ORDER and REASONS
FELDMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiffs, a class of black registered voters residing in Orleans Parish, brought this action on behalf of all black registered voters similarly situated alleging violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.1 Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the manner in which the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters conducted the annual voter canvass and purge in Wards 8 and 9 of the City of New Orleans authorized by Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:192 2 and 18:1933, constituted “changes” in voter qualification within the [1227]*1227meaning of Section 5, which were not pre-cleared as required by the Act.4 Finding that there was no showing of irreparable harm because improperly purged voters could be immediately restored to the voter rolls, the single judge court denied plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Registrar from completing the purge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, the district judge then granted plaintiffs’ request that a three-judge court convene. Plaintiffs ask this three-judge Court to grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and all other equitable relief.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that a covered State or political subdivision5 must take certain precautions
“[wjhenever [it] ... shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964....”
42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Before any such change can be implemented, the State or political subdivision must first obtain approval from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, alternatively, administratively from the Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General may preclear a submitted change either by failing to interpose an objection within sixty days of submission, or by affirmatively indicating during the sixty day review period that an objection will not be made. Id. The option of obtaining administrative preelearance from the Attorney General [1228]*1228N.A.A.C.P. v. Hampton County Election Commission, 470 U.S. 166, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 1130 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985) (quoting McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 104 5.Ct. 1037, 1044, 79 L.Ed.2d 271 (1984).
[1227]*1227“was added to the original legislation ‘to provide a speedy alternative method of compliance to covered States.’ ”
[1228]*1228By letter dated September 21,1987, after this suit was filed, the Attorney General addressed
“the alterations in the procedures and schedule for conducting the 1987 annual canvass and purge of registered voters in Wards 8 and 9 of the City of New Orleans in Orleans Parish, Louisiana....”
(Letter of Attorney General).
After reviewing the Registrar’s submissions 6, the Attorney General affirmatively indicated that he “does not interpose any objections to the changes in question.” Id. But plaintiffs could make additional submissions, if they wished. The Attorney General reserved
“the right to reexamine this submission if additional information that would otherwise require an objection comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day review period.”
Id.
In view of the Attorney General’s administrative determination, plaintiffs are not now entitled to injunctive relief. The Attorney General considered the submission, indicated that the alterations in question constitute “changes” within the meaning of Section 5, and granted preclearance. Although plaintiffs attack the propriety of the administrative determination7, it is clear that such an administrative determination by the Attorney General is not judicially reviewable. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504-507, 97 S.Ct. 2411, 2420-2421, 53 L.Ed.2d 506 (1977). In Morris, the Court unequivocally insulated the administrative process from collateral attack:
“... Congress intended to provide covered jurisdictions with an expeditious alternative to declaratory judgment actions. ... Although there was to be no bar to subsequent constitutional challenges to the implemented legislation, there also was to be no dragging out of the extraordinary federal remedy beyond the period specified in the statute.”
432 U.S. at 504, 97 S.Ct. at 2420. The Morris Court concluded that Congress “intended to preclude all judicial review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion or failure to act.” Id. at 507 n. 24, 97 S.Ct. at 2421 n. 24. Even if the decision of the Attorney General is erroneous, it is nevertheless a determination made pursuant to the Attorney General’s Section 5 responsibilities and is nonreviewable. Id.
Plaintiffs urge that this three-judge Court nevertheless retains jurisdiction to determine whether the Registrar’s failure to obtain preclearance prior to the implementation of the canvass and purge requires us to order some equitable remedy. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Hampton County Election Commission, 470 U.S. 166, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985). In Hampton County, the Supreme Court instructed the three-judge trial court to enter an order allowing the jurisdiction to submit certain changes to the Attorney General for approval. If the county failed to make the submission or the Attorney General interposed an objection, an election held pursuant to the change would be set aside. Even if the Attorney General did preclear the change after the fact, the Supreme Court instructed that:
“[T]he District Court should determine, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, whether the results of the election may stand.”
105 S.Ct. at 1138. The Court explained that the three-judge court had
“never engaged in the equitable weighing process necessary to determine whether failure to submit a covered [1229]*1229change for preclearance requires that an election be set aside. The factors to be weighed include ‘the nature of the changes complained of, and whether it was reasonably clear at the time of the election that the changes were covered by § 5.’ ”
Id. at n. 36 (quoting Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396, 91 S.Ct. 431, 441, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971)).
