Jones v. Life Insurance Company of North America

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided May 5, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-04669·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Kip Jones, No. CV-19-04669-PHX-DLR

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Life Insurance Company of North America, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff brought this ERISA action seeking de novo review of Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America’s (“LINA”) decision to terminate his Life Insurance Waiver of Premium (“LWOP”) benefit. Wishing to go outside the administrative record and engage in discovery, Plaintiff filed a brief regarding the need for discovery and its scope, along with a motion to supplement the administrative record. (Doc. 30.) The motion is fully briefed and, for the reasons below, is granted in part and denied in part. I. Background Plaintiff had been an employee of Sabre, Inc. for 19 years when he became disabled on June 25, 2013. Through his work, Plaintiff had acquired a LINA-issued $228,000 life insurance policy (“Policy”). Because LINA made claims decisions about the Policy it had issued, it operated under a conflict of interest. The Policy contained an LWOP benefit whereby premiums are waived if the policy holder meets the Policy’s definition of “disabled.” To meet that definition, a person must be unable to “perform all the material duties of any occupation for which he or she may reasonably become qualified based on education, training or experience.” That definition is consistent with the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) definition of disability. Consistent with the SSA, which approved Plaintiff’s disability claim, LINA found that Plaintiff met the definition of disabled and accordingly had been providing LWOP benefits. Although there had been no change in Plaintiff’s medical condition, in 2018, LINA began a “spontaneous” review of Plaintiff’s LWOP claim, finding that he was not disabled. On October 18, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a mandatory ERISA appeal. On July 9, 2019, after LINA had not rendered its decision on the appeal by the January 26, 2019, regulatory deadline, Plaintiff deemed his claim exhausted and filed this suit. LINA then issued its denial “based entirely on ‘paper ‘reviews from Drs. Kalp, Belcourt and Koh, all retained by long-time disability industry vendors, Genex, ECN, and MES Sollution.” (Doc. 30 at 4-5.) II. Legal Standard. The Court reviews de novo LINA’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s LWOP benefits. In a de novo review, the Court does not consider whether LINA’s decision to deny benefits amounted to an abuse of discretion, but rather the Court evaluates whether the decision was correct. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). In other words, the Court must determine for itself whether Plaintiff meets the definition of “disabled” under the Policy. Because this is an ERISA case, discovery plays a far more limited role than in most civil cases. Limiting discovery is particularly important when the Court is conducting de novo review. “[T]he district court should exercise its discretion to consider evidence outside of the administrative record ‘only when the circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision.’” Opeta v. Nw. Airlines Pension Plan for Contract Emp., 484 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1995)). In Opeta, the Ninth Circuit set forth a “non-exhaustive list of exceptional circumstances where introduction of evidence beyond the administrative record could be considered necessary[.]” Id. However, the existence of exceptional circumstances does not necessarily require the admission of new evidence. Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1993). Although Opeta addressed admissibility of new evidence, it is generally recognized that, logically, Opeta also pertains to limits on discovery. Nguyen v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, CIV. No. 3:14-05295-JST(LB), 2015 WL 6459689 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2015). III. Discussion A. Discovery into LINA’s relationship with its vendors and experts. Plaintiff seeks discovery into LINA’s relationships with the vendors providing reviewing experts and its history with the experts themselves. Plaintiff seeks this information for credibility determinations of the experts who provided opinions that LINA relied on in making its decision to terminate Plaintiff’s LWOP benefits. Plaintiff seeks discovery into the “vendors (Genex, ECN, MES Solutions) who in turn retained biased doctors such as Drs. Belcourt, Kalp and McCrary.” (Doc. 30 at 12.) Plaintiff argues that limited discovery should be allowed because of LINA’s history of self-dealing and because the credibility of the doctors upon which LINA relied, Drs. Belcourt and Kalp, is at the heart of the case. Defendants contend that there is nothing unique or exceptional in this de novo review that would warrant the admission of evidence outside the administrative record, and that any discovery outside the administrative record would not be proportional to the needs of the case because Plaintiff “will neither win a large amount of money nor vindicate vitally important values if she prevails here.” (Doc. 34 at 15.) The outcome of this case turns on the credibility of the experts. This Court has previously ruled that, when presented with diametrically opposed expert reports, the credibility, bias, or prejudice of the experts becomes relevant. (See Doc. 40 in Coffou v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 2:19-cv-03120-DLR). That experts are paid for their work is not probative of bias. “[S]everal district courts in this circuit have held that the mere fact that a physician receives compensation from a plan administrator for performing medical reviews is insufficient by itself to be probative of bias.” Polnicky v. Liberty Assurance Co. of Boston, CIV No. 13-1478-SI, 2014 WL 969973, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2014) (citing cases). However, where an expert or the third-party vendor who supplies that expert has a long-standing relationship with or receives substantial compensation from a carrier or industry, and overwhelmingly renders opinions in their favor, such evidence might be important in accessing that expert’s bias and credibility. The exceptional circumstances test set out by Opeta is met by the existence of the following four factors: (1) Instances where the payor and the administrator are the same entity and the court is concerned about impartiality; (2) claims regarding the credibility of medical experts; (3) claims which would have been insurance contract claims prior to ERISA; (4) circumstances in which there is additional evidence that the claimant could have not presented in the administrative process. LINA has an admitted structural conflict and a history of self-dealing, resulting in its claims practices being subject to an extensive national “market conduct study,” a 2013 Regulatory Settlement Agreement (“RSA”), and continued monitoring. Plaintiff alleges that LINA repeatedly retains Drs. Belcourt, Kalp, and McCrary, who earn substantial sums performing reviews and examinations for the disability insurance industry. As pointed out in Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 30 at 14), “Drs. Belcourt and Kalp’s credibility lies at the heart of this case. If the Court is to find Mr. Jones is not disabled, it must rely on their reports.” LINA argues that the Court should rely solely on the record to make its own credibility determinations. However, information about LINA’s history and relationships (or lack thereof) with the vendors and experts, relevant for accessing credibility, will not be found in the record. Plaint

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Jones v. Life Insurance Company of North America, (D. Ariz. 2020).

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