Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 27, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JOSEPH LEE JONES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 24-3182 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-03172-JWL) JAY ARMBRISTER, (D. Kan.)
Respondent - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Petitioner Joseph Lee Jones, a state prisoner in Kansas, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s order dismissing his habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated below, we deny Mr. Jones a COA
and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
Before the district court, Mr. Jones filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging his conviction in the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas. In his
petition, Mr. Jones stated he pleaded guilty and was convicted of forgery and identity
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 2
theft, but that his conviction was illegal. He stated four grounds for relief: first, he
asserted a violation of his rights to due process of law, equal opportunity and protection
under the law, and additional rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act; second,
he claimed a violation of his First Amendment rights; third, he asserted a violation of his
right to access the courts; and finally, he alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment
right “to not be coerced or influence[d].” ROA at 15. Mr. Jones generally alleged those
rights were violated because he was a “sub-class of super-Humanity,” and his access to
communication and ability to conduct research were being impeded. Id. at 12.
The district court found the petition did not comply with the specificity
requirements of Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts. The court stated it was “unable to determine the precise claims
[Mr. Jones] wishe[d] to assert” because “none of the asserted grounds for relief obviously
relate to [his challenged sentence] and the facts asserted in support of each ground do not
obviously relate to the constitutional violation[s] he has alleged.” Id. at 28. The court sua
sponte granted Mr. Jones leave to file an amended petition that complied with the
requirements of Rule 2(c).
Mr. Jones filed an amended petition which again challenged his conviction in the
District Court of Douglas County. However, the petition was missing ten pages of the
required form and did not list any grounds for relief, facts that might have supported such
grounds, or requests for specific relief. The district court dismissed the amended petition
without prejudice because it “fail[ed] to comply with Rule 2(c) and assert[ed] no
particular grounds for relief.” Id. at 78. The court also denied a COA.
2 Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 3
Mr. Jones now requests a COA from this court. In his application for a COA,
Mr. Jones admits that he “asserts facts that are [d]isorganized by his mental health
problems,” but nonetheless argues that “any [r]easonable person can understand that he is
being held beyond his possible sentence without bail.” COA Appl. at 2. In a supplemental
filing, Mr. Jones raises new concerns regarding mail theft, being “held in a K.U. research
facility jail,” and the government’s failure “to properly employ someone whom [sic]
services are to be free.” Supp. COA Appl. at 2, 4. He also argues he “made it clear” to the
district court that he is “being held with the knowledge [he] will be held waiting on a
bed” at a state hospital “for more than [his] probation sentence.” Id. at 3. Mr. Jones asks
for relief in the form of “[r]elease from [j]ail and any other relief such as [dismissal] of
charges maybe.” Id. at 4. Mr. Jones does not discuss the district court’s denial of a COA
nor the content of his petitions for writ of habeas corpus.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To appeal the district court's denial of his § 2254 petition, Mr. Jones must first
obtain a COA, which is available only if Mr. Jones can establish “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Making this showing
requires Mr. Jones to demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Here, the district court concluded Mr. Jones had failed to meet this
burden and denied him a COA.
3 Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 4
Mr. Jones proceeds pro se. We construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally,
holding them to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). At the same time, “this court has
repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th
Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). As such, “the court cannot take on the
responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and
searching the record.” Kincaid v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, 94 F.4th 936, 947 (10th
Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Jones fails to meet the burden required to obtain a COA. We generally decline
to reach an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Viera, 674
F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to consider arguments for COA that pro se
applicant failed to present in district court); see also McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc.,
287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting our general rule against considering new
arguments on appeal). Here, to the extent we can discern Mr. Jones’s arguments in
support of a COA, they appear to be unrelated to the arguments advanced before the
district court. Specifically, Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 27, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JOSEPH LEE JONES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 24-3182 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-03172-JWL) JAY ARMBRISTER, (D. Kan.)
Respondent - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Petitioner Joseph Lee Jones, a state prisoner in Kansas, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s order dismissing his habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated below, we deny Mr. Jones a COA
and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
Before the district court, Mr. Jones filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging his conviction in the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas. In his
petition, Mr. Jones stated he pleaded guilty and was convicted of forgery and identity
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 2
theft, but that his conviction was illegal. He stated four grounds for relief: first, he
asserted a violation of his rights to due process of law, equal opportunity and protection
under the law, and additional rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act; second,
he claimed a violation of his First Amendment rights; third, he asserted a violation of his
right to access the courts; and finally, he alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment
right “to not be coerced or influence[d].” ROA at 15. Mr. Jones generally alleged those
rights were violated because he was a “sub-class of super-Humanity,” and his access to
communication and ability to conduct research were being impeded. Id. at 12.
