Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2

6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 Mary Joann Jones, No. CV-19-02854-PHX-ESW 9

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v. 12 Commissioner of the Social Security 13 Administration,

14 Defendant. 15

16 17 18 On May 19, 2020, the Court issued an Order reversing the Social Security 19 Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of Plaintiff’s application for disability 20 insurance benefits and remanding the matter to the Commissioner of Social Security for 21 an immediate award of benefits. (Doc. 23). Pending before the Court is the 22 Commissioner’s “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 23 Procedure 59(e)” (Doc. 25). Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 19), to which the 24 Commissioner has not replied. 25 Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file a 26 “motion to alter or amend a judgment.” The Ninth Circuit has explained that [s]ince specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are not 27 listed in the rule, the district court enjoys considerable 28 discretion in granting or denying the motion.” McDowell v. 1 Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). But 2 amending a judgment after its entry remains “an 3 extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In general, there are four 4 basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be 5 granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if 6 such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or 7 previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the 8 amendment is justified by an intervening change in 9 controlling law. Id. 10 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). Rule 59(e) “may not be 11 used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have 12 been made prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 13 485 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted). A Rule 59(e) “motion is not a substitute for appeal and 14 does not allow the unhappy litigant to reargue the case.” Bollenbacher v. Comm'r of Soc. 15 Sec., 621 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 16 In its May 19, 2020 Order, the Court concluded that the Administrative Law Judge 17 (“ALJ”) discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without providing specific and 18 legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 23 at 6-9). The 19 Commissioner asserts that the Court committed clear error by remanding the matter for 20 an award of benefits instead of further proceedings. (Doc. 25). According to the 21 Commissioner, the Court failed to adequately analyze whether there are any outstanding 22 issues on which further administrative proceedings would be useful. (Id. at 3-8). The 23 Commissioner does not argue that the record is incomplete. Instead, the Commissioner 24 argues that there are a number of inconsistencies in the record that should be addressed 25 by the ALJ. The Court affirms its implicit finding that the record in this matter is fully 26 developed.1 “Given this fully developed record, the admission of more evidence would

27 1 This finding is implicit in the Court’s statement “After examining the record, the 28 Court finds no outstanding issues of fact to be resolved through further proceedings.” (Doc. 23 at 9). not be ‘enlightening,’ Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101, and ‘remand for the purpose of 2 allowing the ALJ to have a mulligan [does not qualify] as a remand for a ‘useful 3 purpose,’ Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021.” Henderson v. Berryhill, 691 F. App’x 384, 386 4 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th > Cir. 2014) and Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014)). □□□□□□□□ 6 although there may be some doubt in the record as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the 7 Court affirms its finding that there is not “serious doubt.” (Doc. 23 at 10). Because (i) 8 the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff's symptom ? testimony, (ii) the record is fully developed and there are no outstanding issues that must 10 be resolved before a disability determination can be made (i.e. further administrative M proceedings would not be useful), (iii) crediting Plaintiffs testimony as true would 12 require the ALJ to find Plaintiff disabled on remand, and (iv) there is not “serious doubt” 13 as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the Court did not commit clear error by exercising its discretion to remand this case for an award of benefits. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 15 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of 16 discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits when all of these conditions are met’). The Court concludes that the Commissioner has not presented a 18 valid basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief. Accordingly, 19 IT IS ORDERED denying the Commissioner’s “Motion to Alter or Amend 20 Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)” (Doc. 25). 21 Dated this 24th day of July, 2020. 22 . 23 ,

25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28

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