Jones Stevedoring Co. v. Nippo Kisen Co.

419 F.2d 143, 1969 A.M.C. 2465
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 28, 1969
DocketNo. 22630
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 419 F.2d 143 (Jones Stevedoring Co. v. Nippo Kisen Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones Stevedoring Co. v. Nippo Kisen Co., 419 F.2d 143, 1969 A.M.C. 2465 (9th Cir. 1969).

Opinion

BARNES, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Nippo Kisen Company, Ltd. (hereinafter “Nippo”) and against Jones Stevedoring Company (hereinafter “Jones”).

One Joseph F. Mastro, a longshoreman, was injured aboard the MV HOKYO MARU, a vessel owned by Nippo, while it was berthed in navigable waters of the United States at Stockton, California.

He sought judgment against Nippo based on the negligence of Nippo and the unseaworthiness of the ship. The district court first heard the issue of liability. It found the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of Mastro. It found no negligence on the part of Nippo, and no unseaworthiness of its vessel.

Meanwhile, Nippo had impleaded two third-party defendants: appellant Jones and appellee Stockton Bulk Terminal Company of California (hereinafter “Stockton”), seeking indemnity with respect to any payment to Mastro by way of judgment or settlement (which did not occur), and in addition, attorneys’ fees and costs of defense (which the court, in hearing the remainder of the case, set at “$7,132.90, with court costs and interest from March 4, 1966” (R.T. 139)).

The principal question on this appeal is which of the two third-party defendants, Jones or Stockton, should be required to pay Nippo. A secondary question is the date from which the award of interest was made.

The court below had jurisdiction in admiralty (28 U.S.C. § 1333) and our jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

[145]*145The trial court, on conflicting evidence, determined that Mastro was Jones’ employee (Supp. Finding 1, R. 139).1

Appellant attacks this as a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. It is, perhaps, a little of each. As in various troublesome areas, we frequently find grey areas between the two.

Appellant further urges that the finding is completely erroneous. We cannot agree. A careful perusal of the facts leaves us with no “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” by the district court. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).

And we must, of course, respect Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This requires us to favor the “position of advantage” 2 the trial court holds over an appellate court. That it utilized its advantageous position is demonstrated by its close questioning of witnesses on the very factual issue here involved (R.T. 216-219), and its rulings on evidence (R.T. 209, 230, 231). This is peculiarly the type of case where the trial court’s factual findings should be carefully checked, weighed and considered before being rejected by an appellate court.

Stockton has no stevedores working for it — “The only employees that the Stockton Bulk Terminal Company ever had were the administrative managerial employees. * * * We used Jones to hire the men. * * * The immediate supervision was * * * provided by Jones.” (Gatov.Rep., pp. 5-7.)

Further, Jones carried workmen’s compensation insurance and the report, though signed by Goodwin (Stockton’s employee), was presented to and paid by Jones’ compensation carrier. As the trial court observed: “Ordinarily you don’t make a claim for workmen’s compensation benefits on behalf of an employee if he isn’t an employee.” (R.T. 230-231.) And see LaBolle v. Nitto Line (Jones Stevedoring Co.), 268 F. Supp. 16, 18 (N.D.Cal.1967).

Mastro thought he worked for Jones, “I got my money from Jones Stevedoring Company.” (R.T. 95.)

Further, the Pacific Maritime Association (P.M.A.) is the bargaining agent for various stevedoring companies with the International Longshoremen & Ware-housemen’s Union (I.L.W.U.) (R.T. 47, et seq.) Jones was a member of P.M.A. By the latter’s agreement with I.L.W.U., P.M.A. members could get longshoremen through the I.L.W.U. hiring hall in Stockton. Only members of P.M.A. could do this — Stockton could not “employ” longshoremen, gang bosses or walking bosses from the Union hall.

We quote in the margin from the Brief of Appellee Stockton, which seems accurately to describe the question of control of the longshoremen.3

[146]*146We need add nothing further but to say the determination of the trial court is far from being “completely erroneous.”

As to the award of interest, the question is whether interest should be allowed on defense costs from the time Nippo paid its attorneys, or from the time the award against Jones was made by the court.

Both sides agree this is a matter of judicial discretion. The first portion of the trial was in March 1965, the second portion was May 1967, and the final judgment was entered October 30, 1967. Appellants urge that this delay was “intentional,” and that the court abused its discretion in the award. Appellees first reply that no objection was made below to interest from date of [147]*147shipowner’s payment, and hence the objection was waived, American Home, etc. Co. v. Hargrove, 109 F.2d 86, 87 (10th Cir. 1940); Adams v. United States, 318 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1963), and secondly, that there was no abuse of discretion, it being the court’s duty to grant interest if necessary to provide “just compensation.” President Madison, 91 F.2d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 1937).

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s holding that appellee Nippo was entitled to await a determination in this Circuit of Arista Cia. De Vapores S.A. v. Howard Terminal, 372 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1967), decided February 9, 1967. Had it been decided other than it was, it would have perhaps mooted this case. To pursue the issue immediately would have undoubtedly resulted in additional appeals, and perhaps further delay.

The judgment of the district court is in all respects affirmed.

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