Andrews, Chief Judge.
In Jones v. Ingles Markets, 228 Ga. App. 496 (492 SE2d 257) (1997), we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles on Penny Jones’ claim that Ingles’ negligent failure to keep its food store premises safe for invitees was the proximate cause of an injury she suffered when she stepped in a puddle of liquid on the floor of the store and slipped. The Supreme Court granted Jones’ petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of the merits of Jones’ appeal in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997).
[339]*339Our decision in Ingles Markets was limited to consideration of the second prong of the test set forth in Alterman Foods v. Ligón, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980), where the issue is whether or not the evidence showed that Jones had actual knowledge of the puddle or that in the exercise of ordinary care she should have known about the puddle and avoided it prior to stepping in it. Ingles Markets, supra at 497. Because it is not an issue raised in the appeal, we do not consider whether or not under the first prong of Alterman Foods, Ingles had superior actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle. Accordingly, our reconsideration on remand is limited to consideration of the effect of Robinson on the second prong of Alterman Foods as applied to the facts of this case.
The following facts, as set forth in Ingles Markets, are relevant to the decision in this case: “Jones deposed that as she was leaving the Ingles store after checking out, her left foot slipped on something, but she was able to catch herself before she fell. She alleged that her back and legs were injured as a result of the slip. She testified that after she slipped, she looked down at the floor and could see that she had stepped in a puddle of clear liquid which looked like about a cup and a half of water on the floor. Jones testified that she did not see the liquid prior to stepping in it because, as she was exiting the store prior to the slip, she was looking straight ahead rather than in the direction of the floor. She admitted that nothing prevented her from seeing the liquid on the floor prior to stepping in it and that it would have been visible to her had she looked for it.” Id. at 497. There is no evidence that anything in the control of Ingles was in any way responsible for Jones’ failure to see and avoid the puddle. Id. at 498.
Since there is no evidence that Jones had actual knowledge of the puddle prior to stepping in it, the issue under the second Alterman Foods prong is whether, in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety, Jones should have known about the puddle and avoided it. In Ingles Markets we quoted the Alterman Foods requirements that under the second prong of the test set forth therein, “ £(t)he customer must exercise ordinary care for (her) own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the merchant’s negligence after it becomes apparent to (her) or in the exercise of ordinary care (she) should have learned of it. (She) must make use of all (her) senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to (her).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Alterman Foods, supra at 623.” Ingles Markets, supra at 497-498. Applying these requirements, we found that “the evidence show[ed] that the puddle was visible and, had Jones looked at the floor where, she was walking prior to the slip, she could have seen and avoided it.” Id. at 498. We concluded that Jones’ failure to look where she was walking [340]*340and see the puddle established as a matter of law that the proximate cause of her slip in the puddle was her failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. Id. Accordingly, in Ingles Markets we affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles.
In Robinson, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari “to examine ‘the proper standard for determining whether the plaintiff in a “slip and fall” premises liability case has exercised ordinary care sufficient to prevail against a motion for summary judgment,’ ” id. at 735, and “to examine the appellate decisions which have as their crux a determination as a matter of law that an invitee failed to exercise ordinary care for personal safety.” Id. at 739. In doing so, Robinson examined slip and fall cases which, like the claim in Robinson, were based on claims by invitees that they were injured by a foreign substance on the floor of the premises to which they were invited. Robinson identified Alterman Foods as the landmark decision defining the law governing these slip and fall cases. Robinson, supra at 736.
In its discussion of these cases, Robinson left intact the first prong of the Alterman Foods test concerning the defendant proprietor’s knowledge of the hazard and focused instead on the second Alterman Foods prong dealing with the plaintiff’s knowledge of the hazard. Robinson, supra. Robinson reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods, a plaintiff invitee must prove that the invitee “ ‘was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.’ Id. at 623!” Robinson, supra at 736, 748-749. Under Robinson, however, the defendant now has the initial burden under the second prong of producing evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries at issue. Id. at 747-749. This burden may be carried by the defendant by producing evidence that the plaintiff knew about the hazard or that in the exercise of ordinary care the plaintiff should have known about the hazard. Id.1 Only after the defendant has produced evidence of the plaintiff’s negligence does the plaintiff have the burden of producing evidence which disproves such negligence in opposition to summary judgment. Id.
