Jones Ex Rel. Jones v. Roundtree

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Jones Ex Rel. Jones v. Roundtree

225 A.2d 877, 1967 D.C. App. LEXIS 124

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedJanuary 19, 1967

Docket3928

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 225 A.2d 877 (Jones Ex Rel. Jones v. Roundtree) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jones Ex Rel. Jones v. Roundtree, 225 A.2d 877, 1967 D.C. App. LEXIS 124 (D.C. 1967).

Pincite

Opinions

QUINN, Associate Judge.

Appellant brought suit in June 1965 to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly resulting from appellee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle in February 1964. His action was dismissed with prejudice in October 1965 for (1) failing to obey an order of the court directing him to appear for a medical examination,¹ and [878]*878(2) failing to appear at trial.² Subsequent motions to vacate the order of dismissal were denied ³ and he appeals.

The facts of this case are not easily determined. On the one hand, appellant’s counsel, Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr., contends that his own injuries and illness prevented him from properly attending to his cases, and that his misprisions were also the result of conflicting engagements, clerical errors, and the general confusion caused by his physical incapacity. On the other hand, appellee’s counsel cites a continuous course of conduct on the part of Mr. Johnson which can only be characterized as a flagrant disregard of the court’s rules and orders.

That the trial court had the power to dismiss this action cannot be questioned. Nor can we say that under the circumstances the dismissal was an abuse of that court’s discretion. Protracting litigation and disregarding the rules and orders of our courts are not to be sanctioned or condoned. We are hesitant, however, to visit the sins of an attorney on his client, especially when that client is a minor.

The record indicates that the conduct of counsel cannot be attributed to appellant. Such “inexcusable” neglect on the part of counsel thus became “excusable” neglect on the part of appellant himself. See L. P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 329 F.2d 234, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 35 (1964). The trial court therefore erred in denying appellant’s timely motion to vacate the dismissal, and its action must be reversed and the cause reinstated. In addition, Mr. Johnson is ordered to pay the sum of one hundred dollars to counsel for appellee as reasonable attorney’s fees. The costs of this appeal shall likewise be taxed against him.

Reversed. Cause reinstated.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

QUINN, Associate Judge.

Appellant brought suit in June 1965 to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly resulting from appellee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle in February 1964. His action was dismissed with prejudice in October 1965 for (1) failing to obey an order of the court directing him to appear for a medical examination,¹ and [878]*878(2) failing to appear at trial.² Subsequent motions to vacate the order of dismissal were denied ³ and he appeals.

The facts of this case are not easily determined. On the one hand, appellant’s counsel, Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr., contends that his own injuries and illness prevented him from properly attending to his cases, and that his misprisions were also the result of conflicting engagements, clerical errors, and the general confusion caused by his physical incapacity. On the other hand, appellee’s counsel cites a continuous course of conduct on the part of Mr. Johnson which can only be characterized as a flagrant disregard of the court’s rules and orders.

That the trial court had the power to dismiss this action cannot be questioned. Nor can we say that under the circumstances the dismissal was an abuse of that court’s discretion. Protracting litigation and disregarding the rules and orders of our courts are not to be sanctioned or condoned. We are hesitant, however, to visit the sins of an attorney on his client, especially when that client is a minor.

The record indicates that the conduct of counsel cannot be attributed to appellant. Such “inexcusable” neglect on the part of counsel thus became “excusable” neglect on the part of appellant himself. See L. P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 329 F.2d 234, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 35 (1964). The trial court therefore erred in denying appellant’s timely motion to vacate the dismissal, and its action must be reversed and the cause reinstated. In addition, Mr. Johnson is ordered to pay the sum of one hundred dollars to counsel for appellee as reasonable attorney’s fees. The costs of this appeal shall likewise be taxed against him.

Reversed. Cause reinstated.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

225 A.2d 877, 1967 D.C. App. LEXIS 124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-ex-rel-jones-v-roundtree-dc-1967.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack