Jones v. New York City Department Of Corrections

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 19, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-02145·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MICHAEL JONES, Plaintiff, -against- 21-CV-2145 (LTS) NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ORDER TO AMEND CORRECTIONS, WEST FACILITY, RIKERS ISLAND, NEW YORK CITY, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in Wende Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his federal constitutional rights while he was detained in West Facility on Rikers Island. By order dated April 1, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from the complaint. While Plaintiff was in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), he was placed in administrative segregation “without notification of classification or just reasoning.” (ECF 2, at 5.) 2 He was denied “the means to challenge” his classification and access to the grievance process, and he maintains that “[t]here was no opportunity to appeal and no periodic review.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that DOC placed him in administrative segregation because he is gay and because of his “choice of religion,” which he does not specify. (Id. at 6.) While in administrative segregation, Plaintiff was confined to his cell for 24 hours a day

and denied access to the law library and to recreation. He alleges that his loss of access to the law library “resulted in [his] conviction.” (Id. at 7.) Furthermore, DOC denied Plaintiff access to mental health counseling and refused to provide batteries for Plaintiff’s hearing aid. Plaintiff maintains that the New York City Board of Correction “notified” the DOC that administrative segregation in West Facility on Rikers Island “was not sanctioned in New York City and there is no writ[t]en policy governing” the operation of an administrative segregation unit in New York City. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and “the closing of Rikers Island West [F]acility compound.” (Id. at 7.)

DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated, his claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Because Plaintiff was in DOC custody in West Facility on Rikers Island, the Court assumes for the purposes of this order that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events giving rise to his claims.

2 Page numbers refer to those generated by the Court’s electronic filing system. A. Claims against the New York City Department of Correction and “West Facility, Rikers Island” Plaintiff names as the sole Defendant in this action the “New York City Department of Corrections, West Facility, Rikers Island, New York City.” To the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims against the New York City Department of Correction, those claims must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Jones v. New York City Department Of Corrections, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Jones v. New York City Department Of Corrections (Jones v. New York City Department Of Corrections) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Wolff v. McDonnell
418 U.S. 539 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
455 U.S. 422 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Hewitt v. Helms
459 U.S. 460 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Daniels v. Williams
474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Davidson v. Cannon
474 U.S. 344 (Supreme Court, 1986)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)