Jones v. Perkins

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 5, 2024
• Docket: 23-1655
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTIN JONES, No. 23-1655 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 3:22-cv-05371-BJR v. MEMORANDUM* JEFFEREY PERKINS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 3, 2024** Seattle, Washington

Before: BOGGS***, McKEOWN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Martin Jones appeals the denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). The petition challenges Jones’s first-degree murder conviction for the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation. shooting of Washington State Patrol Trooper Scott Johnson. A motions panel

granted a certificate of appealability on a single issue: whether the state trial court

violated Jones’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by declining to

suppress eyewitness identification evidence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Reviewing the district court’s denial of a writ of habeas

corpus de novo, we affirm. Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010).

Jones argues that the admission of eyewitness identification evidence

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because it was unduly

suggestive under Biggers and Brathwaite, and, consequently, the decision of the

Washington Court of Appeals affirming his sentence was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

But even “a suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure does not

violate due process so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of

reliability.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977). To assess reliability,

courts must consider (1) “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the

time of the crime,” (2) “the witness’ degree of attention,” (3) “the accuracy of the

witness’ prior description of the criminal,” (4) “the level of certainty demonstrated

by the witness at the confrontation,” and (5) “the length of time between the crime

and the confrontation.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972).

2 23-1655 The state trial court addressed all five Biggers factors and reasonably applied

each factor to the facts. Even brief opportunities to view an assailant’s face can be

adequate for reliable identifications. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d

482, 494 (9th Cir. 1985) (deeming identification based on incident where officer

“drove by” a suspect sufficiently reliable). Trooper Johnson saw his assailant on

two separate occasions: once, during the initial confrontation over Susan Jones’s

car, and a second time, immediately after he was attacked. Trooper Johnson also

said that he “got a good look at” his assailant. And a “trained police officer on

duty” can reasonably “be expected to pay scrupulous attention to detail.”

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115. Trooper Johnson’s description of the assailant

matched Jones’s age, height, build, hair color, and facial hair. See Brathwaite, 432

U.S. at 115; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200; United States v. Bruce, 984 F.3d 884, 892

(9th Cir. 2021). Once Trooper Johnson was presented with a clear color

photograph of Jones, he confidently identified Jones as the assailant. He also

expressed a high degree of confidence when presented with Jones’s photograph in

a montage and did not express any doubt in his identification. And finally, very

little time passed between the crime and the presentation of the photograph.

The state court identified the correct governing federal precedent and

reasonably applied it to the facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 389–90,

3 23-1655 407 (2000). Consequently, the state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal precedent.

In the alternative, Jones contends that the state court’s decision was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. But, as Jones acknowledges, the state

court’s rulings “were grounded upon a universe of stipulated facts,” and Jones has

not challenged any specific factual determinations.

AFFIRMED.

4 23-1655