The district court found the petition did not comply with the specificity
requirements of Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts. The court stated it was “unable to determine the precise claims
[Mr. Jones] wishe[d] to assert” because “none of the asserted grounds for relief obviously
relate to [his challenged sentence] and the facts asserted in support of each ground do not
obviously relate to the constitutional violation[s] he has alleged.” Id. at 28. The court sua
sponte granted Mr. Jones leave to file an amended petition that complied with the
requirements of Rule 2(c).
Mr. Jones filed an amended petition which again challenged his conviction in the
District Court of Douglas County. However, the petition was missing ten pages of the
required form and did not list any grounds for relief, facts that might have supported such
grounds, or requests for specific relief. The district court dismissed the amended petition
without prejudice because it “fail[ed] to comply with Rule 2(c) and assert[ed] no
particular grounds for relief.” Id. at 78. The court also denied a COA.
2 Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 3
Mr. Jones now requests a COA from this court. In his application for a COA,
Mr. Jones admits that he “asserts facts that are [d]isorganized by his mental health
problems,” but nonetheless argues that “any [r]easonable person can understand that he is
being held beyond his possible sentence without bail.” COA Appl. at 2. In a supplemental
filing, Mr. Jones raises new concerns regarding mail theft, being “held in a K.U. research
facility jail,” and the government’s failure “to properly employ someone whom [sic]
services are to be free.” Supp. COA Appl. at 2, 4. He also argues he “made it clear” to the
district court that he is “being held with the knowledge [he] will be held waiting on a
bed” at a state hospital “for more than [his] probation sentence.” Id. at 3. Mr. Jones asks
for relief in the form of “[r]elease from [j]ail and any other relief such as [dismissal] of
charges maybe.” Id. at 4. Mr. Jones does not discuss the district court’s denial of a COA
nor the content of his petitions for writ of habeas corpus.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To appeal the district court's denial of his § 2254 petition, Mr. Jones must first
obtain a COA, which is available only if Mr. Jones can establish “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Making this showing
requires Mr. Jones to demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Here, the district court concluded Mr. Jones had failed to meet this
burden and denied him a COA.
3 Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 4
Mr. Jones proceeds pro se. We construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally,
holding them to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). At the same time, “this court has
repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th
Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). As such, “the court cannot take on the
responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and
searching the record.” Kincaid v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, 94 F.4th 936, 947 (10th
Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Jones fails to meet the burden required to obtain a COA. We generally decline
to reach an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Viera, 674
F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to consider arguments for COA that pro se
applicant failed to present in district court); see also McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc.,
287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting our general rule against considering new
arguments on appeal). Here, to the extent we can discern Mr. Jones’s arguments in
support of a COA, they appear to be unrelated to the arguments advanced before the
district court. Specifically, Mr. Jones asserts no arguments concerning the dismissal of
his first habeas petition, which alleged violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, nor does he address the district court’s dismissal of his amended
petition for failing to state any grounds for relief. Instead, he asserts he “made it clear” to
the district court he was being held beyond his probation sentence—an argument and
4 Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 5
factual assertion that were not made in either of his petitions before the district court. We
decline to consider the new arguments Mr. Jones raises for the first time in his application
for a COA.
But even if we were to consider Mr. Jones’s arguments on appeal, and liberally
construing Mr. Jones’s COA application as we must, Mr. Jones fails to meet his burden to
obtain a COA. Although Mr. Jones has raised some additional concerns in his COA
application, to the extent we can discern his arguments, none address the validity of his
original petitions nor the soundness of the district court’s dismissal. See generally COA
Appl.; Supp. COA App.; see also In re Allen, No. 08-1464, 2008 WL 9497425, at *1
(10th Cir. Dec. 9, 2008) (unpublished) (denying authorization to file successive § 2254
petition where “we [could not] discern even the basic premise of [petitioner’s]
argument”). In the absence of any argument addressing his underlying petitions or the
district court’s reasoning, we cannot conclude that Mr. Jones has demonstrated that “the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
‘were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336
(quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). Consequently, Mr. Jones has failed to meet the required
burden to obtain a COA.
5 Appellate Case: 24-3182 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2025 Page: 6
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we DENY Mr. Jones’s application for COA and
DISMISS this matter.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge