Carly Bright v. Director, Division of Workforce Services; And Catfish Hole Fayetteville, Inc.

2021 Ark. App. 217, 625 S.W.3d 720
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
DecidedMay 5, 2021
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 2021 Ark. App. 217 (Carly Bright v. Director, Division of Workforce Services; And Catfish Hole Fayetteville, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carly Bright v. Director, Division of Workforce Services; And Catfish Hole Fayetteville, Inc., 2021 Ark. App. 217, 625 S.W.3d 720 (Ark. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

Cite as 2021 Ark. App. 217 Elizabeth Perry I attest to the accuracy and ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS integrity of this document DIVISION 2023.06.27 11:38:32 -05'00' No. E-20-278 2023.001.20174 CARLY BRIGHT Opinion Delivered May 5, 2021 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE V. ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW [NO. 2020-BR-01079] DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES; AND CATFISH HOLE FAYETTEVILLE, INC.

APPELLEES AFFIRMED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Carly Bright appeals the Board of Review’s denial of her unemployment claim on

the basis that she was discharged from work for misconduct connected to her work. The

agency determination initially granted benefits finding that misconduct had not been

established. The employer appealed to the Appeal Tribunal, and a hearing was conducted.

Bright failed to appear for the hearing, but Marcia Williams, the front manager for Bright’s

former employer, Catfish Hole, appeared and testified. The Appeal Tribunal found that

Bright had been discharged from last work for reasons other than misconduct, although it

noted that Bright had been late in the past; had received verbal coaching from Williams;

was absent on January 17, 2020 without notice; and had missed several other days in her

scheduled shift. The employer appealed that decision to the Board of Review, which

reversed that Appeal Tribunal decision and denied Bright unemployment benefits finding

she was discharged from last work for misconduct connected to the work. Bright now appeals to this court arguing there was not substantial evidence to support her discharge for

misconduct. We affirm.

On appeal of an unemployment-compensation case, we review the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings.

Jones v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 341, 581 S.W.3d 516. The Board’s findings of fact are

conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Appellate review is

limited to determining whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision based on the

evidence before it, even if there is evidence on which the Board might have reached a

different decision. Higgins v. Dir., 2016 Ark. App. 449, 503 S.W.3d 833. The reviewing

court may not substitute its findings for the Board’s, even though the court might have

reached a different conclusion had it made an original determination on the same evidence.

Id. Also, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony are

matters to be resolved by the Board. Id.

Misconduct includes the violation of any behavioral policies of the employer,

disregard of the employer’s rules, disregard of the standards of behavior that the employer

has a right to expect from its employees, and disregard of the employee’s duties and

obligations to his or her employer. Hopkins v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 84, 571 S.W.3d 524.

It is the employer’s burden to establish misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

Whether an employee’s behavior is misconduct that justifies the denial of unemployment

benefits is a question of fact for the Board to decide. Id. There is an element of intent

associated with a determination of misconduct. Id.

2 Bright was employed by Catfish Hole as a hostess since August 20, 2019. In her

claimant statement, she stated that her last day of work was January 22, 2020, and she was

discharged on January 24. In response to the question concerning the final incident that

caused discharge, Bright wrote,

Sudden death of a friend and a coworker that passed on November 16, 2019. I had

not been coping well with the grief I have and was slacking a bit as far as being 100 percent

present, both mentally and some days physically if my depression was more intense. I was

going to be late on my last day and was discharged.

Bright wrote that the incident that caused her discharge occurred on January 22. In

a different section of her claimant statement, Bright was asked to explain in her own words

why she was no longer working, and she wrote,

The sudden death of my best friend and coworker, Zach, was and has continued to

be extremely difficult for me to sort through. I was diagnosed with clinical depression and

anxiety in 2015, but it has intensified since Zach’s death. I have taken action in seeking

both mental/emotional and medical professionals for help but adjusting back to my

“normal” life and self has taken more time than I would’ve liked. At the time of my

discharge from my last job, I was had [sic] noticed myself constantly being forgetful which

had begun to make me run late to places, get uncontrollably anxious or upset with myself

for not being the organized and timely person I always am, or not perform certain actions

correctly to my usual standard. On my last day of work, I had tried to call in for a sick day

and was refused, so I explained to my manager that I would be late because I had been

crying and was not mentally up-to-par for walking into my work environment, and my

3 manager told me to not come into work and later explained that my grief had compromised

my value as an employee for the time being.

At the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal, Williams testified that Bright failed to

show up for her scheduled work shift on Friday, January 17, 2020, and Bright had “that

day, that Saturday, and that Sunday.” Williams said prior to that, Bright had been absent or

late on several occasions, she had talked to Bright about missing work or being late, and

Bright had apologized and told Williams that she was having some issues. According to

Williams, she told Bright that everyone had problems in life, but Bright was expected to be

at work when she was scheduled; Bright acknowledged that she was aware of this

expectation. Williams texted Bright when she did not show up for work, but Bright did

not return her texts or answer her phone, and Bright did not call in to let Williams know

why she was not coming into work at her scheduled time. Williams acknowledged that

Bright’s coworker had committed suicide and that Bright felt guilty because she had not

answered a phone call from him on the night he took his life, but she stated that if an

employee failed to show up for his or her scheduled work time, the employee would be

dismissed, which Bright knew.

Bright first asserts that Williams’s testimony at the Appeal Tribunal hearing at best

indicates that she missed work on January 17, 2020, not the three-day period of January 17–

19 the Board concluded she missed and which the Board determined was an intentional

disregard of the employer’s best interest. The record indicates that the hearing officer asked

Williams how many days Bright missed, and Williams replied, “She had that day, that

Saturday, the Sunday, but previously before that, she was late for work several times.”

4 Bright failed to appear for the hearing to refute Williams’s testimony. Reviewing the

evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to

the Board’s findings, we can reasonably conclude, as the Board did, that Williams meant

Bright did not show up for all three days of work.

Bright argues that the denial of benefits should be reversed according to Oliver v.

Director, 80 Ark. App. 275, 94 S.W.3d 362 (2002). In Oliver, the appellant accrued six

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