The defendants filed a Rule 7(h) expedited, non- dispositive motion for leave to file a response to the plaintiffs’ notice of supplemental authority. Dkt. No. 81. The court will deny these motions, although it will deny all but one without prejudice. By separate order, the court will address the defendants’ motions to exclude three expert witnesses, dkt. nos. 46, 49, 53, the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, dkt. no. 43, and, when fully briefed, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dkt. no. 91. I. Motions to Seal and Restrict General Local Rule 79(d)(2) (E.D. Wis.) requires that a party publicly file a motion to seal or restrict and attach a version of the document the party wants sealed, redacting those portions of the document that are subject to the request. Rule 79(d)(3) requires that any motion to restrict access or seal be supported by sufficient facts demonstrating good cause for withholding the document or material from the public record. If the movant is not the party who designated the material confidential, the movant may “explain in the motion that the documents or materials are being filed under seal pursuant to a Court-approved protective order or otherwise, and that the filing party supports, objects to, or takes no position on the continued sealing of the documents or materials.” Id. In response, the person who designated the documents as confidential may provide sufficient facts demonstrating good cause to continue sealing the documents. Id. If neither party provides “a sufficient factual basis demonstrating good cause sufficient to seal the documents or materials,” the court “must” deny the motion. Id. Section (d)(4) requires the movant to include in its motion “a certification that the parties have conferred in a good faith attempt to avoid the motion or to limit the scope of the documents or materials subject to sealing under the motion.” Id. Whether the party asks to seal or restrict makes a difference in terms of who can access the documents. Only the court has access to a sealed document; the parties do not. In contrast, a party asking a court to restrict documents may ask that the documents be restricted to viewing only by the court and the case participants. General Local Rule 79 exists because the Seventh Circuit requires good cause to seal or restrict a document. “Documents that affect the disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to public view. The reason for this right of public access to the judicial record enable interested members of the public . . . to know who’s using the courts, to understand judicial decisions and to monitor the judiciary's performance of its duties.” Goesel v. Boley Int'l (H.K.) Ltd., 738 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). A party may override the public’s interest only if its privacy interest surmounts the public’s interest; “that is, only if there is good cause for sealing a part or the whole of the record in that case.” Roumann Consulting Inc. v. T.V. John & Son, Inc., Case No. 17-C-1407, 2019 WL 3501513, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 1, 2019). The fact that parties agree that a document should be sealed does not override the public’s interest. See United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 713 (7th Cir. 2015) (vacated on other grounds, United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016)). A. Plaintiffs’ Motions

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Materials under Seal (Dkt. No. 42)

The plaintiffs’ first motion for leave to file materials under seal asks to “file provisionally under seal Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and its accompanying exhibits.” Dkt. No. 42 at 1. The plaintiffs explain that the motion references and discusses information that the defendants and third parties Mitchell International, Inc. and J.D. Power and Associates designated as “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential—Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.” Id. at 1. The plaintiffs “take no position on whether these documents satisfy the applicable standard for remaining under seal and [are] filing them under seal here out of respect for Defendants’ and third-parties’ designations.” Id. at 1-2. There was no certificate of service filed and no one responded to the motion. 2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Materials Under Seal (Dkt. No. 64)

When the plaintiffs filed their reply brief in support of class certification, they filed another motion to “file provisionally under seal Plaintiffs’ Rely in support of Class Certification and its accompanying exhibits.” Dkt. No. 64 at 1. The plaintiffs say little more than that the reply and opposition briefs discuss information designated by defendants and third parties as confidential. They again “take no position on whether these documents satisfy the applicable standard for remaining under seal and [are] filing them under seal here out of respect for Defendants’ and third-parties’ designations.” Id. at 2. The plaintiffs’ certificate of service states that the motion was filed “using the Court’s CM/ECF filing system, which will send electronic notification to the parties and registered attorneys of record.” Id. at 3. Again, no one responded to the motion. 3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Materials Under Seal (Dkt. No. 97)1

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Related

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
467 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 1984)
United States v. Sanford-Brown, Limited
788 F.3d 696 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd.
136 S. Ct. 2506 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Goesel v. Boley International (H.K.) Ltd.
738 F.3d 831 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
Jones v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-progressive-universal-insurance-company-wied-2024.