Adams, J.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant has no legal right either to borrow money or to issue bonds for the purposes stated in the case agreed and assigns in support of his position four distinct grounds, each of which requires investigation.
1. His first proposition is this: At the election held on 25 April, 1922, the vote was confined to the question of levying a tax and did not include that - of borrowing money or issuing bonds, and hence both borrowing the money and issuing the bonds are inhibited by the organic
law. Tbe constitutional provision relied on as tbe basis of tbe proposition is as follows: “No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.” Const., Art: VII, sec. 7.
It has been held that a taxing district of the character described is within this constitutional provision and that the subject of the proposed tax is not a necessary expense; in fact, the defendant does not contend that it is. The requirement that public schools shall be maintained at least six months in every year is not involved. Const., Art. VIII, sec. 3;
Williams v. Comrs.,
176 N. C., 554;
Bennett v. Comrs.,
173 N. C., 625;
Ellis v. Trustees,
156 N. C., 10. The plaintiff’s proposition must therefore be dealt with upon the assumption that the proposed indebtedness is not to be incurred for an expense which is necessary within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition.
It is true, as contended by the plaintiff, that the first section of the original act merely prescribes the means of ascertaining the will of the voters and does not in express terms embrace the question either of borrowing money or issuing bonds; but in several other sections are found the two expressions “If a majority of the qualified voters favor the additional school tax” and “If this act is approved by a majority of the qualified voters.” These expressions are not to be treated as sur-plusage, but on the contrary as importing special significance. In order to discover and give effect to the legislative intent we must consider the act as a whole, having due regard to each of its express provisions; for there is no presumption that any provision is useless or redundant. That the act consists of several sections is altogether immaterial on the question of its unity. “The construction of a statute can ordinarily be in no wise affected by the fact that it is subdivided into sections or titles. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose or intent. Consequently the several parts or sections of an act are to be construed in connection with every other part or section and all are to be considered as parts of a connected whole and harmonized, if possible, so as to aid in giving effect to the intention of the lawmakers.” 25 R. C. L., 1009, sec. 248.
The only way in which the will of the voters was to be ascertained is found in the first section of the act' referred to, and in this way and by this method a majority of the qualified voters manifested their approval, not only of the proposed additional fax, but of all the provisions of the act which were necessary to accomplish the ultimate legislative purpose. For not only as a public-local law, but as a law particularly mentioned in the published notice of the election, did the
original act impart to every voter constructive notice of all its provisions.
We must therefore assume that those who voted in the election knew that approval of the act would be equivalent to authorizing the defendant with the sanction of the Legislature to borrow money for the purposes set out in section seven; and the power to borrow money implies the power incidentally to execute the proper evidence of the indebtedness so incurred. In
Charlotte v. Shepard,
122 N.
C.,
602, it is held that where a municipal corporation by authority of the Legislature and the approval of a majority of the qualified voters acquires the right to create a debt and issue bonds, it is clothed with power to levy the taxes necessary to pay the bonds and the accruing interest. There the Court says: “When such corporation has thus acquired the right to create the debt and to issue the bonds, this power carries with it the power to levy the" taxes necessary to pay said bonds and the accruing interest thereon.
Rawls County Court v. U. S.,
105 U. S., 733;
U. S. v. New Orleans,
98 U. S., 381. It is admitted that these cases are direct authority for this position, if there is no public law to the contrary, but it is suggested that Art. VII, sec. 7 of the Constitution, provides otherwise, and therefore the doctrine declared in these cases does not apply, and that it is necessary that the power to tax should be expressly granted in the legislative act. We do not think Art. VII, sec. 7, nor any other provision of the Constitution, contains any such requirement as this. If it did, we would feel bound by it, no matter what might be held to be the general rule in other jurisdictions. That clause of Art. VII, sec. 7 of the Constitution, if intended to have any separate and independent meaning, was only intended to apply to such indebtedness as had not been submitted to the vote of the people.”
In
Slocomb v. Fayetteville,
125 N. C., 362, it appears that the defendant was authorized to create a municipal debt, but was not expressly empowered to levy the tax necessary to pay the bonds; and it was held on appeal that if a municipal corporation has the power to create a debt it has also the right to levy the necessary tax, because such right attaches by necessary implication. If the right to create a debt carries with it the power to levy a tax to provide for payment,
a fortiori
does the right to levy a tax with which to pay back borrowed money essentially imply the right to issue the proper evidence of such obligation. Indeed, there are decisions which uphold the principle that a municipal corporation which has contracted or is authorized to contract a yalid debt is empowered also to issue bonds as evidence of such debt.