[341]*341Robinson also reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods, an invitee has the following duties: “An invitee is charged with exercising ordinary care for personal safety and using ordinary care to avoid the effect of the owner/occupier’s negligence after that negligence becomes apparent to the invitee or in the exercise of ordinary care the invitee should have learned of it. In the exercise of ordinary care, the invitee must use all senses to discover and avoid hurtful things. Alterman Foods v. Ligón, supra, 246 Ga. at 623.” Robinson, supra at 741. In considering whether or not an invitee has exercised such ordinary care, Robinson further stated that: “The established standard is whether, taking everything into account, the act is one which the common sense of mankind pronounces wants of such prudence as the ordinarily careful person would use in a like situation. The invitee is not bound to avoid hazards not usually present on the premises and which the invitee, exercising ordinary care, did not observe, and the invitee is not required, in all circumstances, to look continuously at the floor, without intermission, for defects in the floor.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 741. Robinson
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Andrews, Chief Judge.
In Jones v. Ingles Markets, 228 Ga. App. 496 (492 SE2d 257) (1997), we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles on Penny Jones’ claim that Ingles’ negligent failure to keep its food store premises safe for invitees was the proximate cause of an injury she suffered when she stepped in a puddle of liquid on the floor of the store and slipped. The Supreme Court granted Jones’ petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of the merits of Jones’ appeal in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997).
[339]*339Our decision in Ingles Markets was limited to consideration of the second prong of the test set forth in Alterman Foods v. Ligón, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980), where the issue is whether or not the evidence showed that Jones had actual knowledge of the puddle or that in the exercise of ordinary care she should have known about the puddle and avoided it prior to stepping in it. Ingles Markets, supra at 497. Because it is not an issue raised in the appeal, we do not consider whether or not under the first prong of Alterman Foods, Ingles had superior actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle. Accordingly, our reconsideration on remand is limited to consideration of the effect of Robinson on the second prong of Alterman Foods as applied to the facts of this case.
The following facts, as set forth in Ingles Markets, are relevant to the decision in this case: “Jones deposed that as she was leaving the Ingles store after checking out, her left foot slipped on something, but she was able to catch herself before she fell. She alleged that her back and legs were injured as a result of the slip. She testified that after she slipped, she looked down at the floor and could see that she had stepped in a puddle of clear liquid which looked like about a cup and a half of water on the floor. Jones testified that she did not see the liquid prior to stepping in it because, as she was exiting the store prior to the slip, she was looking straight ahead rather than in the direction of the floor. She admitted that nothing prevented her from seeing the liquid on the floor prior to stepping in it and that it would have been visible to her had she looked for it.” Id. at 497. There is no evidence that anything in the control of Ingles was in any way responsible for Jones’ failure to see and avoid the puddle. Id. at 498.
Since there is no evidence that Jones had actual knowledge of the puddle prior to stepping in it, the issue under the second Alterman Foods prong is whether, in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety, Jones should have known about the puddle and avoided it. In Ingles Markets we quoted the Alterman Foods requirements that under the second prong of the test set forth therein, “ £(t)he customer must exercise ordinary care for (her) own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the merchant’s negligence after it becomes apparent to (her) or in the exercise of ordinary care (she) should have learned of it. (She) must make use of all (her) senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to (her).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Alterman Foods, supra at 623.” Ingles Markets, supra at 497-498. Applying these requirements, we found that “the evidence show[ed] that the puddle was visible and, had Jones looked at the floor where, she was walking prior to the slip, she could have seen and avoided it.” Id. at 498. We concluded that Jones’ failure to look where she was walking [340]*340and see the puddle established as a matter of law that the proximate cause of her slip in the puddle was her failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. Id. Accordingly, in Ingles Markets we affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles.
In Robinson, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari “to examine ‘the proper standard for determining whether the plaintiff in a “slip and fall” premises liability case has exercised ordinary care sufficient to prevail against a motion for summary judgment,’ ” id. at 735, and “to examine the appellate decisions which have as their crux a determination as a matter of law that an invitee failed to exercise ordinary care for personal safety.” Id. at 739. In doing so, Robinson examined slip and fall cases which, like the claim in Robinson, were based on claims by invitees that they were injured by a foreign substance on the floor of the premises to which they were invited. Robinson identified Alterman Foods as the landmark decision defining the law governing these slip and fall cases. Robinson, supra at 736.
In its discussion of these cases, Robinson left intact the first prong of the Alterman Foods test concerning the defendant proprietor’s knowledge of the hazard and focused instead on the second Alterman Foods prong dealing with the plaintiff’s knowledge of the hazard. Robinson, supra. Robinson reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods, a plaintiff invitee must prove that the invitee “ ‘was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.’ Id. at 623!” Robinson, supra at 736, 748-749. Under Robinson, however, the defendant now has the initial burden under the second prong of producing evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries at issue. Id. at 747-749. This burden may be carried by the defendant by producing evidence that the plaintiff knew about the hazard or that in the exercise of ordinary care the plaintiff should have known about the hazard. Id.1 Only after the defendant has produced evidence of the plaintiff’s negligence does the plaintiff have the burden of producing evidence which disproves such negligence in opposition to summary judgment. Id.
[341]*341Robinson also reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods, an invitee has the following duties: “An invitee is charged with exercising ordinary care for personal safety and using ordinary care to avoid the effect of the owner/occupier’s negligence after that negligence becomes apparent to the invitee or in the exercise of ordinary care the invitee should have learned of it. In the exercise of ordinary care, the invitee must use all senses to discover and avoid hurtful things. Alterman Foods v. Ligón, supra, 246 Ga. at 623.” Robinson, supra at 741. In considering whether or not an invitee has exercised such ordinary care, Robinson further stated that: “The established standard is whether, taking everything into account, the act is one which the common sense of mankind pronounces wants of such prudence as the ordinarily careful person would use in a like situation. The invitee is not bound to avoid hazards not usually present on the premises and which the invitee, exercising ordinary care, did not observe, and the invitee is not required, in all circumstances, to look continuously at the floor, without intermission, for defects in the floor.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 741. Robinson further held “that an invitee presents some evidence of the exercise of reasonable care for personal safety when the invitee explains that something in the control of the owner/occupier and of such a nature that the owner/occupier knew or should have known of its distractive quality caused him not to look at the site of the hazard.” Id. at 748.
Applying these standards, Robinson confirmed that a court may conclude as a matter of law that an invitee failed to exercise ordinary care where the evidence establishing that fact is plain, palpable and undisputable. Id. at 739-740. But Robinson emphasized that the question of ordinary care is generally an issue for the trier of fact and that where reasonable minds can differ as to the conclusion to be reached, summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.
In considering the facts in the case before it, Robinson reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kroger and concluded that: “[A]n invitee’s failure to exercise ordinary care is not established as a matter of law by the invitee’s admission that he did not look at the site on which he placed his foot or that he could have seen the hazard had he visually examined the floor before taking the step which led to his downfall. Rather, the issue is whether, taking into account all the circumstances existing at the time and place of the fall, the invitee exercised the prudence the ordinarily careful person would use in a like situation.” Id. at 748.
In the present case, Ingles produced deposition testimony given by Jones which carried its initial burden of producing evidence that the proximate cause of the injury was Jones’ negligent failure to exercise ordinary care to see and avoid the puddle in her path. Jones produced no additional evidence in rebuttal nor did she claim that any[342]*342thing in the control of Ingles distracted her and prevented her from seeing the puddle. Rather, she relied on the same deposition testimony as evidence that she did not see the puddle of clear liquid on the floor despite exercising ordinary care for her safety. In Ingles Markets, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles and concluded as a matter of law that Jones failed to exercise ordinary care because she admitted that she could have seen the puddle of clear liquid if she had looked at the floor where she was walking before stepping in it. Given the factual similarity of this case to Robinson, we now conclude that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Birdsong, R J., concurs and concurs specially. Eldridge, J., concurs specially.