Jones, L. v. Jones, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 1206 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Panella

Opinion

J-A04003-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

LISA JONES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : TORREY JONES : No. 1206 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered August 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-FC-001338-03

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 30, 2026

Lisa Schmidt, formerly Lisa Jones (“Mother”), appeals pro se from the

order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County finding her in contempt of

the custody order. Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

finding her in contempt and awarding Torrey Jones (“Father”) attorney’s fees.

We affirm.

We glean the following facts from the certified record. Mother and Father

have four children together: L.J. (born 2008), K.J. (born 2011), O.J. (born

2012), and G.J. (born 2016) (collectively, “the Children”).1 On November 4,

2024, the court approved a stipulated custody order where Mother had sole

legal custody and primary physical custody of O.J. and G.J., and Father had

____________________________________________

1 Custody of K.J. was not in dispute during these proceedings. Therefore, any

reference to “the Children” in this memorandum excludes K.J. J-A04003-26

sole legal custody and primary physical custody of L.J. and K.J. Under the

agreement, Father had partial physical custody of O.J. and G.J., and Mother

had partial physical custody of L.J. and K.J. on alternate weekends from Friday

evening to Sunday evening.

Father filed a contempt petition on April 24, 2025, and an amended

petition on June 19, 2025, alleging that Mother had been wrongfully

withholding custody.

According to Father’s petition, on April 13, 2025, Father agreed to allow

L.J. to stay in Mother’s custody until Thursday April 17, 2025. Two days later,

Father was visited by a Lebanon County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”)

employee regarding allegations of sexual abuse of G.J.2 The next day, Mother

messaged Father that due to the pending investigation she would not allow

Father to exercise his custody of O.J. and G.J. and she would not be returning

L.J. to his custody.

Mother and Father exchanged messages that they planned on attending

one of the Children’s football games on Saturday April 19, 2025. Father

informed Mother that he intended on retaining custody of L.J. and exercising

his visitation rights for O.J. and G.J. after the game. Mother insisted that

Father first have a recorded conversation with Mother and her now-husband,

Bobby Schmidt (“Stepfather”), which Father rejected. Father did not maintain

2 CYS later determined that the allegations were unfounded.

-2- J-A04003-26

custody after the football game. Over the next couple days, Mother and Father

exchanged messages negotiating the terms of exchanging custody. Father

maintained that he would not meet with Stepfather or have a recorded

conversation. Ultimately, Father did not retain custody.

On April 23, 2025, Mother filed a protection from abuse (“PFA”) petition

against Father on behalf of G.J., claiming sexual abuse. A temporary PFA order

was granted and after multiple continuances, a hearing was held on Friday

May 23, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the PFA petition was denied.

The parties arranged to exchange custody later that evening at a McDonald’s

parking lot.

At the McDonald’s parking lot,

there was initial resistance to the Children getting out of the car for the exchange. Stepfather got out of the car and evidently attempted to demonstrate to Father that the Children were refusing to be exchanged. L.J. ultimately got out of the car and attacked Father, triggering a general melee involving the Children, Father, and Stepfather to varying degrees. Father had to intervene and stop a fight between two of the Children.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/22/25, at 5 (some capitalization provided).

The Derry Township Police responded to the scene. Afterwards,

Stepfather filed a PFA petition against Father on behalf of L.J., O.J., and G.J.

and a temporary PFA order was granted on May 28, 2025. Further, Dauphin

County Social Services for Children and Youth opened an investigation.

A hearing for Father’s contempt petition against Mother was held on

August 1, 2025. At the hearing, Mother represented herself pro se. Mother,

-3- J-A04003-26

Father, and Stepfather testified. Mother attempted to call L.J. as a witness to

testify to “May 23rd and why he does not want to go to his father’s.” N.T.,

8/1/25, at 105. The trial court did not allow L.J. to testify stating “[t]hat’s

custody trial stuff[, t]hat’s not contempt stuff.” Id. at 106.

At the conclusion of the hearing,

[t]he court made a finding of contempt as to Mother. The court ordered that Mother accommodate seven days of make-up custody time for Father as it relates to L.J. and O.J. The court ordered one day of make-up time for G.J. The court established new custody exchange protocols limiting the parties who may be present and limiting the involvement of [S]tepfather in parenting. The court also ordered that Mother pay $2,500.00 in attorney fees to Father’s attorney.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/22/25, at 2.3, 4

Mother timely appealed pro se. Mother and the trial court complied with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).

3 The trial court also specified that,

I find by preponderance of the evidence that there was contempt, that there was knowledge of the contents of the Order, that the Order was intentionally violated, and that . . . it was a material violation.

N.T., 8/1/25, at 123.

4 Although the trial court entered the contempt order on the record at the conclusion of the hearing, “the date on which the clerk ma[de] the notation in the docket that written notice of entry of the order ha[d] been given” was August 6, 2025. Pa.R.A.P. 108(c). Therefore, we consider August 6, 2025, to be the date the order was entered. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (c).

-4- J-A04003-26

At the outset, we must address which issues have been properly

preserved for our review. In her concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal, Mother purported to raise thirteen issues. See Concise Statement,

9/22/25. The “Statement of Questions Involved” section of her brief contains

seven issues. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-6 (pagination added). However, the

argument section of her brief only contains two argument headings with three

subheadings under one heading. See id. at 9-12 (pagination added).

Issues raised in her concise statement that are not set forth and

developed in the argument section of her brief are considered waived for lack

of development. See Interest of D.C., 263 A.3d 326, 336 (Pa. Super. 2021);

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Further, at least two arguments raised in her argument

section were not raised in her concise statement and therefore are waived for

failing to preserve the issue.5 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(4)(vii).

With that in mind, the properly preserved issues that Mother raises on

appeal are that the trial court abused its discretion in finding her in contempt

of the custody order because the custody order, specifically paragraph 20,

was ambiguous, and the trial court failed to properly consider the welfare of

the Children. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-12 (pagination added). Mother also

5 The arguments that Mother raises for the first time in her brief are that the

trial court abused its discretion in finding her in contempt because she did not willfully disobey the custody order and that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding make up custody days. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10, 12-13 (pagination added).

-5- J-A04003-26

claims that the attorney’s fees award was excessive. See id. at 12-14

(pagination added).

“On appeal from an order holding a party in contempt of court, our scope

of review is very narrow, and we place great reliance on the court’s discretion.”

Thomas v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 220, 225 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

“We review custody contempt orders for an abuse of discretion.” E.K. v.

J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 526 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “A trial court

abuses its discretion in entering a custody contempt order if it misapplies the

law, exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason, or does not follow

legal procedure.” Id. (citation omitted). We defer to the credibility

determinations of the trial court. See Harcar v. Harcar, 982 A.2d 1230, 1236

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

“To be in contempt, a party must have violated a court Order, and the

complaining party must satisfy that burden by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Id. at 1234 (citation omitted). “[T]he complainant must prove

certain distinct elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific

order or decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act

constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) that the

contemnor acted with wrongful intent.” J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260, 1264

(Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and brackets omitted).

Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding her in

contempt because the custody order, specifically paragraph 20, was

-6- J-A04003-26

ambiguous, and the trial court failed to properly consider the welfare of the

Children. See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-12 (pagination added).

Paragraph 20 of the stipulated custody agreement states,

20. WELFARE OF THE CHILD TO BE CONSIDERED:

The welfare and convenience of the subject minor children shall be the prime consideration of the parties in any application of the provisions of this Child Custody Stipulation and Agreement. Both parents are directed to listen carefully and consider the wishes of the subject minor children in addressing the custodial schedule, any changes to the schedule, and any other parenting issues.

Custody Agreement, 11/4/24, at ¶ 20.

The trial court explained its consideration of the welfare of the Children.

[T]he court did not conclude that Father harmed the Children. It was Father who initially suffered an unprovoked assault by L.J. at the custody exchange. He later tried to break up a fight between two of the Children. The court did not conclude that he was a risk to the Children. Judge Snyder dismissed the PFA earlier that day, so that was not a finding of abuse. The pending children and youth matter had not resulted in a finding by the date of the hearing in this matter. The PFA of [Stepfather] had not reached a decision in a final hearing by the date of this hearing. The credible testimony of Father was that Mother and [Stepfather] engaged in escalations immediately prior to L.J. assaulting Father by giving him the finger and getting out of the car and using invective. The court was not persuaded that Father presented a risk of harm to the Children. The court understands that Mother has concerns, but the court does not share those concerns based on the evidence it has been presented with.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/25, at 12 (emphasis and some capitalization added).

The trial court found that during the periods when there was no active

CYS investigation or a temporary PFA order, Father posed no risk of harm to

the Children. Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of

-7- J-A04003-26

discretion with the trial court’s findings. Paragraph 20 is not ambiguous about

Mother’s obligation to comply with the custody order. Mother’s concerns for

the Children did not justify unilaterally disobeying the custody order. See

Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711, 719 (Pa. Super. 2002). Mother could

have addressed her concerns by filing a modification petition.6 See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 5338. Therefore, her argument is without merit.

In her final issue Mother challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s

fees. “The imposition of counsel fees can serve as a sanction upon a finding

of civil contempt.” Thomas, 194 A.3d at 226 (citations omitted). “Sanctions

for civil contempt can be imposed for one or both of two purposes: to compel

or coerce obedience to a court order and/or to compensate the contemnor’s

adversary for injuries resulting from the contemnor’s noncompliance with a

court order.” Rhoades v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148, 152 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en

banc) (citation omitted). “Because an award of counsel fees is intended to

reimburse an innocent litigant for expenses made necessary by the conduct

of an opponent, it is coercive and compensatory, and not punitive.” Id.

(citation omitted). “We review an award of contempt sanctions in the form of

6 We note that paragraph 22 of the custody order addressed modifying the custody agreement. It stated that if the parties cannot agree to a modification they may not “follow their own ideas as to what they think the arrangements should be. Absent an agreement to change the terms of the agreement, these terms will determine the rights of each party for custody of the subject minor children until further agreement or [o]rder of [c]ourt.” Custody Agreement, 11/4/24, at ¶ 22.

-8- J-A04003-26

counsel fees for an abuse of discretion.” Thomas, 194 A.3d at 226 (citation

omitted).

Mother argues that the award of attorney’s fees was an inappropriate

sanction because the record does not support the trial court’s contempt

finding. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-14 (pagination added). This argument

amounts to another challenge to the trial court’s contempt decision. Mother

does not set forth a separate argument as to how the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding Father attorney’s fees.

The trial court found Mother in contempt of the custody order, and it

acted within its discretion in awarding Father attorney’s fees to help remedy

Mother’s contempt.7 Therefore, Mother is not entitled to relief.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 03/30/2026

7 The trial court also explained that the amount of attorney’s fees was based

on a “reasonable accounting” provided by Father and its own experience such that “[t]he fees awarded were ordinary and reasonable.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/25, at 13.

-9-