Bennett v. Comrs., supra; Comrs. v. Webb,
148 N. C., 120;
McCless v. Meekins,
117 N. C., 34;
Tucker v. Raleigh,
75 N. C., 267;
Parvin v. Comrs.,
177 N. C., 508;
Riddle v. Cumberland,
180 N. C., 321.
Tbe fact that tbe indebtedness may bave been incurred for a necessary expense does not affect tbe relevancy of tbe principle discussed in these decisions, because in tbe instant case there is no controversy as to tbe regularity of tbe election or tbe proper passage of tbe act under which it was held.
We bave not referred to the act ratified 26 February, 1920, because in our judgment the defendant without its aid bad the legal right to issue the bonds, but by this act the former laws are reenacted and the defendant is given express power to issue the necessary bonds in its corporate name. In this way the right is doubly assured.
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Adams, J.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant has no legal right either to borrow money or to issue bonds for the purposes stated in the case agreed and assigns in support of his position four distinct grounds, each of which requires investigation.
1. His first proposition is this: At the election held on 25 April, 1922, the vote was confined to the question of levying a tax and did not include that - of borrowing money or issuing bonds, and hence both borrowing the money and issuing the bonds are inhibited by the organic
law. Tbe constitutional provision relied on as tbe basis of tbe proposition is as follows: “No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.” Const., Art: VII, sec. 7.
It has been held that a taxing district of the character described is within this constitutional provision and that the subject of the proposed tax is not a necessary expense; in fact, the defendant does not contend that it is. The requirement that public schools shall be maintained at least six months in every year is not involved. Const., Art. VIII, sec. 3;
Williams v. Comrs.,
176 N. C., 554;
Bennett v. Comrs.,
173 N. C., 625;
Ellis v. Trustees,
156 N. C., 10. The plaintiff’s proposition must therefore be dealt with upon the assumption that the proposed indebtedness is not to be incurred for an expense which is necessary within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition.
It is true, as contended by the plaintiff, that the first section of the original act merely prescribes the means of ascertaining the will of the voters and does not in express terms embrace the question either of borrowing money or issuing bonds; but in several other sections are found the two expressions “If a majority of the qualified voters favor the additional school tax” and “If this act is approved by a majority of the qualified voters.” These expressions are not to be treated as sur-plusage, but on the contrary as importing special significance. In order to discover and give effect to the legislative intent we must consider the act as a whole, having due regard to each of its express provisions; for there is no presumption that any provision is useless or redundant. That the act consists of several sections is altogether immaterial on the question of its unity. “The construction of a statute can ordinarily be in no wise affected by the fact that it is subdivided into sections or titles. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose or intent. Consequently the several parts or sections of an act are to be construed in connection with every other part or section and all are to be considered as parts of a connected whole and harmonized, if possible, so as to aid in giving effect to the intention of the lawmakers.” 25 R. C. L., 1009, sec. 248.
The only way in which the will of the voters was to be ascertained is found in the first section of the act' referred to, and in this way and by this method a majority of the qualified voters manifested their approval, not only of the proposed additional fax, but of all the provisions of the act which were necessary to accomplish the ultimate legislative purpose. For not only as a public-local law, but as a law particularly mentioned in the published notice of the election, did the
original act impart to every voter constructive notice of all its provisions.
We must therefore assume that those who voted in the election knew that approval of the act would be equivalent to authorizing the defendant with the sanction of the Legislature to borrow money for the purposes set out in section seven; and the power to borrow money implies the power incidentally to execute the proper evidence of the indebtedness so incurred. In
Charlotte v. Shepard,
122 N.
C.,
602, it is held that where a municipal corporation by authority of the Legislature and the approval of a majority of the qualified voters acquires the right to create a debt and issue bonds, it is clothed with power to levy the taxes necessary to pay the bonds and the accruing interest. There the Court says: “When such corporation has thus acquired the right to create the debt and to issue the bonds, this power carries with it the power to levy the" taxes necessary to pay said bonds and the accruing interest thereon.
Rawls County Court v. U. S.,
105 U. S., 733;
U. S. v. New Orleans,
98 U. S., 381. It is admitted that these cases are direct authority for this position, if there is no public law to the contrary, but it is suggested that Art. VII, sec. 7 of the Constitution, provides otherwise, and therefore the doctrine declared in these cases does not apply, and that it is necessary that the power to tax should be expressly granted in the legislative act. We do not think Art. VII, sec. 7, nor any other provision of the Constitution, contains any such requirement as this. If it did, we would feel bound by it, no matter what might be held to be the general rule in other jurisdictions. That clause of Art. VII, sec. 7 of the Constitution, if intended to have any separate and independent meaning, was only intended to apply to such indebtedness as had not been submitted to the vote of the people.”