The Court believes that
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ORDER and REASONS
FELDMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiffs, a class of black registered voters residing in Orleans Parish, brought this action on behalf of all black registered voters similarly situated alleging violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.1 Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the manner in which the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters conducted the annual voter canvass and purge in Wards 8 and 9 of the City of New Orleans authorized by Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:192 2 and 18:1933, constituted “changes” in voter qualification within the [1227]*1227meaning of Section 5, which were not pre-cleared as required by the Act.4 Finding that there was no showing of irreparable harm because improperly purged voters could be immediately restored to the voter rolls, the single judge court denied plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Registrar from completing the purge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, the district judge then granted plaintiffs’ request that a three-judge court convene. Plaintiffs ask this three-judge Court to grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and all other equitable relief.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that a covered State or political subdivision5 must take certain precautions
“[wjhenever [it] ... shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964....”
42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Before any such change can be implemented, the State or political subdivision must first obtain approval from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, alternatively, administratively from the Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General may preclear a submitted change either by failing to interpose an objection within sixty days of submission, or by affirmatively indicating during the sixty day review period that an objection will not be made. Id. The option of obtaining administrative preelearance from the Attorney General [1228]*1228N.A.A.C.P. v. Hampton County Election Commission, 470 U.S. 166, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 1130 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985) (quoting McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 104 5.Ct. 1037, 1044, 79 L.Ed.2d 271 (1984).
[1227]*1227“was added to the original legislation ‘to provide a speedy alternative method of compliance to covered States.’ ”
[1228]*1228By letter dated September 21,1987, after this suit was filed, the Attorney General addressed
“the alterations in the procedures and schedule for conducting the 1987 annual canvass and purge of registered voters in Wards 8 and 9 of the City of New Orleans in Orleans Parish, Louisiana....”
(Letter of Attorney General).
After reviewing the Registrar’s submissions 6, the Attorney General affirmatively indicated that he “does not interpose any objections to the changes in question.” Id. But plaintiffs could make additional submissions, if they wished. The Attorney General reserved
“the right to reexamine this submission if additional information that would otherwise require an objection comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day review period.”
Id.
In view of the Attorney General’s administrative determination, plaintiffs are not now entitled to injunctive relief. The Attorney General considered the submission, indicated that the alterations in question constitute “changes” within the meaning of Section 5, and granted preclearance. Although plaintiffs attack the propriety of the administrative determination7, it is clear that such an administrative determination by the Attorney General is not judicially reviewable. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504-507, 97 S.Ct. 2411, 2420-2421, 53 L.Ed.2d 506 (1977). In Morris, the Court unequivocally insulated the administrative process from collateral attack:
“... Congress intended to provide covered jurisdictions with an expeditious alternative to declaratory judgment actions. ... Although there was to be no bar to subsequent constitutional challenges to the implemented legislation, there also was to be no dragging out of the extraordinary federal remedy beyond the period specified in the statute.”
432 U.S. at 504, 97 S.Ct. at 2420. The Morris Court concluded that Congress “intended to preclude all judicial review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion or failure to act.” Id. at 507 n. 24, 97 S.Ct. at 2421 n. 24. Even if the decision of the Attorney General is erroneous, it is nevertheless a determination made pursuant to the Attorney General’s Section 5 responsibilities and is nonreviewable. Id.
Plaintiffs urge that this three-judge Court nevertheless retains jurisdiction to determine whether the Registrar’s failure to obtain preclearance prior to the implementation of the canvass and purge requires us to order some equitable remedy. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Hampton County Election Commission, 470 U.S. 166, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985). In Hampton County, the Supreme Court instructed the three-judge trial court to enter an order allowing the jurisdiction to submit certain changes to the Attorney General for approval. If the county failed to make the submission or the Attorney General interposed an objection, an election held pursuant to the change would be set aside. Even if the Attorney General did preclear the change after the fact, the Supreme Court instructed that:
“[T]he District Court should determine, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, whether the results of the election may stand.”
105 S.Ct. at 1138. The Court explained that the three-judge court had
“never engaged in the equitable weighing process necessary to determine whether failure to submit a covered [1229]*1229change for preclearance requires that an election be set aside. The factors to be weighed include ‘the nature of the changes complained of, and whether it was reasonably clear at the time of the election that the changes were covered by § 5.’ ”
Id. at n. 36 (quoting Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396, 91 S.Ct. 431, 441, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971)).
The Court believes that Hampton County presents a far different factual picture. That case involved an election held pursuant to a change in a statute which was never submitted to the Attorney General for preclearance. In Hampton County, the complained of conduct was never pre-cleared. Here, it was.
Although this Court has the authority and power to engage in such an equitable weighing process and to order such relief as might be indicated, we are not satisfied that at the time of the canvass and purge it was “reasonably clear” within the meaning of Hampton County that the Registrar’s actions constituted “changes” under Section 5 which must be additionally pre-cleared. Plaintiffs charge that the Registrar deviated from the statutory requirement of conducting the annual canvass “in January.” However, the record clearly indicates that the Registrar began the canvass process in January. The Registrar argues that that satisfies Section 192. The principal drafter of the statute testified in a state court proceeding, and would testify in this instance, that the “in January” language was added merely to serve as a directive to state registrars regarding the proper time to begin the canvass. Plaintiffs also urge that the Registrar failed to “immediately” notify those registrants whose canvass cards were returned by the post office. LSA-R.S. 18:193. Yet it cannot be said that it is reasonably clear that mailing the notices of irregularity on May 4, 1987, after completing processing of the returned canvass cards by April 15, 1987, constitutes a “change” within the meaning of Section 5. Plaintiffs further claim that the Registrar failed to publish within the required five days from the mailing of the notices, a list of those voters subject to removal from the rolls. LSA-R.S. 18:193. However, the Registrar did publish such a list on May 7, 1987, well within the May 4, 1987 mailing. This publication was later deemed invalid by a state court, which issued a series of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions and then vacated them. It was not until July 22, 1987, that the Registrar was effectively allowed to continue the cancellation procedure. On July 30, the Registrar mailed second notices of irregularity and, within 5 days, on August 3, 1987, the Registrar published the list in accordance with Revised Statute 18:193.
We do not decide whether the Registrar’s conduct amounted to changes. Indeed, the Attorney General found that changes had occurred and we defer to that finding. But, under these circumstances, it is not at all clear to this Court, nor was it reasonably clear at the time of the canvass and purge, that the Registrar’s actions constituted “changes” under Section 5 which require preclearance. Reasonable jurists can and do differ about what is a change. See, e.g., Garcia v. Guerra, 744 F.2d 1159, 1166 (5th Cir.1984) (Randall, J., concurring)8. The question we must address is whether the two threshhold tests of Hampton County are met under these facts so as to justify some equitable relief. Guided by the Supreme Court’s instruction in Hampton County, this Court finds that equitable relief is not appropriate because it was not reasonably clear at the time that the Registrar’s actions needed to be precleared.
But we do not stop our analysis at that point because plaintiffs’ concern over the need for relief is unfounded. Plaintiffs propose an equitable remedy of allowing improperly purged registrants in Wards 8 [1230]*1230and 9 to cast provisional ballots which would somehow be separated and not counted pending resolution of plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim. However, there is no need for this extraordinary solution. State law adequately provides its own solution. Louisiana Revised Statute 18:562 explicitly anticipates the problem of the individual who is threatened with the possibility of not being allowed to vote for erroneous reasons, and, in fact, grants more relief than that sought by plaintiffs. Section 562 provides in pertinent part:
“Errors and omissions in voter records. If the registration certificate of a qualified voter was omitted from or incorrectly written on the precinct register or, in the parishes using the computer system, if the name of a qualified voter was omitted from or incorrectly written on the computer voting list, the commissioner shall:
(1) Contact the registrar of voters to ascertain whether or not the person applying to vote is registered to vote in that precinct.
(2) In the absence of a valid challenge of the voter, allow the voter to vote after he has made an affidavit before a commissioner attesting that he is a qualified registered voter and describing the error or omission in the voter records.
(3) Preserve the voter’s affidavit as part of the election records by placing it in the envelope marked ‘Put in Voting Machine.’ ”
LSA-R.S. 18:562.
Because broader remedial protection is already mandated by the Louisiana Election Code, plaintiffs’ claim for equitable relief is unnecessary, even if it were warranted.9
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
Plaintiffs’ Section 5 claim is dismissed.
McNAMARA, J., concurs.