Jones v. Dir.

2019 Ark. App. 341

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: August 28, 2019
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 341

Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry Date: 2022.07.21 13:53:52 -05'00' DIVISION III Adobe Acrobat version: No. E-18-322 2022.001.20169

Opinion Delivered: August 28, 2019 ROBERTA JONES APPELLANT

V. APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF [NO. 2018-BR-01119] WORKFORCE SERVICES, AND ATRIUM HOSPITALITY LP APPELLEES AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Roberta Jones appeals the Arkansas Board of Review’s (“Board’s”) decision denying

her claim for unemployment benefits. On appeal, Jones argues that the Board erred in

finding that she was disqualified from receiving benefits because (1) she voluntarily left her

last work without good cause and (2) she was not able and available for suitable work. We

affirm.

On June 27, 2018, Jones filed an application for unemployment-insurance benefits

with the director of the Department of Workforce Services (“Department”). She indicated

that she had last worked for Atrium Hospitality LP (“Atrium”) and that her employment

had ended on March 11. She further stated that her separation from employment was for

medical leave and that she has disabilities that limited her ability to perform her job duties. Also on June 27, Jones completed an “Able and Available-Claimant Statement” and

responded that she was not able and available for work from March 9, and she left the ending

date open. She further marked that she was “[s]till not able and available for work.”

On July 6, Atrium responded that Jones had been on medical leave through June 30

and that she was scheduled to return to work on July 1. Atrium attached a June 25 letter

from Cigna Insurance (“Cigna”) stating that Jones’s medical leave would expire on June 30

and that she had been advised to return to work on the first working day following the

expiration.

On July 17, Jones completed a “Miscellaneous-Claimant Statement.” She wrote,

I didn’t go back to work because I am still not able to work. I was suppose[d] to return to work 7-1-18 but I didn’t. I didn’t take anything from my employer stating I still needed time off. I did file for workmans [sic] comp but they denied it because they said there is no proof that I was hurt [a]t work. I have filed a grievance since they denied my worksman [sic] comp but I haven’t heard anything.

On July 18, the Department found that Jones was disqualified from benefits because

(1) she had left Atrium without making reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights and (2)

she was not able to perform suitable work due to a disabling physical condition.

Jones appealed the Department’s decision to the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal

(“Tribunal”). She did not appear for the August 14 hearing, and the Tribunal affirmed the

Department’s decision. Jones requested a reopening of the case, and the Tribunal conducted

a reopening hearing on September 13. At the hearing, Jones admitted that she had received

notice of the August 14 hearing date and time but stated that she was stressed and “got

mixed up with the timing.” The Tribunal denied Jones’s request for reopening because she

did not have good cause for failing to appear at the hearing. Jones appealed the Tribunal’s

2 decision to the Board, and on October 30, the Board affirmed and adopted the Tribunal’s

decision. This appeal followed.

On appeal of an unemployment-compensation case, we review the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings.

Coker v. Dir., 99 Ark. App. 455, 456, 262 S.W.3d 175, 176 (2007). The Board’s findings of

fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. However, that is

not to say that our function on appeal is merely to ratify whatever decision is made by the

Board. Boothe v. Dir., 59 Ark. App. 169, 954 S.W.2d 946 (1997). We will reverse the

Board’s decision when it is not supported by substantial evidence. Id.

On appeal, Jones first argues that the Board’s finding that she left work without good

cause is not supported by substantial evidence. She asserts that she requested an extension of

her medical leave from Cigna, the agency that handles Atrium’s medical leave, before she

left her employment. Thus, she argues that she preserved her job rights before not returning

to work.

A person who voluntarily leaves her employment without good cause connected to

the work shall be disqualified for benefits. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(a)(1) (Repl. 2012).

However, no individual shall be disqualified if, after making reasonable efforts to preserve

her job rights, she left her last work because of illness, injury, pregnancy, or disability of the

individual or member of the individual’s immediate family. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-

513(b)(2)(A). In Foster v. Director, 2013 Ark. App. 190, this court held that an employee left

her last employment without making reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights when she

3 did not return to work upon the expiration of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.

She made no attempt to inform her employer that she wanted her job, which left the

employer with no choice but to assume that she had quit. Id.

In this case, we hold that the Board’s decision that Jones left her last work without

good cause is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence showed that Jones knew that

she was scheduled to return to work on July 1, 2018, and that Jones did not appear for work

that day. Specifically, Atrium offered a June 25 letter from Cigna stating that it had advised

Jones that her medical leave expired on June 30 and that she was expected to return on the

first working day following that date. Further, Jones admitted on the “Miscellaneous-

Claimant Statement” that she was scheduled to return to work on July 1 and that she did

not appear for work that day. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s

decision that Jones left her last work without good cause and without preserving her job

rights. Because there is sufficient evidence to support the denial of benefits as a result of

Jones’s leaving her last work without good cause, we need not address Jones’s second point

on appeal.

Affirmed.

HIXSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Sheila F. Campbell, P.A., by: Sheila F. Campbell, for appellant.

Cynthia Uhrynowycz, for appellee.