In
Slocomb v. Fayetteville,
125 N. C., 362, it appears that the defendant was authorized to create a municipal debt, but was not expressly empowered to levy the tax necessary to pay the bonds; and it was held on appeal that if a municipal corporation has the power to create a debt it has also the right to levy the necessary tax, because such right attaches by necessary implication. If the right to create a debt carries with it the power to levy a tax to provide for payment,
a fortiori
does the right to levy a tax with which to pay back borrowed money essentially imply the right to issue the proper evidence of such obligation. Indeed, there are decisions which uphold the principle that a municipal corporation which has contracted or is authorized to contract a yalid debt is empowered also to issue bonds as evidence of such debt.
Bennett v. Comrs., supra; Comrs. v. Webb,
148 N. C., 120;
McCless v. Meekins,
117 N. C., 34;
Tucker v. Raleigh,
75 N. C., 267;
Parvin v. Comrs.,
177 N. C., 508;
Riddle v. Cumberland,
180 N. C., 321.
Tbe fact that tbe indebtedness may bave been incurred for a necessary expense does not affect tbe relevancy of tbe principle discussed in these decisions, because in tbe instant case there is no controversy as to tbe regularity of tbe election or tbe proper passage of tbe act under which it was held.
We bave not referred to the act ratified 26 February, 1920, because in our judgment the defendant without its aid bad the legal right to issue the bonds, but by this act the former laws are reenacted and the defendant is given express power to issue the necessary bonds in its corporate name. In this way the right is doubly assured. the plaintiff, as we understand, does not question the power of the Legislature to enact this statute.
Belo v. Comrs.,
76 N. C., 489;
Anderson v. Wilkins,
142 N. C., 154;
Edwards v. Comrs.,
183 N. C., 58.
2. the plaintiff argues, in the second place, that even- if the.approval of the proposed tax implies the power to borrow money the defendant cannot borrow in any one year any amount in excess of that which may be raised by the annual tax. He contends that the words “borrow money” are generally understood to refer to short-term loans in anticipation of current revenue as distinguished from long-term bond issues; but we do not think they are limited to this sense. They imply the power to raise money for the public use on the pledge of the public credit, and such power may be exercised to meet either present or anticipated expenses and liabilities. As held in the Legal Tender Cases it may be exercised to issue in return for borrowed money obligations in any appropriate form, whether bonds, bills, or notes. 110 U. S., 421. the right to borrow money as applied to a municipal corporation is a power to create indebtedness and procure for its payment funds from others to be paid at a future date.
Orchard v. School District,
14 Neb., 378. It is evidently in this sense that the term is used in section seven, for the amended proviso obviously contemplates the possibility of an indebtedness very much in excess of the amount to be derived from any tax which may be annually levied and collected.
3. the plaintiff next says that the bonds, if issued in the name of the defendant, would in effect become the obligations of the county and that the General Assembly could not authorize the creation of a county obligation for the benefit of a taxing district which does not include the entire county. In support of the proposition be cites
Comrs. v. Boring,
175 N. C., 105, and
Comrs. v. Lacy,
174 N. C., 141.
The difference between these cases is merely formal and in only one or two phases to which we shall advert are they apparently relevant to the question here presented. In substance they announce the doctrine that the Legislature is without power to require a county to give its binding obligation for1 the payment of money on the application and
vote of a township or road district for the construction and maintenance of the roads of such township or district, since it is not within the legislative power to "tax one community or local taxing district for the exclusive benefit of another. And in
Boring’s case, Walker, J.,
adopts a quotation from Cooley on Taxation to the effect that the taxing district through which the tax is to be apportioned must be the district which is to be benefited by its collection and expenditure. This is exactly what the act of 1921 provides. The taxing district is not coterminous with the county and is not a political entity. It was provided therefore that the obligations of the district should be issued in the corporate name of the defendant and that they should be paid out of funds to be derived from the tax levied only in the district for building purposes or out of the special annual tax for building purposes authorized by the original act and the amendments. ' This is the only way devised for paying back the money to be borrowed, and we find nothing in the record which justifies the conclusion that the bonds when issued will become the general or unrestricted obligations of the defendant or of Guilford County. The special purpose of the tax is to erect buildings and maintain schools within the taxing district and these things are to be accomplished through the agency of the county board of education.
Faison v. Comrs.,
171 N. C., 411.
4. The proviso in the first section of the original act is in this language:
Provided,
that if the General Assembly or the board of commissioners by authority of the General Assembly shall order a general increase in the valuation of property in said territory, then it shall operate to automatically decrease by the same percentage the maximum rates fixed in this section and vice versa.
The plaintiff contends that this proviso is void for uncertainty and that the entire act for this reason is ineffective. We do not concur in this conclusion.
Comrs. v. Boring, supra.
Moreover, it is altogether possible that no contingency will arise requiring judicial construction of the proviso and it is unnecessary at this time to discuss a question which is purely academic.
Finding no error we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.